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Abstract: We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it
should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the
controversial “is-ought” inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are
competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but
not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we propose that a clear distinction between normative systems
and competence theories is essential, arguing that equating them invites an “is-ought” inference: to wit, supporting normative
“ought” theories with empirical “is” evidence. We analyze in detail two research programmes with normativist features – Oaksford
and Chater’s rational analysis and Stanovich and West’s individual differences approach – demonstrating how, in each case,
equating norm and competence leads to an is-ought inference. Normativism triggers a host of research biases in the psychology of
reasoning and decision making: focusing on untrained participants and novel problems, analyzing psychological processes in terms
of their normative correlates, and neglecting philosophically significant paradigms when they do not supply clear standards for
normative judgement. For example, in a dual-process framework, normativism can lead to a fallacious “ought-is” inference, in
which normative responses are taken as diagnostic of analytic reasoning. We propose that little can be gained from normativism
that cannot be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis, illustrating our position with Hypothetical Thinking Theory
and the theory of the suppositional conditional. We conclude that descriptivism is a viable option, and that theories of higher
mental processing would be better off freed from normative considerations.
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“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said
the Cat.
“I don’t much care where –”said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.
— Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
1. Logicism and normativism and their
discontents
In everyday life, we are thoroughly accustomed to norma-
tive dictates wherever we turn. When we play chess, we
conform to the rules of the game; when we drive, we try
to heed traffic laws and know we would be sanctioned if
we disobeyed them. In some countries, language is norma-
tively regulated – L’Acade´mie franc¸aise is a prominent
example. Voluntary or governmental bodies, such as the
Advertising Standards Authority in the United Kingdom,
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impose normative constraints on advertisements. And
occasionally, normative issues find their way into scientific
theories, as well.
The research literature in higher mental processing –
reasoning, judgement, and decision making – is rife with
normative considerations. In the study of human reason-
ing, these considerations have traditionally taken the
form of logicism – the idea that thinking (1) reflects
some internalized form of extensional, classical logic and
(2) should be measured against classical logic as a norma-
tive system (Evans 2002) and ought in some clearly evalua-
tive sense to conform with it (see Appendix for
terminological clarifications). We will dub these two dis-
tinct meanings empirical versus prescriptive logicism,
respectively. Inhelder and Piaget hold the dubious title
of prototype logicists: In their monograph on the formal
operations stage of cognitive development (Inhelder &
Piaget 1958), they argued that normal adolescents and ulti-
mately adults attain the ability to reason according to the
rules of formal classical logic.
Half a century on, logicism in both its forms is not nearly
as dominant in reasoning research as it used to be. Peter
Wason’s seminal work in the 1960s and ’70s was motivated
by an attack on empirical logicism in a period dominated
by Piagetian theory. In support of this, he devised
several ingenious reasoning problems, including the 2-4-
6 task (Wason 1960), the much researched selection task
(e.g., Wason 1966), and the THOG problem (Wason &
Brooks 1979). However, Wason never seemed to doubt
that human reasoning should conform to classical logic
(i.e., prescriptive logicism), so that his interpretation of
the many logical errors observed on his tasks was that
people are illogical and therefore irrational (see Evans
[2002] for a detailed account). Following the critique of
Cohen (1981), however, later researchers began to ques-
tion whether logic was the right normative system
against which to judge the rationality of people’s reason-
ing, so that prescriptive logicism also came under attack.
Some researchers have proposed that we should adopt
alternative normative systems such as those based on
information, probability, or decision theory (e.g., Oaksford
& Chater 1991; 1998a; 2007), while others proposed that
at least some forms of rationality need not necessarily
require a normative system at all (e.g., Evans 1993;
2002; Evans & Over 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten 2001).
By this position, organisms are rational if they act in
such a manner as to achieve personal goals, and such
rationality need not involve any normative rule following.
Our concern here is not with logicism per se; in our
view, logicism is but a special case of a more general atti-
tude. Consider the empirical and prescriptive tenets of
logicism. We could easily substitute for the word logic a
name of another normative system, such as Bayesian
probability:
Empirical logicism: Thinking reflects logic.
Prescriptive logicism: Rational thinking should be
measured against logic as a normative system.
Empirical Bayesianism: Thinking reflects Bayesian
probability.
Prescriptive Bayesianism: Rational thinking should be
measured against Bayesian probability as a normative
system.
Our own take on this is that both logicism and Bayesian-
ism are special cases of the same paradigm. We call this
paradigm normativism; analogous to what Stein (1996)
calls “the standard picture,” it can be formulated in
terms closely related to the ones we have already exam-
ined. These are:
Empirical normativism: Thinking reflects S.
Prescriptive normativism: Rational thinking should be
measured against S as a normative system, and ought
to conform to it.
Here S is a formal normative system such as logic (classical
or otherwise), Bayesian probability, or decision theory.
Note that a formal theory is not necessarily a normative
theory unless taken as such by a specific normativist
account. For example, extensional logic can be conceived
as a useful computational tool rather than a normative stan-
dard for human reasoning. The notable exception is Subjec-
tive Expected Utility (SEU), which was developed with a
normative goal in the first place (Savage 1954, p. 19; von
Neumann & Morgenstern 1947, pp. 8–9). Taken in this
sense, widely diverse research programmes can be said to
be normativist. For example, much of the judgement and
decision making (JDM) literature is normativist in the pre-
scriptive (albeit not in the empirical) sense, with SEU
playing the role of the normative system. Even the most
famous (and Nobel Prize–winning) descriptive theory of
risky decision making – the prospect theory of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) – was framed as a demonstration that
the standard normative account provided by decision and
probability theory failed to accurately describe human
economic behaviour.
The prescriptive and empirical tenets of normativism
can be considered as vectors defining a two-dimensional
space, which makes normativism (and its subordinate
paradigms, such as logicism and Bayesianism) a matter
of varying degrees. Figure 1 maps out the normative
space defined by empirical and prescriptive normativism,
respectively, on which we have placed a number of
leading authors for illustrative purposes. We realize that
some readers would wish to debate the exact coordinates
assigned, but that is not important for our purposes
here. Note that the right-hand side – the high prescriptive
side – of Figure 1 is much more crowded. This is hardly
surprising. Historically, positions of prescriptive normati-
vism tend to survive longer than positions of empirical
normativism, because – for reasons we will explore
later – they are much more difficult to eliminate. Two
notable examples are, as already indicated, Wason’s rejec-
tion of empirical logicism while continuing to uphold
prescriptive logicism (Evans 2002), and the heuristics
and biases programme of Tversky and Kahneman (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky 1979). But a consequence of such
a line of argument is that one must conclude people to
be irrational. That is why those who feel that people
should be rational have proposed alternative normative
systems (e.g., Cohen 1981).
Note, too, that the upper-left quadrant of the normative
space mapped out in Figure 1 is empty, highlighting that
there is no coherent way of proposing high empirical nor-
mativism with low prescriptive normativism. In other
words, the existence of a normative system is a necessary
(albeit not sufficient) condition for the empirical facts of
satisfying this system.
Empirical normativism can vary, from hardcore pos-
itions which consider thought processes to be isomorphic
to the normative system (e.g., Inhelder and Piaget’s formal
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operations), to positions which reject the normative system
entirely. For example, Gigerenzer (e.g., Gigerenzer et al.
1999) famously repudiates any form of normative
system, arguing that heuristic rules of thumb outperform
normative computations. In between are positions which
might be termed “soft logicism,” and which postulate
that some logical principles, such as non-contradiction,
might underlie some thinking, but only to a limited
extent (e.g., Over 2007). Prescriptive normativism can
vary according to factors such as the a priori status of
the normative system, the position famously advocated
by the philosophers Jonathan Cohen (1981) and Daniel
Dennett (1987). Psychologists tend more to regard select-
ing the appropriate normative system as an empirical
issue, a view shared by authors leading such diverse
research programmes as Oaksford and Chater’s rational
analysis, which focuses on modal responses as a source
for normative evaluations (Oaksford & Chater 1998a;
2007), and the earlier phase of Stanovich’s individual
differences programme (Stanovich 1999), which focused
on the normatively superior performance of cognitively
able participants. We discuss the problems with this
approach in section 4, and examine these research pro-
grammes in further detail in section 5.
Another factor that may vary is whether conformity to a
normative system is considered both necessary and suffi-
cient for rationality, or only necessary – the latter seems
to be more common. Positions high on prescriptive norma-
tivism are also typically universalist, explicitly or implicitly
taking the view that there is just one “right,” all-encom-
passing normative system, and all the others are
“wrong.” However, this can still vary to some extent,
with some authors (Oaksford & Chater 1998a; 2007) advo-
cating one normative system across the board, while others
are willing to accept a different normative solution for each
specific task (Stanovich 1999; 2004; Stanovich & West
2000b). A relativist position of the sort famously advocated
by Stich (1990), and to some extent by Baron (2008) and
by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008), would place
these programmes lower on prescriptive normativism.
In what follows, our main concern is with the prescrip-
tive tenet of normativism – the belief that people ought to
conform to a normative standard – although we have a few
things to say about empirical normativism as well. Our
thesis is that prescriptive normativism is both problematic
and unnecessary in scientific studies of human thinking.
We start by outlining what we mean by normativism in
reasoning and decision-making research, and how it
differs from other forms of rationality. We then examine
the possible relations between normative systems and
psychological evidence, focusing in particular on the
thorny problem of arbitration – that is, cases of conflict
between competing normative systems. It will become
clear that we have no quarrel with the use of formal the-
ories per se, provided that they are used in a descriptive
rather than normative manner.
We shall discuss several problems that normativist
thinking has created. First, research programmes have
been used to derive normative claims from empirical evi-
dence, relying on the controversial inference from is to
ought. We illustrate this with discussion of two leading
research programmes in the study of human thinking.
Next, we argue that normativism has systematically and
harmfully biased the scientific study of thinking, affecting
Figure 1. Two-vector normativist space with sample references.
Note: Emp. Norm. ¼ Empirical normativism: Thinking reflects normative system, S.
Pres. Norm. ¼ Prescriptive normativism: Thinking should be measured against S as a normative system and ought to conform to it.
(For reasons of space, each research programme is identified in the figure by a single sample reference.)
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what is studied, how it is studied, and how findings are
interpreted. We illustrate these further by discussion of
the particular problems that normativist thinking has
created in the study of dual processes in higher cognition.
Finally, we argue that normativism is unnecessary: A
descriptive approach aided by computational analysis can
address all the relevant scientific questions, ridding the
field of the research biases we discuss. We hence conclude
that theories of reasoning, judgement, and decision
making would be better off liberated from normative
goals and augmented by a descriptivist agenda.
2. Normativism, rationality, and the three
senses of “ought”
Normative rationality is not the only type. Here are some
of the other concepts of rationality to be found in the lit-
erature (also see Nickerson 2008, for a recent review):
Instrumental rationality: Behaving in such a way as to
achieve one’s personal goals.
Bounded rationality: Behaviour that is adaptive within
the constraints of cognitive and biological capacity.
Ecological rationality: Behaviour that is adapted to the
environment in which the organism is operating.
Evolutionary rationality: Behaviour that has been
shaped by evolution and which serves the purpose of
the genes.
What seems to set apart normative rationality from
other types of rationality is the “oughtness” involved in
normativism. Bounded rationality, for example, is not
bounded because it ought to be so. Instead, there are
just biological limits to how large brains can grow and
how much information and how many computational
algorithms they can store and execute. There is no “ought-
ness” to the Darwinian and Skinnerian algorithms that
shape ecological rationality either. Adaptation to the
environment is an “is,” not an “ought.” Darwinian prin-
ciples are like Newton’s laws of mechanics. Unsupported
objects fall to the earth not because they ought to, but
because that is what the laws of physics dictate. In the
same way, there appears to be no scientific justification
for “intelligent design” in evolution. Organisms develop
adaptations in accordance with the laws of natural and
sexual selection in much the same way as apples fall off
trees in compliance with the law of gravity.
A possible argument here is that oughtness is part of what
biological function is about; that the idea of function is basi-
cally a normative one.1 Often this argument is couched in
adaptationist terms; for example, that the heart has a
“proper function” (in the terminology suggested by Ruth
Millikan; e.g., Millikan 1984; 1995; 1996) to pump the
blood, which is what it was selected for and therefore
what it ought to do (although cf. Fodor 2008; and for
response, Dennett 2008). One could even take this argu-
ment further and maintain that, by losing oughtness, we
lose our ability to talk about function at all, biological, econ-
omic, or otherwise.2 However, our point is that functional
“ought” is a different type of ought than the one involved
in normativism. Ought, and its close relations must and
should, can take at least three different meanings. Consider:
1. Poverty should not exist.
2. You must take the second exit from the roundabout.
3. Ron should be able to catch the 4:25 to Birmingham.
Meanings (1) and (2) are deontic: they express evalu-
ation and obligation; meaning (3), on the other hand, is
epistemic, expressing belief or probability. In addition,
there is a difference between the deontic function of (1),
which is evaluative, and of (2), which is to direct a specific
course of action. (Schurz [1997] makes a related distinction
between what he terms “normative” and “valuative,”
roughly equivalent to our directive and evaluative sense,
respectively.) In everyday discourse, the directive and eva-
luative oughts are often combined, as in “I ought to donate
to Oxfam.” However, as (2) demonstrates, these two deontic
senses can be distinguished. Directive oughts are generally
instrumental3 – for example, we need to take that second
exit because it would bring us to our destination.
The “ought” of normativism is evaluative: it resembles
(1). In contrast, the “ought” of selection-for and of func-
tional analysis in general is directive, as in (2). There was
no normative obligation for nature to select hearts for
pumping. Natural selection can be said to contain a direc-
tive ought in the sense that function constrains (at least to
some extent) evolution; what it does not have is the evalua-
tive ought. With this caveat in place, we have no argument
with the rational analysis approach of Anderson (1990),
whose main thesis is that rationality is best understood
by formal task analysis. We do not need to take a position
in the debate over the role of adaptations in evolution (see,
e.g., Gould & Lewontin 1979; and then Fodor 2008 and
Dennett 2008, respectively) to be wary of normativism.
Within bounds, behaviour is likely to be adaptive, so that
analysis of the task and its environment may well be
helpful in developing a formal account of human behav-
iour. Insofar as a research programme asks, as Oaksford
and Chater’s does in their adaptation of Anderson, which
of several formal systems is most helpful to achieve one’s
goals, this falls under our definition of directive ought. It
is only when formal systems are regarded as having
a priori, unconditional value that the “ought” becomes
an evaluative one. This is a very different argument than
the one that leads from rational analysis to normative
theory, and that, too, is part of Oaksford and Chater’s
research programme (see sect. 5).
With this distinction in mind, we can now rephrase
some of the debate over instrumental rationality. The sep-
aration proposed by Evans and Over (1996) between
instrumental and normative rationality (i.e., achieving
one’s goals versus obeying a normative system, respect-
ively) has been contested by various authors. Oaksford
and Chater (1998a; 2007) objected on the grounds that
instrumental rationality needs to be justified, and that
this justification should be normative, hence obliterating
the boundaries between normative and instrumental
rationality. In the terminology proposed here, Oaksford
and Chater see the directive ought as inseparable from
the evaluative ought, whereas we argue that these two
senses are best kept apart.
So it appears to us that normativism is neither necessary
nor helpful in discussions of function, adaptation, and eco-
logical and instrumental rationality. Our task as scientists is
to observe what people do and to construct and test the-
ories of how they do it. That behaviour is typically well
adapted and that people typically achieve their personal
goals (with many exceptions, of course), can be described
in some terms as “rational,” but without recourse to any
normative theory of what people ought to be doing. It is
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an observation to be accounted for, rather than obligation
to be fulfilled.
3. Normative systems and the problem
of arbitration
For a normativist position to be coherent, in particular the
prescriptive tenet, it has to have a selective notion of norm:
There is a “right” or “appropriate” normative system for
a paradigm (or even all across the board), and there
are “wrong” ones. Nozick (1993), for example, argues for
“nomic universals” – scientific law–like statements,
suggesting that norms cannot be particular. In some
areas of cognition, deciding on the appropriate norm –
and the closely related notion of error – does not seem
to pose a practical problem. In most memory paradigms,
for example, an error is when one falsely identifies a new
stimulus as previously presented, or fails to identify an
old stimulus – a practice that goes back to Ebbinghaus
and the earliest days of experimental psychology. For psy-
chologists, the problem becomes acute when one tries to
adopt this sort of “signal detection” paradigm to reasoning
and decision-making research, and this is where consensus
on the normative system conspicuously fails. But without
a clear-cut norm, normativism becomes far shakier.
Normativism thus faces a problem when more than one
normative system seems to fit the bill; Evans (1993) calls
this the “normative system problem”; Stanovich (1999),
“the inappropriate norm argument” (see also Cohen
1981; 1982; Gigerenzer 1991; Lopes 1991). Deciding on
an appropriate normative system for any set of experimen-
tal findings is, more often than not, far from obvious.
Indeed, in contrast to memory, one is hard put to find
an experimental paradigm in reasoning and decision
making that has just one obvious norm to compare
against and no competing alternative norms. In the follow-
ing, we propose a typology of three normative situations,
based on the nature and number of competing normative
accounts of a particular experimental paradigm. Of the
three types, two involve normative conflict and one
involves no conflict. Table 1 summarizes them.
With one established norm and no conflict, single-norm
paradigms seem to offer the prototypical normativist situ-
ation. In other cognitive research domains, single-norm
paradigms are indeed both basic and ubiquitous. Thus,
in memory, in signal detection, and in most theory-of-
mind paradigms, what is “right” and what is “wrong” is
ordinarily beyond dispute. Either there is (for example)
a visual signal or there isn’t: the experimental environment
is constructed so as to obviate the question. Not so,
however, in reasoning and decision making, where
single-norm paradigms are increasingly rare. One of the
few remaining single-norm paradigms in reasoning
seems to be conditional inference, or, more specifically,
conditional elimination inferences. Such inferences are
typically comprised of a “major” conditional premise of
the form, if p, then q, and a categorical premise (e.g., p).
The conclusion is categorical, eliminating the conditional
form. There are also conditional introduction inferences,
in which the conditional form is the conclusion of the
inference rather than (one of) its premise(s). Table 2 pre-
sents several types of conditional inference.
The conditional elimination inferences constitute a
single-norm paradigm: Regardless of one’s theoretical pos-
ition, MP (Modus Ponens) and MT (Modus Tollens) are
generally considered valid types of inference, whereas
DA (Denial of the Antecedent) and AC (Affirmation of
the Consequent) are invalid. Although this validity can
and has been contested under specific conditions (e.g.,
McGee 1985), experimental paradigms are generally con-
structed to avoid these conditions. However, this is only
half the story. When conditional inference is viewed as a
whole, normative considerations are by no means uncon-
troversial. For example, the paradoxes of material impli-
cation (again, see Table 2) are the subject of some
intensive dispute, considered valid in mental model
theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 2002; Schroyens 2010)
but deemed invalid in probabilistic approaches (e.g.,
Evans et al. 2005; Oaksford & Chater 2007). Hence,
when participants judge the paradoxes as invalid (Pfeifer
& Kleiter 2011), mental model theory judges their
response as erroneous, whereas probabilistic approaches
regard the same response as perfectly normative (and
see Over et al. [2010] for discussion of another type of con-
ditional introduction inference with conflicting normative
judgements).
While the conditional elimination inferences can be
considered single-norm, conditional introduction infer-
ences, then, are subject to dispute. We call these alterna-
tive-norm paradigms. Extensively covered by Stanovich
(1999), alternative-norm paradigms are far more prevalent
in the psychology of reasoning and JDM (judgement and
decision making). In a typical debate of this type, a stan-
dard account of a particular observation competes with
another, alternative account (or accounts), making an
observed behaviour normatively rational according to the
latter but not according to the former (and vice versa).
Examples of alternative-norm paradigms are legion (Sta-
novich [1999] reviews some classic alternative-norm para-
digms; Hahn & Warren [2009] review some recent such
developments in JDM). The longer a paradigm is
studied, the more it tends to have alternative normative
systems proposed.
Table 1. The three types of normative conflict
Type Conflict/No conflict Number/Type of norms involved Example(s)
Single No Conflict One Conditional elimination inference
Alternative Conflict One Standardþ at least one alternative Conditional introduction inference
Wason selection task
Multiple Conflict Several, equally standard Metadeduction
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The classic case is probably the Wason selection task
(Wason 1966), a hypothesis-testing task designed to test
understanding of the logic of conditionals. In the abstract
version of this famous task, participants are presented with
four cards bearing values, such as A, G, 3, and 7, and are
given a conditional rule of the general form, if p, then q,
such as: “If there is an A on one side of the card, then
there is a 3 on the other side.” Their task is to turn over
all the cards – and only the cards – that need to be exam-
ined in order to decide whether the rule is true or false.
The task is notoriously difficult in its standard, abstract
form (for a recent review, see Evans & Over 2004). Only
about 10% of participants (of higher IQ) typically find
the standard normative solution: p and not-q (which in
this example would be A and 7; A because a not-3
number on the other side would disprove the rule, and 7
because an A on the other side would do the same).
However, Wason’s normative departure point was logicist:
the material conditional of the propositional calculus,
according to which a conditional statement if p, then q
is true whenever q is true or p is false. When measured
against alternative normative systems, such as decision
theory (Manktelow & Over 1991), Bayesian probability
or information theory (Oaksford & Chater 1994; 1996),
or default logics (Stenning & van Lambalgen 2008), the
prevalent choices can be argued to be rational. For
example, Oaksford and Chater (e.g., 1994; 2007) argue
that participants select the optimal information in order
to decide whether q depends on p or not, and are therefore
normatively rational in terms of gaining information.
Clearly, alternative-norm paradigms pose a major chal-
lenge for normativism. If there is just one “correct” norma-
tive system, what are the mechanisms to arbitrate between
the competing accounts? Another problem with the
alternative-norm paradigm is that what makes one
account “standard” and the other “alternative” is often
hard to determine. Why, for example, should classical
logic be considered “standard,” in the case of the selection
task, and information theory considered “alternative”?
Because classical logic was the first proposed or has
been around the longest? Oaksford and Chater (2007)
have recently argued that Bayesian probability is becom-
ing the dominant paradigm in cognitive science. If this is
true, then the current Kuhnian paradigm for the selection
task is probabilistic, but the original normative system –
and the one that has been around longest – is deductive.
So which should we view as the standard and which the
alternative?
The problem becomes even more striking when we con-
sider multiple-norm paradigms, in which there are several
normative systems available but none that appears to be
standard. For example, consider the reasoning literature
on metadeduction (e.g., Byrne & Handley 1997; Byrne
et al. 1995; Elqayam 2006; Rips 1989; Schroyens et al.
1999). In this paradigm, participants are presented with
the Island of Knights and Knaves, whose inhabitants are
either knaves (liars) or knights (truth-tellers). The task is
to identify the speakers based on their statements. It is
generally (albeit implicitly) assumed in the metadeduction
literature that statements can be assigned truth-value
based on partial information; for example, that one false
conjunct is sufficient to make a conjunction false (so its
speaker can be identified as a knave). But consider this
sentence: “I am a knave, and snow is black,” described
by most participants as indeterminate (Elqayam 2006). Is
such a response erroneous, then? The difficulty is that
the statement “I am a knave” is paradoxical: it is a
version of the Liar paradox (e.g., Martin 1984). The
issue now becomes evaluation of sentences with paradox-
ical constituents – which brings us to many-valued logics.
As Elqayam (2003) argued, given the plethora of
many-valued logics (for reviews, see Gottwald 2001;
Rescher 1969), there is little ground for preferring one
type of system over the other.
Table 2. Types of conditional inference
Inference type Form Example
Conditional elimination
inference
Modus Ponens (MP) If p then q If it snows then the path will be icy
p It snows
Therefore, q Therefore, the path is icy
Denial of the Antecedent (DA) If p then q If it snows then the path will be icy
Not p It does not snow
Therefore, not q Therefore, the path is not icy
Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) If p then q If it snows then the path will be icy
q The path is icy
Therefore, p Therefore, it snows
Modus Tollens (MT) If p then q If it snows then the path will be icy
Not q The path is not icy




Paradox 1 q The path is icy
Therefore, if p then q Therefore, if it snows then the path will
be icy
Paradox 2 Not p It does not snow
Therefore, if p then q Therefore, if it snows then the path will
be icy
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The (increasing) scarcity of single-norm paradigms in
reasoning and decision making poses a major problem for
normativism, as the latter depends on an agreed norm
for assessment. Psychologists can, of course, and do get
involved in arguments about which norm is right –
perhaps an odd activity for empirical scientists. In fact,
the temptation to which they often succumb is to try to
resolve the issue empirically. But this leads them into the
questionable form of argumentation that involves is-
ought inference, discussed below. First, we clarify the
status of formal theories and their role in empirical science.
4. The computational, the competent, and
the normative
From the foregoing discussion, the reader might have
formed the impression that we reject formal systems
entirely in favour of purely processing accounts. However,
our objection is not to formal systems per se, but to their
use as normative systems; it is the deontic, evaluative
“ought” that we caution against. We have no problem
with formal systems as competence or computational-
level systems. Indeed, each of us separately has previously
used formal systems as a major source of inspiration to con-
struct a psychological theory, albeit on the computational
rather than normative level. For example, Evans and
Over (2004) utilized the suppositional conditional (Edging-
ton 1995; 2008); Elqayam (2006) used Kripke’s (1975)
theory of truth. We did so in much the same way that
Chomskyan grammar provided and still provides inspi-
ration to psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic research.
(We will take this up again in more detail in section 7.)
This distinction between competence theory and nor-
mative theory is paramount to our argument. To illustrate
it, we will start with linguistics, where a tradition going
back to De Saussure (1916/1966) clearly separates
descriptive from normative accounts in favour of the
former. Here is a classic example. Consider double nega-
tion, as in “I don’t know nothing.” Countless primary
school teachers have lectured countless generations that
double negation is not “Good English”. However, double
negation is part of the grammar in some variants of
English, such as African American Vernacular English
(AAVE): A theory seeking to describe the linguistic
competence of AAVE speakers would have to include it.
Double negation, then, is part of a competence theory of
AAVE, although it falls outside normative grammar.
While descriptive competence theories aim to describe
the rules of language actually used by speakers, normative
approaches aim to regulate speech in particular ways,
sometimes motivated by a social, educational, or political
agenda that has little to do with the way human language
works. For example, Mustafa Kemal Atatu¨rk’s reform of
the Turkish language, “purging” it of centuries of Arabic
influence (Lewis 1999), was grounded in nationalist
normativism.
There are quite a few categorizations of levels of inquiry
in the cognitive literature (for a review, see Stanovich
1999), but Chomsky’s and Marr’s are probably the most
influential ones in cognitive science, so we will limit our-
selves to these two. We use the term competence here in
the Chomskyan sense (e.g., Chomsky 1965), which is to
say, a structural description of abstract knowledge that is
quite value-free (although cf. Harris 1980; 1981). “Compe-
tence” is not intended to be contrasted with “incompe-
tence,” but rather with performance, that is, the
instantiation of linguistic competence in actual speech.
The Chomskyan notion of competence is parallel to
Marr’s (1982) conception of the computational level of
analysis – the level that describes what is being computed
and why (e.g., the rules of arithmetic). Marr himself noted
the analogue to Chomsky; what Marr’s conception adds is
the notion of function, which (as we have seen in sect. 2)
has implications for our discussion. Additionally, Marr out-
lined an algorithmic level of analysis, which describes how
the function is being computed (e.g., the calculator’s chip).
This is roughly analogous to the Chomskyan performance
(although the latter is more heterogeneous; see Jackendoff
2002). This computational/algorithmic (or competence/
performance) distinction is akin to the veteran product/
process distinction, respectively: The structural descrip-
tion of the output (product) function is featured on the
computational or competence level, while the actual pro-
cesses involved in a specific task are on the algorithmic
or performance level. [Marr also introduced a third
level, the implementational (hardware/wetware) level,
but this is not relevant to our discussion here.]
The essence of the difference between normative and
computational/competence theories is in their respective
research questions. As Marr noted, an algorithmic theory
asks “how is. . .” questions; for example, how is a decision
made in various frame contexts. A descriptive competence
theory asks “what is. . .” questions; for example, what is the
relation between the negative particle and the verb phrase
in AAVE. A normative theory asks evaluative “ought”
questions: “What ought to be the good use of negation in
language?” A normative approach contains an element of
evaluation, a sense of “goodness” and “badness,” of
“right” and “wrong,” that is absent from a purely compe-
tence account. In short, normative theories are “ought”-
type theories; computational theories are “is”-type the-
ories. Note that competence theories and performance
theories are both descriptive – what they share is the is.
In conclusion, our position is that the normative and the
descriptive functions of competence theories are best kept
strictly separate, as they are in mainstream linguistics. At
the very least, it is not obvious that norm and competence
are one and the same, and we suggest that the burden of
proof is on anyone contesting the distinction. We therefore
conceptualize competence-level explanations – alongside
algorithmic-level explanations – as descriptive, “is”-type the-
ories, rather than normative, “ought”-type theories. We will
argue that failing to distinguish between is and ought inevi-
tably invites a highly controversial type of inference. We now
turn to examine this inference and its consequences.
5. Inferring ought from is
Differentiating between normative and competence
accounts might not have mattered all that much were it
not for the problem of arbitrating between competing nor-
mative accounts. As noted above, normativism has to be
selective: where there are alternative systems, only one
of them is “appropriate” (what Stanovich 1999 calls “the
inappropriate norm argument”). However, with alterna-
tive-norm and multiple-norm paradigms, arbitrating
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between competing normative systems is both crucial and
far from easy. This is where the difference between nor-
mative and competence theories becomes critical. Compe-
tence theories are descriptive and can hence be supported
by descriptive evidence. In contrast, can one support nor-
mative theory with descriptive evidence? Can one infer
the ought from the is?
The short answer is “no”. Inferring an “ought”-type con-
clusion from “is”-type premises is highly controversial, and
considered by many authors to be a logical fallacy. First
identified by Hume (1739–1740/2000; although cf.
MacIntyre 1959), is-ought inference is made whenever
we attempt to derive a normative or evaluative conclusion
from descriptive premises (although cf. Frankena 1939;
Searle 1964; Williams 1985). For example:
Human beings have natural fear of heights.
Therefore, we should not fly in airplanes.
Since the premise has no normative value, inferring a nor-
mative conclusion is argued to be fallacious. Is-ought
inference is closely related to what is called the “naturalis-
tic fallacy” (Moore 1903): deriving ethical norms from
natural phenomena; for example, deriving ethics from
evolution. The term is sometimes extended to any sort of
evaluative norm derived from natural observation, and in
that sense it overlaps to a great extent with is-ought infer-
ence. Our airplane example is problematic both in the is-
ought sense and in the naturalistic sense. Note that one
can argue that there is an implicit normative premise:
the belief that we should act according to our natural
emotions, including fear. With the implicit premise made
explicit as a second premise, the normative term is included
in the premises, and the argument no longer a fallacy.
However, identifying – and justifying – the implicit
“ought” premise can be rather tricky.
We should clarify at this stage that the is-ought question
is a highly polemical one; whether it is always a fallacy is
much contested in the philosophical literature (for
reviews, see Hudson 1969; Schurz 1997). However, none
of the proposed solutions suggests that is-ought inference
is universally valid; solutions typically specify a set of con-
ditions under which it is valid (e.g., for constitutive rules
only; Searle 1964). Cases that fall outside these conditions
are indisputably invalid. Whether these conditions apply
in the case of normativism is moot (Elqayam 2011), and
we propose that the burden of proof is on normativism.
We therefore submit that it is preferable to avoid such infer-
ence entirely. To do so, we must confine ourselves to com-
petence, and not normative, theories. In what follows, we
will look in detail into two examples of is-ought inference,
both made by prominent normativist research programmes:
Oaksford and Chater’s (1998a; 2007) rational analysis pro-
gramme, and Stanovich and West’s (Stanovich 1999; Stano-
vich & West 2000b) individual differences research
programme. We have chosen to focus on these two
examples because they are high profile and well respected
in the literature. Indeed, we ourselves admire both of
these programmes in many respects. However, we also
contend that each involves evaluative normativist thinking
and a form of is-ought inference.
5.1. Oaksford and Chater’s Bayesian rational analysis
Since the early 1990s (Oaksford & Chater 1991), and culmi-
nating in their recent book, Bayesian Rationality (2007),
Oaksford and Chater have pioneered a research pro-
gramme that strongly rejects logicism in both its forms,
empirical and prescriptive, and endeavours to replace it
with another normativist framework, namely Bayesianism.
Throughout this period, Oaksford and Chater have advo-
cated in no uncertain terms both empirical and prescriptive
Bayesianism – that is to say, the idea that human thinking is
both grounded in Bayesian probability and normatively jus-
tified by it. Paradoxically, the very rejection of logicism puts
Oaksford and Chater at a rather high level of prescriptive
normativism. They leave little doubt that their research
agenda is fully committed to normativism in its Bayesian
form. Adopting Anderson’s (1990; 1991) framework of
rational analysis, which opts for computational-level task
analysis in preference to processing account, they maintain
that the evolutionary success of human behaviour has to be
explained by a computationally adequate normative theory,
the basic principles of which are probabilistic. Oaksford
and Chater also maintain that the computational level
“must be normatively justified” (Oaksford & Chater
1998a, p. 6). Their argument can be simplified as follows:
Premise 1: People behave in a way that approximates
Bayesian probability (“is”).
Premise 2: This behaviour is successfully adaptive (“is”).
Conclusion: Therefore, Bayesian probability is the
appropriate normative system (“ought”).
In what seems to be a classic is-ought inference, “is”-type
evidence is brought to bear on an “ought”-type conclusion
(also see Schroyens 2009). Indeed, Oaksford and Chater
(2007) are quite explicit about this:
The empirical approach to rationality aims to interpret
people’s reasoning behaviour so that their reasoning makes
sense . . . [T]he formal standards of rationality appropriate
for explaining some particular cognitive process or aspect of
behaviour are not prior to, but rather developed as part of,
the explanation of empirical data. (p. 31)
They make a clear distinction between “formal” and
“everyday” rationality. Whereas everyday rationality is
instrumentally defined by “people’s beliefs and actions in
specific circumstances” (2007, p. 19), formal rationality is
normatively defined by “formal principles of good reason-
ing” (2007, p. 21):
[In] addition to this informal, everyday sense of rationality, . . .
the concept of rationality also has another root, linked not to
human behaviour, but to mathematical theories of good reason-
ing, such as logic and probability. According to these calculi,
rationality is defined, in the first instance, in terms of confor-
mity with specific formal principle, rather than in terms of suc-
cessful behaviour in the everyday world. (2007, p. 21)
Note how formal rationality is defined in evaluative
terms (“good reasoning”) and contrasted with successful
behaviour. This seems to be the missing evaluative ought
link. The evaluative position is then even more clearly
laid out in the following:
[I]f everyday rationality is viewed as basic, assessing rationality
appears to be down to intuition. There is a danger here of
losing any normative force to the notion of rationality – if
rationality is merely conformity to each other’s predominant
intuitions, then being rational is like a musician being in
tune. On this view, rationality has no absolute significance. . ..
But there is a strong intuition that rationality is not like this at
all – that there is some absolute sense in which some reasoning
or decision-making is good, and other reasoning and decision-
making is bad. (Oaksford & Chater 2007, pp. 24–25; italics
ours)
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With this statement, Oaksford and Chater inject a strong
note of evaluation into the debate; they make it quite
clear that their normative agenda is evaluative, and that
evaluative cannot be boiled down to instrumental. A
little further on, they explicitly reject a purely instrumental
account of rationality:
An alternative normative grounding for rationality seems intui-
tively appealing: good everyday reasoning and decision-making
should lead to successful action. For example, from an evol-
utionary perspective, we might define success as inclusive
fitness, and argue that behaviour is rational to the degree
that it tends to increase inclusive fitness. But now the notion
of rationality seems to collapse into a more general notion of
adaptiveness. (2007, p. 26; italics in original)
Finally, Oaksford and Chater make a point of arguing that
any adaptively rational behaviour should be justified in
terms of some normative system (Oaksford & Chater
1998a, pp. 291–97; 2007, pp. 30–31); otherwise, they
maintain, its rationality is meaningless.
It seems, then, that what Oaksford and Chater propose
is a circle of normativity, in which formal rationality nor-
matively justifies everyday rationality (evaluative ought),
while everyday rationality provides empirical evidence
for formal rationality (epistemic ought). With this dual
mechanism in place, there seems to be no is-ought infer-
ence involved. We have already noted that what appears
to be an is-ought inference can be simply enthymematic;
if the implicit “ought” premise is a priori filled in, the
inference is inarguably valid. This is the route that
Oaksford and Chater seem to take. However, whether is-
ought inference is indeed avoided is moot. As we have
noted earlier (sect. 1), a normative system is one that is
taken as an evaluative ought for human rationality. A
priori analysis can only show that a theory is well-
formed, but, given the multiplicity of well-formed
systems and the ensuing arbitration problem, normativism
still needs a move from well-formedness to normative
status. The latter is not given as a premise; to complete
it, Oaksford and Chater use empirical data. Hence, it
can still be argued that they draw is-ought inference.
Before concluding this section, we should clarify that
our reservations are not with rational analysis as a research
programme, only with its evaluative ought. Oaksford and
Chater’s thesis is a complex one, mixing several senses of
ought. A significant part of their argument is what we
called the directive, or instrumental, sense of ought: the
thesis that, given specific goals, some computational
systems are more useful than others, and that empirical
data can help clarify which. As this aspect of their
approach is descriptive, we have no argument with it at all.
5.2. The individual differences programme of Stanovich
and West
Another highly influential research programme with
emphasis on normative and evaluative concerns is Stano-
vich and West’s dual-system theory, based on systematic
analysis of individual differences (Stanovich 1999; 2004;
Stanovich & West 2000b). Their theory is of a type
termed “default-interventionist” by Evans (2008), as
indeed is Jonathan Evans’ own dual-process theory
(Evans 2006; 2007). Hence, we can broadly agree with Sta-
novich and West’s assertion that System 1, the heuristic
system, triggers contextualized, belief-laden responses
that can be intervened on and altered by System 2, the
analytic system. And we can accept their findings that
both the likelihood and nature of such interventions are
affected by the cognitive ability of the participants.
Where the difficulty arises is in the interpretation of
these findings. In these earlier studies (summarized by
Stanovich 1999), higher-ability participants mostly gave
more “correct” answers on these tasks, according to the
standard norm applied. Thus, it appeared that “correct”
reasoning required a high probability of intervention
and/or a higher quality of reasoning, both associated
with high cognitive capacity. In more recent writings, Sta-
novich has added a number of other preconditions for
rational reasoning (Stanovich 2009a; 2009b). He and
West have also demonstrated recently that a number of
decision biases – as a result – are not affected by cognitive
ability (Stanovich & West 2008).
In the earlier work, however, Stanovich directly con-
nected normative theory with computational-level analy-
sis, albeit in cautious terms. Prefacing his 1999 book
with an extensive review of various theories that depict
different levels of analysis, he argued: “It is at the inten-
tional level that issues of rationality arise” (Stanovich
1999, p. 12). Note that Stanovich merely traced rationality
to the intentional level, rather than calling for normative
justification of this level in the way Oaksford and Chater
do. However, an is-ought inference was still involved in
this earlier writing. Its basis was an application of Slovic
and Tversky’s (1974) understanding/acceptance principle:
the empirical normativism idea that the better one under-
stands the normative principles involved in a specific task,
the likelier is one to accept these principles. Hence, cogni-
tively gifted reasoners are likely to endorse the appropriate
normative system involved in a specific task. Stanovich also
added the converse, prescriptive normativism principle:
Responses of the more able participants provide the deci-
sive clue for arbitrating between normative systems; what-
ever they endorse is the appropriate system for a particular
task. “The direction that performance moves in response
to increased understanding provides an empirical clue as
to what is the normative model to be applied” (Stanovich
1999, p. 63). For example, when higher-ability participants
provided what is traditionally viewed as the “correct”
answer to the Wason selection task (Stanovich & West
1998), this was taken to imply that deductive logic rather
than information gain should be accepted as the appropri-
ate normative system for this problem.
A form of is-ought inference was apparent at this stage,
although to some extent moderated by the restricted appli-
cability to elite reasoners (Elqayam 2003). The is evidence
was performance by higher-ability participants; the ought
conclusion was the choice of a particular normative
system as appropriate. Stanovich actually acknowledged
an inherent naturalistic fallacy (Stanovich 1999, pp. 59–
60), although he maintained that a worse version of the
same fallacy is made by the camp which regards behaviour
as a priori rational. (We concur.). He also argued that, “if
the theorists discussed so far are actually committing the
naturalistic fallacy, then many of the best minds in cognitive
science seem to be doing so” (Stanovich 1999, p. 60). Here,
too, we concur – but would point out that this did not solve
the problem. Indeed, perhaps this is the problem.
It is important to note that Stanovich and West them-
selves no longer use this arbitration strategy, and that
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they have discontinued even the use of the term normative
rationality (Stanovich & West 2003). However, the is-
ought strategy in Stanovich (1999) still has current influ-
ence over the research community. For example, it has
recently been extended to support sensitivity to diversity
as a normative account for category-based induction
(Feeney 2007). In a later phase in the development of Sta-
novich and West’s theory, the focus is on instrumental
rationality in the traditional sense of achieving one’s
goals, and on epistemic rationality in the sense of
holding well-calibrated beliefs (Stanovich 2004; 2009b;
Stanovich & West 2003), with which we have no quarrel.
However, there are still clear evaluative elements in
their approach. While the term “normative” has been
dropped, the term “error” has not: A recent book (Stano-
vich 2009b) presents an extensive discussion of the
source of reasoning and decision-making errors, implying
norms.
Lastly, it is important to note that we have no argument
with Stanovich’s (and others’) position when examined
from the angle of applied science. If your objective is to
improve thinking (rather than to understand it), then
you must have criteria for distinguishing good thinking
from bad (more on this in section 8).
5.3. Evaluative ought versus directive ought
Having described the is-ought inference in Oaksford and
Chater’s rational analysis and in the (still influential)
earlier formulation of Stanovich and West’s approach,
we come now to a crucial test: comparing them. Recall
how the arbitration problem poses a major challenge to
normativism; it is particularly striking here. Although
both approaches share an evolutionary agenda, each
starts from a completely different evaluative position and
draws completely different normative conclusions. Oaks-
ford and Chater’s rational analysis, with its adaptationist
leanings, starts with the presupposition that evolution opti-
mizes, and that gene-dictated behaviour is by definition
rational. In contrast, Stanovich and West adopt a view of
rationality that is self-described as Meliorist (Stanovich
1999; 2004; 2009b). That is, they do not believe that
people are invariably rational, but rather that people are
capable of being so and that this capability can be
improved by education and training.
Individual differences in reasoning pose major difficul-
ties for the optimization stance of Oaksford and Chater.
Consider the case of the abstract Wason selection task.
The early Stanovich and West (e.g., 2000b) have argued
for logic as the correct normative system because those
who are of highest ability solve the problem in these
terms. But these participants are only about 10–20% of
those tested. By contrast, Oaksford and Chater argue
that information theory is the correct normative theory
of the task, because it can account for the majority of
responses to the problem. So “is-ought” theorists are
in dispute as to what is the is from which to infer the
ought.
This is not a chance outcome; we submit that the very
nature of research programmes of the is-ought type is
bound to lead to these differences. Adaptations per se
can provide us only with epistemic or at most directive
oughts. What happens when two directives clash? This is
the case that Stanovich highlights. In a dual-system
approach, Systems 1 and 2 may pursue different goals by
different mechanisms (Stanovich 2004; see also Evans
2010b). We cannot describe a unique standard even for
instrumental rationality. When directive oughts conflict,
it seems to be evaluative oughts that drive the evaluation
for the theoretician. Whereas Oaksford and Chater do
not seem to acknowledge that there might be a clash, Sta-
novich and West do, and their solution is determined not
by the empirical data but by evaluative considerations; that
is, the idea that rationality is determined at the individual
level, giving preference to not only System 2 but its appli-
cation by those of high intelligence. System 2, for example,
is portrayed as an intelligent “robot” that can and should
rebel against the tyranny of the genes which created it
(Stanovich 2004).
6. Normativist research biases
It may seem to some readers, as it did to a referee of an
earlier draft of this paper, that we are objecting only to
the style of research and writing about human thinking,
and that our comments have few implications for the sub-
stance of such research programmes. This is far from the
case. In fact, we wish to argue the opposite: that normati-
vism has seriously biased and distorted the ways in which
psychologists go about studying thinking, reasoning, and
decision making (see Table 3). It makes a very substantial
difference to how we practice our craft, and to the
research questions we ask on both the processing and
Table 3. Normativist research biases in psychology of reasoning and JDM
Normativist
research bias What it means Level of analysis Research practice
Prior rules bias People have built-in normative systems computational/processing Exclude trained participants;
exclude helpful knowledge
Interpretation bias Responses are presented in terms of
normative correctness




Clear norms bias Look for unambiguous norms computational Exclude multiple-norm paradigms
from psychological inquiry
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the computational levels. A descriptivist approach may
free the psychology of reasoning and JDM from these
research biases.
Let us start with the case of logic and the deduction
paradigm (Evans 2002). The standard practice in the
psychology of reasoning, at least until the past decade
or so, was as follows: You draw a sample of participants,
specifically excluding any who have had formal training
in logic. You present them with problems that are
either abstract or designed in such a way that any influ-
ence of real-world beliefs can only be interpreted as a
bias, since it is orthogonal to the logical structure. You
then instruct participants to assume that all the infor-
mation given is true, to base their reasoning only on
the information given, and to draw only necessary con-
clusions. However, normally you do not provide them
with any kind of instruction or training in logical prin-
ciples, including that of necessary inference. You then
assess performance against standard logical solutions to
the problems, and also count as a cognitive bias any
source of variance other than the logical structure. This
describes the predominant practice in the psychology
of reasoning over the past 50 years or so, and it explains
the origins of such terms as belief bias (e.g., Evans et al.
1983; and see sect. 6.1 below) and matching bias (Evans
1972); the balance has only started to shift in recent
years.
We ask readers to reflect on whether the deduction
paradigm could have developed this way without the logi-
cist and normativist thinking that preceded it. The argu-
ment encouraged by Inhelder and Piaget and numerous
philosophers is essentially this: (Classical) logic provides
the laws of rational thought in all contexts. People are
rational. Therefore, logic must be built into people’s
heads in some innate and a priori manner. We call this
the prior rules bias. This is basically an empirical normati-
vism approach, the idea that thinking reflects a normative
system; and it has implications for computational-level
analysis as well as processing accounts. From this, every-
thing about the deduction paradigm follows, including
the use of participants untrained in logic and contexts
lacking helpful pragmatic cues. If people are rational,
then they should still give the logical answers. Researchers
then seem to be astonished when participants get the
answers wrong, in contrast with the remarkable achieve-
ments of the human species in many specific fields of
endeavour that require advanced reasoning.
Without logicism, the study of rationality in reasoning
might have been entirely different. Why on earth, for
example, should our notion of rationality exclude learning?
Why not start with the observation that people can become
expert reasoners in law, medicine, science, engineering,
and so forth, noting that in every case they spend many
years in specialized training to achieve this level of exper-
tise? Why not focus on expert reasoning and how it is
acquired? But no, we have spent the past half a century
instead studying naı¨ve participants with novel problems,
resulting in a Kuhnian crisis as the field struggled to
throw off the shackles of logicism (Evans 2002; 2010b;
Oaksford & Chater 1998a; 2007). The new paradigm
that is emerging utilizes a wide variation of methods,
with a focus on uncertainty, belief, and pragmatic influ-
ences on reasoning. However, merely discarding logicism
will not resolve the problem. As befits the topic of this
target article, there is an as yet unresolved debate about
whether the new paradigm requires an alternative norma-
tive theory, such as Bayesianism (Evans, in press b). The
prior rules bias is still active – only the proposed rules
have changed.
If we examine the study of judgement and decision
making, we find that normativism has dictated research
strategy in very similar ways. Here, too, researchers predo-
minantly assess rationality by testing naı¨ve participants on
novel problems, carefully avoiding any instruction in the
rules with which they need to reason. The prior rules
bias is evident, for example, in the study of Bayesian
reasoning. According to Bayes’ theorem, posterior prob-
ability judgements should reflect a multiplicative function
of prior probabilities (i.e., base rates) and diagnostic evi-
dence. Since the pioneering work of Kahneman and
Tversky (1972) there has been much concern, and a very
large number of research papers, about the finding that
people neglect or underweight base rates in making pos-
terior probability judgements (for review, see Barbey &
Sloman 2007). But think what is required to get the
problem right. The participants must either know or
somehow derive from first principles Bayes’ theorem (or
at least some sort of approximation), as this is never
given by the experimenter. They must also perform the
mental arithmetic required to multiply the relevant prob-
abilities. Very few are able to do this, except when the
information is presented in transparent “nested sets”
clearly demonstrating the relations between superordinate
and subordinate sets (Barbey & Sloman 2007; Cosmides &
Tooby 1996; Evans et al. 2000; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage
1995). This facilitates a relatively simple mental represen-
tation of the problem, enabling its solution by general
reasoning.
What kind of test of rationality do standard tests of
Bayesian reasoning provide? Why should we expect
people to reason with rules they do not possess, lacking
the “mindware” for the task (Stanovich 2010a)? Granted,
many studies have shown base rate neglect in expert
groups (Koehler 1996), with the obvious implication that
such groups (doctors, lawyers, etc.) require training in
this kind of reasoning. But this is where the enquiry
should have begun. Some kinds of statistical reasoning
can be learned by general experience, even if it remains
domain specific (Nisbett et al. 1983), but other kinds
cannot and require rule-based training. The question of
whether people can be rational statistical reasoners must
be assessed when appropriate training has been provided.
Evolution may have provided “fast and frugal heuristics,”
labour-saving rules of thumb that work well in some cir-
cumstances (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), but it certainly
cannot provide us with the ability to be lawyers, engineers,
and rocket scientists without training.
Normativism has affected not just the methodology of
the psychology of reasoning but also the way in which find-
ings are reported and interpreted on the processing level.
We will call this the interpretation bias. In Jonathan
Evans’ first book on the topic (Evans 1982), he argued
that we should desist from the practice of reporting
logical accuracy in reasoning tasks, and instead report
what people actually did. This is particularly critical in
the study of conditional inference. The standard paradigm
focuses on the elimination inferences and it tests whether
people will endorse each of the four inferences MP, DA,
Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5 243
AC, and MT (see Table 2). The traditional practice, still
quite common in the developmental literature (e.g., Bar-
rouillet et al. 2001), is to score the number of logically
correct inferences endorsed, which means adding yes
answers to MP and MT (valid inferences) to no answers
for DA and AC (invalid inferences). But this practice is
highly interpretative and misleading. From a cognitive
point of view, an inference is either drawn or it is not.
The interpretation bias leads researchers to equate endor-
sing one kind of inference with refusing another, as though
these were similar rather than opposite cognitive pro-
cesses. Logicist thinking has even led leading advocates
of the mental logic theory of reasoning to propose entirely
different mechanisms to explain the drawing of valid and
invalid conditional inferences (e.g., Braine & O’Brien
1998), the former based on mental rules and the latter
on pragmatic implicatures. But the experimental evidence
supports no such distinction. For example, DA (invalid)
and MT (valid) inferences are prone to exactly the same
form of negative conclusion bias or double negation
effect (Evans et al. 1993). How could this be if different
mechanisms are involved?
The field of judgement and decision making is, if any-
thing, even more prone to interpretation bias than is the
psychology of reasoning. Encouraged by the discipline
of economics, from which the study of rational decision
making derived, studies of JDM have focused again and
again on conformity to or deviations from normative
theory to the exclusion of psychological accounts of
what people are actually doing. This may be why dual-
process accounts of JDM were, until recently, mostly
proposed by those working predominantly in the psy-
chology of reasoning (Evans 2007; Evans & Over 1996;
Stanovich 1999; 2010a). Fortunately, following the
explicit adoption of the theory by Kahneman and
Frederick (2002), this is starting to change. However,
JDM still lags behind the new paradigm psychology of
reasoning in the use of process tracing methods such
as protocol analysis, response times, eye-movement
tracking, and neural imaging; but again, we are pleased
to see this is now changing. But why has it taken so
long for researchers to get focused on the cognitive pro-
cesses underlying judgement and decision tasks? In a
word: normativism.
Even at the purely computational level, normativist
research biases may affect the very research puzzles
that psychologists select to study. Recall our classifi-
cation of conflict between formal systems in section 3:
single-norm paradigms, where there is no conflict;
alternative-norm paradigms, where an alternative
system competes with the standard one; and multiple-
norm paradigms, where there is multiplicity of formal
systems, none of which can be said to have any pre-
cedence. Historically, the psychology of reasoning and
decision making tended to be biased towards asking
research questions drawing on single-norm paradigms,
although they have a tendency to mutate into alterna-
tive-norm paradigms as researchers discover or invent
alternative norms. The expectation that there will be a
single, or at least standard, normative system is a
natural consequence of empirical normativism: the
belief that human thought follows a normative system.
It is also crucial for prescriptive normativism, since a
normative system has to be clearly identified for
prescriptive normativism to make any sense. We call
this the clear norms bias.
When an alternative norm is proposed, heated debate
tends to follow, as normativism requires a clear standard.
Moreover, the motivation for proposing alternative
norms may be the observation that empirical normativism
fails with the existing standard. Oaksford and Chater’s
(1996) account of selection task choices in terms of
expected information gain, and the spate of critical notes
that followed it, illustrate both aspects. In JDM, Hahn
and Warren (2009) have similarly taken on normative
analysis of lay perception of randomness, long perceived
as normatively incorrect in the JDM literature. Arguing
that such perceptions are normatively correct when one
takes into account the “finite attentional window”
through which random strings are typically available to
working memory, Hahn and Warren also partially exoner-
ated the “gambler’s fallacy” (the conviction that consecu-
tive random draws should be balanced), again with the
foreseeable flurry of critical notes.
As to multiple-norm paradigms, where no agreed nor-
mative standard exists, there is correspondingly little
experimental work. Examples include embedded con-
ditional statements, where “no theory has an intuitively
adequate account” (Edgington 2008), and conditional
introduction, as opposed to the much studied elimination
inferences (but see Over et al. [2010] for recent discus-
sion). These are by no means trivial paradigms: both
have generated a great deal of discussion in philosophical
logic (for review, see Edgington 2008). Issues that the psy-
chology of reasoning overlooked despite patent philoso-
phical value tend to be multiple-norm paradigms. We
find this suggestive to say the least.
6.1. Normativist research biases and dual processing:
The ought-is fallacy
Dual-process and dual-system theories of higher cogni-
tion have become increasingly popular in both cognitive
and social psychology (Evans 2003; 2008; Evans &
Frankish 2009; Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Lieberman
2007; Sloman 1996; Smith & DeCoster 2000; Stanovich
1999; 2004). We discuss them here to illustrate how nor-
mativism has biased and hindered this particular research
paradigm.
Dual-process theories postulate two types of processes:
heuristic, rapid, parallel preconscious processes (“Type 1”)
versus analytic, effortful, sequential processes that corre-
late with general ability (“Type 2”). Dual-system theories
add the stronger postulate that these processes are
anchored in distinct cognitive systems (Evans 2003),
which Stanovich (1999) dubbed “System 1” and “System
2,” respectively. Dual-process and dual-system theories
can at most be empirically normative to a moderate
extent, because the two processes cue different responses.
Historically, dual-process theories of reasoning and
decision making have been used to explain conflict
between normatively correct responding and cognitive
biases. Evans’ (1982) early two-factor theory of reasoning,
for example, proposed that logical and non-logical pro-
cesses combined in determining behaviour. A classic
example is the belief bias paradigm in syllogistic reasoning,
in which participants have to judge the validity of argu-
ments that are either logically valid or invalid and have
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either believable or unbelievable conclusions. Evans et al.
(1983) established that people will prefer both logically
valid conclusions (with belief constant) and believable
conclusions (with logic constant), which the authors
characterized at the time as a within-participant conflict
between logic and belief. Stanovich’s (1999) earlier
research programme on individual differences in cognitive
performance associated normatively correct responding
with high cognitive ability and associated belief biases
with low cognitive ability, with a theoretical account in
terms of greater ability for System 2 reasoning in those
of high cognitive capacity (although cf. Stanovich 2009a;
2009b). Similar appeals to System 2 as means of avoiding
biases and achieving normatively correct solutions are to
be found in other major contributions in the field (e.g.,
Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Sloman 1996). All of
which might combine to give the (unfortunate) impression
that System 2 is an empirically normativist system – an
impeccable mental logic that delivers reliably normative
reasoning.
Another source that might have contributed to this
impression is Evans and Over’s (1996) commonly cited
distinction between two forms of rationality:
Instrumental rationality (Rationality1): Thinking, speaking,
reasoning, making a decision, or acting in such a way that is
generally reliable and efficient for achieving one’s goals.
Normative rationality (Rationality2): Thinking, speaking,
reasoning, making a decision, or acting when one has a
reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory.
(p. 8)
Subsequently in the book, Evans and Over developed a
dual-process theory in which they distinguished
between implicit and explicit processes. In presenting a
dual theory of rationality and dual-process theory of
thinking within the same work, Evans and Over (1996)
provided a temptation for some readers to confuse the
two, even though they explicitly cautioned against
making such a direct equation (p. 147). Given that their
definition of normative rationality involved explicit rule
following, it follows, of course, that Type 2 processing
is necessary to achieve it. But nothing in their account
implies that it is sufficient. With the dominance of the
normativist thinking, however, it is all too easy to substi-
tute “sufficient” for “necessary,” and hence to assign a
one-to-one relation between Type 2 processing and nor-
mative solutions.
The equation of System 1 with bias and System 2 with
normatively correct reasoning is in fact a dangerous
fallacy. The temptation is to treat correct responses as
being diagnostic of System 2 processing, and biased
responses as diagnostic of System 1 processing, an infer-
ence to be found throughout the dual-processing litera-
tures. Note that this fallacy is a special case of
interpretation bias (see sect. 6), and hence of empirical
normativism, as it presupposes that System 2 corresponds
to a normative system. Because the fallacy involves infer-
ring is (System 2 involvement) from ought (normative
responses), we will dub it the ought-is fallacy. The
ought-is fallacy is particularly hazardous in paradigms
where there are just two alternative answers: one con-
sidered correct and one considered a bias, as when base
rate and diagnostic information are put into conflict in
Bayesian reasoning (see, e.g., De Neys & Glumicic 2008;
see also Ferreira et al. [2006] on the limitations of this
paradigm in dual-processing research). Using a forced-
choice paradigm in this way is open to a number of
other possible interpretations, including erroneous (by
normativist lights) System 2 reasoning, normatively
aligned heuristics, guessing, and random error.
The claim that heuristics can lead to effective responding
rather than the cognitive biases emphasized in the Tversky
and Kahneman tradition (Gilovich et al. 2002) has been
well argued by advocates of fast and frugal heuristics
(Gigerenzer 2007; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). In situations
where participants have had opportunity for relevant
experiential learning, they may also make decisions that
are more satisfactory and instrumentally efficient using
intuition than when allowed to engage in reflective thinking
(Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Klein 1998; Reyna 2004; Wilson
& Schooler 1991). On the other hand, it is not hard to
see either that System 2, rule-based reasoning can lead to
normative errors. For example, we may have learnt (nor-
matively) bad rules, such as the “law of averages” that
people draw upon to justify irrational gambling behaviour
(Wagenaar 1988). We may also have good rules (from a
normative viewpoint), but process them badly. In a
recent review of a range of hypothetical thinking tasks,
Evans (2007) actually attributes the cognitive biases
observed in these tasks equally to heuristic (Type 1) and
to analytic (Type 2) processes. Stanovich (2009a; 2009b)
has also identified recently a form of System 2 processing,
which he calls “serial associative cognition,” which may
lead to errors and biases.
What this discussion illustrates is that while dual-
process research may appear to assume or even benefit
from a form of empirical normativism, in which System
2 (but not System 1) is assumed to generate normatively
correct responses, this is far from the case. In fact, dual-
process research suffers from this form of normativist
reasoning. It leads researchers to think that they have an
easy shortcut method to identify the type of process
from the correctness of the response, when none such is
in fact available. This has been recognized implicitly in
some recent dual-process accounts of how beliefs influ-
ence reasoning (Evans & Handley 1999; Klauer et al.
2000; Verschueren et al. 2005). These theories propose
both (1) that beliefs may influence responding directly
through heuristic cues and (2) that beliefs may bias the
direction and focus of explicit analytic reasoning. Such
theoretical developments would not be possible with the
System 2 ¼ normative system mindset.
In reasoning theories, ought-is fallacy seems empirically
dissociated from is-ought inference in the sense
expounded in section 5 – that is, it is different authors
who tend to make the two types of inference. In particular,
Stanovich’s recent research programme emphasizes the
System 2 sources of biases, thus not only avoiding ought-
is fallacy but explicitly precluding it. This is hardly surpris-
ing, for an approach that we have already characterized as
relatively low on empirical normativism. Whereas is-ought
inference is a special case of prescriptive normativism
(“thinking should be measured against a normative
system”), ought-is fallacy, with its assumption that
System 2 equals mental logic, is a special case of empirical
normativism (“thinking reflects a normative system”).
As we commented earlier, prescriptive normativism is
necessary for empirical normativism but by no means
sufficient.
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In conclusion, normative research biases affect what is
studied in the psychology of reasoning and JDM, how it
is studied, and how findings are reported and interpreted,
both on the processing and the computational levels of
explanation. Prior rules bias has affected research practice
by providing undue focus on untrained participants
reasoning with novel problems; interpretation bias and
its close associate ought-is fallacy has prompted research-
ers to analyze psychological processes in terms of their
normative correlates; and clear norms bias has focused
attention on single-norm paradigms, or on normative
rather than empirical arguments when they change into
alternative-norm paradigms, and has arguably sentenced
multiple-norm paradigms to unwarranted neglect. These
biases are highly prevalent and afflict much of the field.
Although it might be possible to patch them up ad hoc,
we contend they can be most parsimoniously eliminated
with a descriptivist approach, focusing on observing and
explaining the thinking and reasoning that people do,
without the prior concerns about what they ought to do.
7. Can we manage without a normative theory?
The previous three sections have reviewed the pitfalls of
normativism. First, we have argued that in a quest to
solve the thorny arbitration problem, theorists have
fallen into the practice of dubious is-ought inference,
which in the worst case can lead to circular reasoning:
people ought to do whatever it is they actually do! Next,
we have shown how normativist thinking has biased and
constrained the relevant research programmes. Illustrat-
ing the problem with the case of research on dual pro-
cesses, we have also identified a specific bias which we
term the ought-is fallacy: the belief that System 2 is
responsible for normative responding (and System 1 for
errors and biases).
We now seem to be faced with a dilemma. On the one
hand, the problems we have identified with normativism
make it highly questionable as a meta-theoretical frame-
work for the psychology of reasoning and JDM (judgement
and decision making). On the other hand, the long and
productive history of normative approaches in reasoning
and JDM should give one pause before throwing them
overboard. Formal systems such as logic and Bayesianism
have provided major incentives and inspiration to count-
less research paradigms. Popper’s logicist philosophy of
science was the main motivation behind Wason’s selection
task and the 2-4-6 task; decision theory motivated Tversky
and Kahneman’s heuristics and biases programme. Can
we make do in reasoning and JDM without normative the-
ories altogether?
Evaluative normative considerations are just one way in
which formal theories can be useful for psychological the-
orizing. There is a wide range of possible relations
between formal systems and psychological theory,
depicted in Figure 2. Formal theories can also constrain
psychological theorizing; that is, psychological theory can
be formed in a way that takes computational-level theories
into account, and can provide a useful formal language.4
Formal theories can also inspire psychological
theory, which can be seen as a special case of weak con-
straining: a single idea or principle is taken from the
formal theory, leaving a wide margin for psychological
principles to be developed semi-independently. Psycho-
logical theorizing and data can also reflect back on
formal theories: to arbitrate between formal accounts,
either normatively or descriptively; and to judge the
psychological validity of formal accounts.
Normativism potentially utilizes almost all the relations
shown in Figure 2 except validation: formal theory both
inspires and constrains psychological theory. In contrast,
with descriptivism, there is considerable variety. Although
no theoretical approach seems to be explicitly committed
to what we called “descriptivism,” some theoretical
approaches can be characterized this way post hoc. One
such approach has been adopted by Gigerenzer and his
research group (e.g., Gigerenzer 2007; Gigerenzer &
Selten 2001; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Gigerenzer and
Todd, in introducing their research programme on “fast
and frugal” heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd 1999), appeal
first to bounded rationality (Simon 1982), then to ecologi-
cal rationality, and finally to evolutionary rationality. What
they specifically exclude, however, is normative rationality.
The concept of normative rationality is replaced with the
concept of ecological rationality, the rationality of adaptive
behaviour. In noting the probabilistic revolution that has
undermined logicism, Gigerenzer and Todd comment
that their approach embraces its emphasis on uncertainty
“without sharing its focus on probability theory, either as a
description or an attainable norm of human behavior”
(Gigerenzer & Todd 1999, p. 6). Paradoxically perhaps,
it is this very rejection of normativism that has led Stano-
vich (1999, pp. 57–58) to ascribe the naturalistic fallacy
(see sect. 5) to Gigerenzer (1991), maintaining that he
links the normative to the descriptive, even if only to reject it.
We have no argument with adaptive rationality per se;
indeed, we keep to the position expressed by Over and
Evans (1997, pp. 255–56), which regarded any sort of
instrumental rationality (adaptive rationality included) as
primary. However, we agree with Stanovich (1999) that
Gigerenzer’s approach invites a strong is-ought inference:
It seems that merely opting for a position of adaptive
rationality does not inoculate a theory against it. Further-
more, given the heuristic value of formal theories, we are
not convinced that a descriptivist theory should do without
formal theories entirely; we argue that many of the
relations depicted in Figure 2 can be maintained in a
descriptivist approach.
Figure 2. Models of interaction between formal and
psychological theories.
Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
246 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5
The closest model we have is our preferred theoretical
framework of hypothetical thinking theory (HTT), a
dual-process framework of human thinking (Evans 2006;
2007). According to HTT, the main characteristic of ana-
lytic (or Type 2) processes is the ability to simulate
hypothetical possibilities. HTT proposes that Type 2 pro-
cesses use epistemic mental models. Unlike the semantic
mental models of mental model theory (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne 1991; 2002), which represent states of the world,
epistemic mental models represent what we believe
about the world. For this reason, they can include subjec-
tive probabilities, causal relations, and so on, which must
be excluded from truth-verifiable semantic models. This
emphasis on subjective belief makes HTT explicitly Baye-
sian (Evans 2007, p. 33). Here is an interesting point of
comparison with Oaksford and Chater’s rational analysis
programme. While both programmes are Bayesian (and
decision-theoretic) in their treatment of deductive compe-
tence, HTT draws on Bayesian theory for its psychological
features: subjectivity, belief, uncertainty. Indeed, Evans
(2007) comments that Bayesian philosophy is a “more
credible descriptive model” of scientific thinking than is
the Popperian approach (p. 33, emphasis ours).
A similar case is the theory of the suppositional con-
ditional, a special case of HTT (Evans & Over 2004; see
also Evans et al. 2003; 2005). Strongly influenced by
Edgington’s philosophical work (e.g., Edgington 1995;
2003; 2008), it draws on a famous philosophical tenet,
the Ramsey test, which argues that, to judge a conditional
sentence of the form if p, then q, we add p hypothetically
to our stock of knowledge and evaluate q in this context
(Ramsey 1931/1990). In HTT, the philosophical Ramsey
test is translated into a psychological principle of hypothe-
tical thought and linked to Evans’s (e.g., 1989) earlier
hypothesis that “if” triggers a focus on the conditional’s
antecedent (i.e., the p part of if p, then q). Evans and
Over (2004, p. vi) explicitly state that they do not try to
answer normative questions. The philosophical foundation
is there, but the concerns of the psychological theory are
different: for example, it is strongly committed to a psycho-
logical dual-processing framework, while remaining
uncommitted to any specific philosophical version of the
Ramsey test (Evans & Over 2004, Ch. 2; for review of
the philosophical literature, cf. Edgington 2008). Evans
et al. (2003, p. 323) also refer to the Ramsey test as a
source of inspiration.
More generally, HTT opts for an (implicitly) descripti-
vist framework by emphasizing the primacy of psychologi-
cal processes. Evans (2007) specifically critiques the use of
normative rationality in psychological inquiry. He dis-
cusses the issue in some detail, commenting that violations
of normative theory are not an informative source for the-
orizing on cognitive processes (p. 108); and he creates a
clear distinction between normative rationality and ana-
lytic thinking (pp. 159–61). Evans also addresses the
issue of normative rationality explicitly, with these
comments:
Normative rationality is essentially a philosophical and not a
psychological concept. Analytic reasoning may (or may not)
involve following explicit rules as some theorists argue [. . .]
but the relation of those rules to formal normative theories
cannot form part of our psychological definition of System 2
thinking. (Evans 2007, p. 161)
HTT, then, uses formal theories as a source of inspiration
and even as weakly constraining psychological theorizing,
without, however, accepting their normative role. While
descriptivism can take different forms, we advocate the
type that makes use of formal systems as fully as possible,
with HTT as the closest existing realization of it.
In conclusion, we believe that descriptivism is a viable
alternative to normativism. It can offer as much as norma-
tivism does in terms of the heuristic value of formal the-
ories, without the problematic inferences and attendant
research biases.
8. Final thoughts and conclusions
It is not our purpose to exclude normativism entirely from
scientific endeavour. There is a need for research in edu-
cation, planning, policy development, and so on, in all of
which norms play a crucial role. The Meliorist position is
a strong case in point, both the version advocated so
powerfully by the individual differences research pro-
gramme of Stanovich and West (2000b; also Stanovich
1999; 2004; 2009b) and the version put forward by
Baron (e.g., 2008). Such authors wish to find ways to
improve people’s reasoning and decision making and
therefore require some standard definition of what it
means to be rational. This is an entirely different enter-
prise from the scientific investigation of the cognitive
processes. Take the case of gambling. Gambling on
games of chance that guarantee expected losses is com-
monplace in Western cultures, and as many as 1–2% of
the population may become pathological gamblers
(Raylu & Oei 2002). Such behaviour appears to be
neither normatively nor instrumentally rational (although
cf. Hahn & Warren [2009] on the gambler’s fallacy), if
you define rationality as behaving in such a way as to
achieve financial gain.
Gambling is interesting in part because of its apparent
irrationality. However, this is not because we (scientists)
regard gamblers as immoral people or sadly lacking in
the theory of Bayesian decision making. What is striking
is the apparent lack of instrumental rationality – people
persist in behaviours that bring them more losses than
gains. Among many interesting psychological findings in
this field is that people hold false theories about chance
and probability that reinforce their gambling habits
(Wagenaar 1988), although it is unclear whether these
are causal or confabulatory (Evans & Coventry 2006). In
our view, normative theory has no role to play in the
study of gambling behaviour, except perhaps to motivate
interest in the topic. We need to understand what
people are doing and why, rather than discussing what
they are not doing. By contrast, normative theory has a
clear role in the treatment of pathological gambling. Dis-
abusing people of their false beliefs and teaching them
the normative theory of probability has been shown to
be an effective form of cognitive therapy for problem gam-
blers (Raylu & Oei 2002). The researchers who discovered
this were clearly judgemental: they believed that patho-
logical gambling was a bad thing, a severe problem for
the individual, who should therefore be helped to stop
doing it. We find this approach suitable – necessary,
even – in applied research; but we see it as wholly inap-
propriate in basic theoretical research.
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Meliorism does not have to rely on normative theories.
As the gambling case shows, it is sufficient to focus on
instrumental irrationality. While the earlier Meliorist
research programme of Stanovich and West did employ
normative theories, we have no argument with norms
used to facilitate performance, so long as their evaluative
aspect is acknowledged to precede research rather than
to follow from it. We note also that Baron’s Meliorist pos-
ition is explicitly instrumental: “The best kind of thinking,
which we shall call rational thinking, is whatever kind of
thinking best helps people achieve their goals” (Baron
2008, p. 61); “rational decisions can be defined relative
to a person at a given time, with a given set of beliefs
and goals” (p. 63).
For decades, the normativist agenda has reigned
supreme in the psychology of human thinking – deductive
reasoning and decision making – and it is still pretty much
a dominant paradigm. However, its tenets and practices
can no longer be taken for granted. The controversial
inferences we have pointed out – is-ought and ought-is,
respectively – are both a result of combining the descrip-
tive with the prescriptive, as are several biases that affect
the conduct and interpretation of research work. We do
not deny that, as with gambling, normative thinking can
attract interest in a phenomenon. In general, with a com-
bination of evolutionary programming and instrumental
learning, we would expect people to achieve most of
their goals, most of the time. If we observe, for example,
that many people buy high and sell low in the stock
markets, then we are more likely to study their behaviour
than if it were the other way around. Instrumentalism is
the default behaviour and easily explained. The converse
behaviour is more interesting, we agree. It may also be
important to understand it from an applied perspective.
In conclusion, our argument is that psychology of
human thinking would be better off with a descriptivist
agenda. Normativism has played out its role in the
history of the research on human thinking. The descripti-
vist approach views theoretical research on reasoning and
decision-making research as descriptive rather than eva-
luative. The object is not to judge such behaviour, but to
understand and predict it, using all relevant theoretical
and methodological tools. Formal and computational
models have an important role to play in this without
being evaluative or being used to justify is-ought infer-
ence. We contend that evaluative considerations need
only be invoked in educational and other applied research
where the object is to improve human thinking and per-
formance. A shift away from normativism and towards
descriptivism has played a crucial role in the development
of linguistics as a mature science. A similar change of
direction may prove just as beneficial for the study of
human reasoning and decision making.
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APPENDIX
It is difficult to tread anywhere in psychology, philosophy,
and cognitive science without disturbing the ghosts of pre-
vious terminological usage. Rather than encumber the
reader with a host of terminological footnotes, we pool
them together here.
Logic and logicism. Throughout this article the term
logicism is used in its meaning in psychology of reasoning;
that is, the idea that classical logic is both a descriptor and
a normative standard of human thinking. This is distinct
from the logicism of philosophical logic, namely, the
view that mathematics can be reduced to logic (e.g.,
Whitehead & Russell 1910/1962). The common denomi-
nator is that logic is conceived as primary. Note, too,
that for the sake of simplicity, we sometimes resort to
logic as short for “classical, extensional, bivalent, mono-
tonic logic” (unless stated otherwise, as we do in section 3).
Bayesianism. The term Bayesianism already has a
prevalent use in statistics and the psychology of judgement
and decision making, referring to the subjectivist approach
to probability, in contrast to the conventional or frequen-
tist paradigm (Howson & Urbach 1993). This approach
can be applied normatively or descriptively, but most of
our discussion touches on Bayesianism as a norm; so
when we refer to “Bayesianism” it should be taken in the
normative sense unless noted otherwise. We discuss the
difference between normative and descriptive approaches
to Bayesianism in section 7.
Descriptive. We use the term descriptive as the contras-
tive of normative. The term has another sense in the
psychological literature, which can best be rendered as
“a-theoretical” – that is, description of observational
phenomena without attempt for theoretical analysis. This
is not the sense we mean for descriptive; indeed, we
refer to descriptive theories. For example, prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) is explicitly descrip-
tive in the sense of being non-normative, but certainly
not in the sense of being non-theoretical.
Descriptivism. The term descriptivism has been used by
Hare (1969; 1993) to denote more or less the opposite of
what we mean. Hare follows Austin (1961), who coined
the term descriptive fallacy to denote the error of assum-
ing that all language is descriptive or truth-functional;
descriptivism for Hare means the systematic application
of the descriptive fallacy. Of course, this is not what we
mean by descriptivism. For us, descriptivism means,
among other things, avoiding the descriptive fallacy,
rather than falling prey to it. We do so by identifying
which terms are descriptive and which are deontic, and
concentrating on the former in psychology of human
thought.
NOTES
1. We owe this point to Keith Frankish.
2. We owe this point to Mike Oaksford.
3. We owe this point to David Over.
4. We owe this point to Gernot Kleiter and Niki Pfeifer.
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Abstract: It is neither desirable nor possible to eliminate normative
concerns from the psychology of reasoning. Norms define the most
fundamental psychological questions: What are people trying to do, and
how? Even if no one system of reasoning can be the norm, pure
descriptivism is as undesirable and unobtainable in the psychology of
reasoning as elsewhere in science.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) construe normativism as the proposal
that a unique formal model (logic, Bayesian probability, whatever)
is the paradigm of human rationality. The authors do recognize
that there are programs “lower on prescriptive normativism,”
(target article, sect. 1, para. 9), that is, programs that make use
of reasoning norms but not as the unique standard of human
rationality, either empirically or prescriptively construed; see, for
example, Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008). The latter
example proposes multiple logics as formal models of reasoning,
and that their use necessarily involves normative claims. E&E,
in contrast, propose a thoroughgoing descriptivism for the study
of human reasoning, but believe that they can preserve the use
of formal systems (competence models) in their descriptivism.
We agree that resorting to a single formal system as the standard
of rationality is doomed to failure (Stenning & van Lambalgen
2008), but we disagree that formal systems can be preserved in a
thoroughgoing descriptivism. Here we explain the role of norma-
tivity in formal models by making use of the distinction between
constitutive and regulative norms (Kant 1781/1998; Rawls 1955;
Searle 1970). And we explain the psychologically crucial role of
normativism through the interplay between these two kinds of nor-
mativity in the application of formal systems to the modelling
of data. It is a corollary that any single formal system will be
inadequate for modelling all human reasoning.
E&E equate normativity with the “ought” that is erroneously
derived from “is”; what they fail to notice, however, is that
without an “ought” there can’t be an “is” in the first place. To
help identify the norms that play an important role in human
reasoning, one can make use of the distinction between constitu-
tive and regulative norms. Abstractly, norms are constitutive of a
certain behaviour if they are part of recognising the behaviour as
the one that it is identified to be; norms are regulative of a certain
behaviour if they are responsible for steering a behaviour in a
certain direction. The two examples of norms that the authors
mention at the very beginning of their article are a good illus-
tration of the distinction: Not conforming to the rules of chess
means that one is not playing chess, whereas one is still driving
when not heeding traffic laws.
Constitutive norms are internal to a certain reasoning system in
that they address the question of “what the reasoning is,” whereas
regulative norms are external to a system in that they address the
question of “why the reasoning is the one that it is.” The distinction
may seem analogous to E&E’s empirical–prescriptive distinction,
but it is not. Constitutive norms are not simply empirical because
they cannot be described by mere recourse to experience: the rules
for playing a certain game are not something one can just observe.
Regulative norms are not prescriptive in the sense that they do not
prescribe a unique behaviour; rather, they provide those reasons
and constraints that make a certain choice possible in the first
place (the choice need not be a conscious one).
Syllogistic reasoning provides a laboratory example. We present
the 64 argument forms of the syllogism to subjects and want to
interpret the results. What should they do? Experimenters
assumed for many years that it was obvious that they should
obey classical logic – after all this was the original logical fragment,
dammit. But Stenning and Yule (1997) have pointed out that there
is another important interpretation as cooperative exposition, in
which the readers’ task is to discover the author’s single intended
model. The defeasible logical model of this task is in many ways
opposite. These two kinds of logic have different constitutive
norms, which mean that they have different regulative norms.
Classical logic is partly constituted by its concept of validity –
truth of conclusions in all possible models. This means it is regula-
tively appropriate for use in adversarial argument from closed
premises about all interpretations. Defeasible logic is also partly
constituted by its own concept of validity – roughly, the truth of
conclusion in the intended model – which means it is regulatively
appropriate for cooperative reasoning from a database of long-term
knowledge plus the present text, to a single interpretation of the
text. The first goal of a psychology of reasoning should be the
empirical investigation of which of these goals (or others) subjects
adopt, and in what contexts. Without knowing how subjects under-
stand the task, we cannot sensibly interpret the data. There are also
issues about which goal it is more reasonable to adopt in the exper-
imental context – an important regulative normative question.
Subjects themselves often switch interpretations/goals spon-
taneously during a sequence of problems, sometime uttering
expletives when they realise what the experimenter intended –
in some ways the most interesting psychological events (see also,
Fugard et al. [2011b] for an example in a probabilistic framework).
None of this is available to a thoroughgoing descriptivism, which
can tabulate the frequencies of the conclusions drawn for the 64
problems but has no basis for generalising beyond this table, or
even justifying the range of options presented. Such thoroughgoing
descriptivisms were the goal of positivist theories of science widely
discredited by the observation that data is always shot through with
theoretical interpretation, knowingly or not (Hanson 1958; Kuhn
1962). It is a corollary that no single formal system can provide a
regulative norm for human reasoning, because, at the very least,
argument and exposition are two incompatible reasoning goals
that people ought to adopt at different times. Bayesian accounts
are not a homogenous alternative, because they fail to model
the necessary processes of interpretation (Fugard et al. 2011a;
Stenning & van Lambalgen 2010). Of course, many other
systems of reasoning with other goals are also needed.
It is fashionable in some quarters to claim that subjects fre-
quently have no systematic goal for their reasoning; a suicide
note for the psychology of reasoning – subjects with no goals.
Psychologists should learn to love normativity, suitably regu-
lated – after all biology is shot through with normativity, and
seems to be doing rather well.
Norms for reasoning about decisions
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Abstract: Reasoning research has traditionally focused on the derivation
of beliefs from beliefs, but it is increasingly turning to reasoning about
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decisions. In the absence of a single, entrenched normative model, the
drive toward normativism is weaker in this new field than in its parent
fields. The current balance between normativism and descriptivism is
illustrated by three approaches to reasoning about decisions.
As suggested by Elqayam & Evans (E&E), normativism faces an
arbitration problem when many researchers in the field are fam-
iliar with many formalisms that are eligible for normative status.
Normativism, obviously, faces even more of a problem when very
few researchers in the field have heard of any eligible formalism.
Accordingly, normativism is expected to be strong in fields where
exactly one formalism is a well-known candidate for normative
status. The psychology of reasoning qualifies for this category,
and so does the psychology of decision-making. Although there
are investigations of formalisms that provide alternative norms
for reasoning (Benferhat et al. 2005) or decision-making (Bonne-
fon et al. 2008), they have garnered considerably less attention
than the dominant competitors: logic and Bayesianism (for
reasoning), and utility maximization (for decision-making).
An interesting trend is developing, however, with the ongoing
convergence of the two fields. Students of reasoning, in particu-
lar, are increasingly incorporating decision-theoretic elements in
their investigations. Whereas reasoning research has traditionally
focused on the derivation of disinterested beliefs from other dis-
interested beliefs, current research is giving increasing attention
to reasoning about preferences and decisions. Under its most
general form, the problem is to account for the ways in which
people infer the beliefs, preferences, or decisions of other
people based on partial knowledge about this whole set of infor-
mation. Because there is no single, well-entrenched formal
model of how this should be done, the drive toward normativism
is paradoxically weaker when investigating how people reason
about decisions, than when investigating either how they
reason in general, or how they make decisions. Even in Artificial
Intelligence, models of how agents reason about decisions make a
clear distinction between their own decision-making models, the
models others may be using, and the extent to which everyone
may deviate from these models (Gal & Pfeffer 2008).
Accordingly, when moving from reasoning about facts to
reasoning about decisions, E&E’s distinction between prescrip-
tive and descriptive normativism unpacks into three distinct
questions: (1) Do models of reasoning about decisions consider
that people assume other people to be normative decision-
makers? (2) Is there an optimal way to reason about decisions,
whether or not other people are assumed to be normative
decision-makers? (3) If so, does reasoning about decisions
reflect this optimal solution? The answers to these three ques-
tions can vary to a large extent in different psychological
approaches to reasoning about decisions. The computational
model offered by Baker et al. (2009), and the descriptive model
put forward by Bonnefon (2009) may represent two extremes
on that spectrum, while the graphical causal model approach
adopted by Hagmayer and Sloman (2009) seems to take an inter-
mediate perspective.
On the normativist side of the spectrum, Baker et al. (2009)
offer a model of reasoning about decisions where the response
to each of the three questions above is “Yes”. In this model,
other people are assumed to be rational decision-makers who
choose actions that achieve their desires most efficiently, given
their beliefs. By virtue of being computational, the model
assumes that there is an optimal solution to the problem of
reasoning about decisions (prescriptive normativism), and the
normative framework that it uses is Bayesian inverse planning
from Markov decision problems. Finally, it is expected that
real-life inferences will be better predicted by this optimal
model than by simple heuristics (descriptive normativism).
Hagmayer and Sloman (2009, Experiment 4) investigated
inferences about the beliefs of other people, based on their pre-
ferences and decisions. Their core assumption is that people
assume others to conceive of choices as interventions on a
causal graphical network. Hagmayer and Sloman do not explicitly
state that the choice-as-intervention (CI) principle is normative,
but the reasons they consider for someone not to endorse it have
an obvious non-normative flavor (e.g., self-deception, self-handi-
capping, illusion of control, superstition). Thus, the model
appears to feature a normative calculus (causal graphical
models) involving the assumption that other people are norma-
tive decision-makers (the CI principle). As such, it would
qualify for prescriptive normativism, as defined by E&E. Hag-
mayer and Sloman do not endorse descriptive normativism,
however, as they explicitly consider the conditions (e.g., lack of
motivation or capacity) under which inferences are not expected
to reflect the CI principle and the causal graphical calculus.
Finally, at the descriptive end of the spectrum, Bonnefon
(2009) offers a theory of how reasoners infer the decisions and
attitudes of agents, based on utility conditional statements such
as “if p then q”, where p and q bear on the utility functions of
these and other agents. Rather than assuming people to believe
that other agents are fully rational, the theory is based on folk
axioms of decision, that is, the naı¨ve beliefs that people have
about the way other agents make their decisions. The theory is
purely descriptive in the sense that it does not assume the exist-
ence of an optimal solution for reasoning about utility condi-
tionals. Its response to each of the three questions above is
therefore “No”.
As can be seen from these three examples, the new field of
reasoning about decisions is remarkably opened to descriptivist
as well as normativist approaches, in contrast to its two parent
fields (reasoning and decision-making), which are much more
influenced by normativist approaches. In light of the case that
E&E make against the dominance of normativist approaches,
this flexibility bodes well for the future of the psychology of
reasoning about decisions.
The unbearable lightness of “Thinking”:
Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking,
rationality, and hypothesis testing
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Abstract: Three correctives can get researchers out of the trap of
constructing unitary theories of “thinking”: (1) Strong inference
methods largely avoid problems associated with universal prescriptive
normativism; (2) theories must recognize that significant modularity of
cognitive processes is antithetical to general accounts of thinking; and
(3) consideration of the domain-specificity of rationality render many of
the present article’s issues moot.
We are happy to agree with Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) position
that prescriptive norms can be damaging to both scientific pro-
gress and society to the extent that they repress innovation, crea-
tivity, and knowledge. As E&E point out, there is a useful and
important distinction to keep in mind between prescriptive nor-
mativism (how one ought to behave in order to conform to some
abstract ideal) and empirical normativism (how one ought to
behave, given a particular model or theory of how the mind
works). Somewhere around here, however, we part ways in our
views of how the behavioral sciences should deal with this
issue. We believe there is little to gain from following E&E
down the path of yet another general, and generally vague,
approach such as Hypothetical Thinking Theory. Solving the pro-
blems they raise will require a better conception of how theories
are constructed and evaluated.
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Strong inference methods. The method of strong inference
(Platt 1964) rejects the traditional null-hypothesis model and
instead tests between multiple, viable scientific hypotheses
about a phenomenon. One can then devise experiments that
adjudicate between these rival hypotheses (by identifying the
situations under which the hypotheses made different predic-
tions and conducting research on these situations). This
process can be recycled as many times as needed to definitively
exclude one or more of the alternate hypotheses and to evaluate
subsequent refinements of remaining hypotheses. Using strong
inference methods generates multiple empirical norms and
would go a very long way towards avoiding the problems associ-
ated with prescriptive normativism. Strong inference methods
also appear to occupy the top, left corner of E&E’s Figure 1
(see target article), a position which they claim is impossible.
The idea of strong inference is hardly new (Anderson & Shan-
teau 1977), so why is it not a go-to option for avoiding the pitfalls
of prescriptive normativism? One likely reason is the persistence
of null-hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) ideology (Krueger
2001; Loftus 1996; Nickerson 2000; S. Sun et al. 2010). This
use of NHST is not only entrenched in textbooks and pedagogy,
but it also appears to be a product of what comes more easily to
the human mind. As F. Scott Fitzgerald (1936) noted, “the test of
a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in
the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function”
(p.44). We need our science to be inspired by first-rate intelli-
gences, not by second-rate null-hypothesis testing practices.
A theory of “thinking”. The topic of this target article is
described as the study of human thinking. “Thinking” is used
in the title, in the abstract, throughout the text, and in the
name of E&E’s Hypothetical Thinking Theory model. It
should not be news to anyone that human cognitive processes,
including language, memory, reasoning, decision making,
vision, hearing, attention, and problem solving, are not all
accomplished by a single thinking system, and therefore are
neither expected nor required to follow a single normative stan-
dard. It seems odd, therefore, to attempt the construction of a
normative system that encompasses such a broad (and vague)
realm of mental activities – it is almost sure to be impossible.
Just as “living” entails the coordinated activities of many func-
tionally specialized systems (e.g., for breathing, eating, diges-
tion, excretion, etc.), the phenomena of “thinking” entail
functionally specialized and coordinated systems such as
those listed previously. In fact, thinking as a unitary process
is contradicted by the neurosciences (e.g., by localization of
function), computer sciences (e.g., in dealing with the frame
problem), philosophy (e.g., see issues of indeterminacy), and
biology (e.g., based on multiple adaptations designed to
address multiple, discrete selection pressures).
Domain specificity. It would be much more productive, we
think, to have serious discussions about the domain-specificity
of rationality (and associated empirical norms). Issues such as
domain-specificity, modularity of the human mind, and the prin-
ciples by which the domains should be discerned are weighty and
contentious (Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Carruthers 2006; Hagen
2005; Samuels 2000). For the purposes of this commentary,
however, it is sufficient to note that any degree of functional mod-
ularity (e.g., vision versus language versus reasoning) is trouble-
some for the monolithic E&E account of “thinking.” Even
basic views of the functional modularity of the mind (e.g.,
Fodor 1983) create problems for any completely general
model, such as Hypothetical Thinking Theory.
More ambitious views of “massive modularity” (e.g., Pinker
1997; 2002; Tooby & Cosmides 1992) are often based on exten-
sive considerations of evolutionary principles, which are ill-rep-
resented by E&E. For example, the work of Oaksford and
Chater, which is interesting in many respects, is presented as
evolutionarily informed and even adaptationist because they
argue “behavior is rational to the degree that it tends to increase
inclusive fitness” (Oaksford & Chater 2007, p. 26, cited in E&E’s
target article, sect. 5.1, para. 3). Such use of a vague “inclusive
fitness” rationale does not qualify Oaksford and Chater as “adap-
tationist leaning[]” (see sect. 5.3, para. 1), just as acknowledging
that there are neurological underpinnings to the mind does not
make them or anyone else neuroscientists.
In summary, rather than a generic model of thinking (dual
process or otherwise), we need models of human cognition that
incorporate the numerous functionally distinct domains of
human cognition. There are many models of how the modularity
of mind is structured, and this situation should be taken advan-
tage of by utilizing strong inference methods.
Competence, reflective equilibrium, and
dual-system theories
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Abstract: A critique of inferences from “is” to “ought” plays a central role
in Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) defense of descriptivism. However, the
reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced
by Rawls, Cohen, and many others poses an important challenge to
that critique. Dual-system theories may help respond to that challenge.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) propose that the study of human
mental processing is best served by keeping normative and
descriptive accounts of reasoning competence separate. We
enthusiastically endorse E&E’s purely descriptivist approach,
and we share their skepticism about normativism. However, we
think that E&E have seriously underestimated how hard it is to
undermine the view that a competence theory is also a normative
theory. We begin by explaining why the link between compe-
tence and normativity is so deeply embedded in philosophical
thinking. We then argue that dual-system theories of reasoning
may provide a powerful new way of challenging this link.
Traditionally, the philosophical literature on rationality has
focused on the question of when an inference is justified. In
one of the most influential passages of twentieth-century philos-
ophy, Nelson Goodman offered the following answer:
The validity of a deduction depends upon . . . conformity to valid rules . . ..
But how is the validity of rules to be determined? . . . Principles of deduc-
tive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive
practice. Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular
deductive inferences that we actually make and sanction. If a rule
yields inacceptable inferences, we drop it as invalid. Justification of
general rules thus derives from judgments rejecting or accepting particu-
lar deductive inferences.
This looks flagrantly circular . . .. But this circle is a virtuous one. The
point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being
brought into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields
an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it vio-
lates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is
the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only justifica-
tion needed for either. (Goodman 1965, pp. 66–67, emphasis in the
original)
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls endorses this “process of
mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgments” as
the primary method for justifying moral judgments and moral
principles (Rawls 1971, p. 20). When this process is successful,
we are in what Rawls labels “reflective equilibrium.” Though
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both the label and the description of this method are twentieth
century products, a case can be made that the method itself
was used by Aristotle, Plato, and many other important figures
in the history of philosophy (see Rawls 1971, p. 51; cf. Stich
2001).
Rawls famously goes on to note that there is an analogy
between the method of reflective equilibrium used in moral
philosophy and the Chomskian project of “describing the
sense of grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of
our native language” (1971, p. 47). For Chomsky and his fol-
lowers, the project that Rawls has in mind goes by another
name: describing a speaker’s grammatical competence. A
decade later, L. J. Cohen extended Rawls’ analogy to the
study of reasoning competence (Cohen 1981). To determine
our reasoning competence, Cohen maintained, we must assem-
ble lots of information about the inferences that we actually
accept and then construct the simplest set of rules that captures
most of those inferences. To construct a normative theory of
reasoning of the sort that Goodman proposed, we would do
exactly the same thing. Thus, Cohen argued, a descriptive
account of our reasoning competence and a normative theory
of reasoning that is supported by the reflective equilibrium
method must coincide. Though people may make lots of per-
formance errors in reasoning, their underlying reasoning com-
petence must be normatively impeccable.
According to E&E, “inferring an ‘ought’ type conclusion from
‘is’ type premises is highly controversial, and considered by many
authors to be a logical fallacy” (target article, sect. 5, para. 2).
They are surely right that some inferences of that sort are very
controversial in philosophy. However, the inference from the
“is” type premise:
(i) This set of (moral or inferential) rules is in reflective
equilibrium.
to the “ought” type conclusion:
(ii) This set of rules is justified.
is far less controversial. Indeed, many philosophers would insist
that in both ethics and logic this is by far the best way of
arguing that a set of rules is justified. But for E&E’s critique of
normativism to be persuasive, the inference from (i) to (ii)
must be challenged.
One of the most effective challenges, we believe, is to emphasize
the way in which such inferences can lead to radical relativism. In
Stich (1981; 1990) it was noted that it is logically possible that just
about any set of inference rules could be in reflective equilibrium
for a cognitive agent. So if the inference from (i) to (ii) is accepted,
just about any set of inference rules could be justified. This strat-
egy made little headway, however, since there was no evidence
that it is psychologically possible for people to have significantly
different reasoning competences. We are inclined to think that
Stanovich’s early work on individual differences goes a long way
toward addressing that concern, though we do not endorse his
claim that the inferential competence of people with high IQ
should be considered normatively privileged (Stanovich 1999).
Recent work on dual-system theories of reasoning poses
another powerful challenge to the idea that reasoning compe-
tence must be normatively impeccable. If these dual-system the-
ories are on the right track, then reasoning is subserved by two
distinct systems, each with its own competence. Moreover, if –
as E&E suggest – much of the content of System 2 is learned
via explicit instruction or acquired from the surrounding
culture, then it is to be expected that the inferential rules in
System 2 will be different for different individuals and different
cultures. If each person’s reasoning is subserved by two quite
different systems, and the second system varies significantly
among individuals and cultures, the claim that an individual’s
reasoning competence must be normatively impeccable is very
implausible indeed. As awareness of dual-system theories of
reasoning becomes more widespread, it may finally begin to
undermine the deeply entrenched philosophical view that a
theory of reasoning competence has normative implications.
A role for normativism
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against prescriptive
normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption,
implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the
two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for
some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the
point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.
In their target article, Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue against
prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. This com-
mentary questions the assumption, implicit in E&E’s article, that
in the study of human reasoning and decision making there is a
fundamental choice to be made between a normativist and a
descriptivist approach. I argue, instead, that there is a role for
both approaches. In particular, I argue that some research ques-
tions fit most naturally in a normativist framework, while others
are better dealt with in a descriptivist framework. E&E’s discus-
sion demonstrates the validity of the latter framework for specific
types of studies, but their discussion seems to overlook a number
of worthwhile research questions that clearly call for a normati-
vist approach. I would like to draw attention to two such
questions.
The first question is suggested by a variety of related arguments
that philosophers and mathematicians have proposed in defense of
the postulates of Bayesian epistemology, that is, the probability
axioms as static norms of rationality, and Bayes’ rule as a
dynamic norm of rationality (e.g., Joyce 1998; Rosenkrantz
1992). In sharp contrast with the more familiar Dutch book argu-
ments, which purport to demonstrate that obeying the Bayesian
norms has certain practical advantages, the newer arguments are
explicitly meant to show that obedience to those norms is epistemi-
cally mandated. For instance, the newer arguments for Bayes’ rule
aim to show that by following this rule, in the long run one will be
more accurate in one’s assignment of probabilities than one could
have been by following any other rule. (Accuracy here is measured
by means of a so-called scoring rule.) This claim is then coupled
with a (purportedly) a priori argument to the effect that long-
run accuracy is what, qua rational epistemic agents, we aim at –
which yields the desired epistemic defense of Bayes’ rule. Even
if we leave open the question of whether long-run accuracy has
been rightly identified as our epistemic goal, the aforementioned
arguments, if sound, entail that if an agent commits himself or
herself to the goal of long-run accuracy, then he or she should
update her subjective probabilities by dint of Bayes’ rule. Does
this hold true of real people? If not, what might explain the discre-
pancy between the norm and the observed behavior? These are
research questions involving a normative “ought,” and nothing
E&E say suggests that these questions are not worth investigating.
Indeed, a discussion of the a priori arguments of the kind referred
to here, and the implications they might have for psychological
research, is altogether lacking from their article.
E&E rightly point out that when there are rival normative
accounts of some aspect of human reasoning or decision
making, experiments will not help us in deciding which of
those (if any) is correct. That might suggest that empirical evi-
dence has no normative value indeed. This suggestion appears
dubitable, however, when we consider the situation in which
we have simply no normative account of some aspect of our
reasoning, while at the same time it does seem obvious that
that aspect is subject to norms of rationality. In such a situation,
empirical evidence might help us find those norms. That would
go at least some way toward deriving an ought from an is.
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To illustrate the point, consider the issue of updating on condi-
tionals. In a standard Bayesian picture, we ought to update on
incoming information by conditionalizing on it (i.e., by using
Bayes’ rule). Back in 1980, Brian Skyrms said that “we have no
clear conception of what it might be to conditionalize on a con-
ditional” (Skyrms 1980, p. 169). Since then, only very little pro-
gress has been made on this matter. That is unfortunate, given
that it is uncontentious that updating on conditionals is governed
by some norms. Douven and Dietz (2011) and Douven and
Romeijn (in press) describe hypothetical cases in which people
obtain conditional information. (They learn, for instance, that if
it continues to rain, then a specific football match will be can-
celled.) These works then point out that we have clear intuitions
about these cases as to whether, given the context in which the
conditional information is obtained, an update on that information
should lead the person receiving the information to raise or,
rather, to lower the probability he or she assigns to the condi-
tional’s antecedent, or whether that probability should remain
unaltered. However, we are currently clueless as to what the
underlying norms might be. Although the past decade has wit-
nessed a surge of interest among psychologists for studying condi-
tionals in a probabilistic setting, so far experimental work on
updating on conditionals is still missing. The lacuna is noteworthy
in itself, but for present purposes the important point is that
getting some understanding of how people actually update on con-
ditionals (or perhaps how cognitively superior people update on
conditionals) might help to suggest, at least in outline form, the
norms that philosophers assume to exist but to this day have
been unable to pinpoint. Here, too, I cannot find anything in
E&E’s article that indicates that this approach is misguided.
E&E might seem to have provided a very general reason against
normativism, to wit, that it has given rise to a number of research
biases. I am not sure we must agree that all that they identify as
research bias should be acknowledged as such, but some definitely
are. Even so, pleading for normativism is not a call for thinking
lightly of such problems. E&E certainly have not shown that if
one embraces normativism, then one is bound to commit those
errors. To the contrary, it is reasonable to think that once a bias
has been identified as such, it should be possible to steer clear
of it. Thus, these research biases give good reason for double- or
even triple-checking the design of experiments conducted in a nor-
mativist framework, but they do not give good reason for abandon-
ing the normativist approach wholesale.
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) critique of normativism is related
to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative affair?
Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present
the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking
belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with
logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.
Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) thought-provoking article questions
the fruitfulness of a normativistic approach to thinking in exper-
imental psychology, but their considerations are directly related
to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative
affair at all? Are the reasoning processes of an agent to be held
accountable towards certain norms? It is not obvious what the
answer should be. Thinking seems to differ from obviously
non-normative phenomena, such as the behavior of physical
objects, but there are also important dissimilarities with
obviously normative phenomena, such as human public actions;
in particular, while public actions typically have practical conse-
quences, thinking as such is a private affair which only has prac-
tical consequences once translated into actions. Now, whether a
given class of phenomena, such as thinking processes, does or
does not fall within the realm of normativity is a question belong-
ing to meta-ethics (Korsgaard 1998; Wedgwood 2007), as it
involves a discussion of the very nature of normativity.
In fact, a negative answer to this philosophical question would
be sufficient but not necessary to establish the methodological
thesis defended by the authors: even if thinking turns out to be
a normative phenomenon, their plea for a descriptivist approach
in psychology may still stand. Just as sociology is descriptive and
law is prescriptive concerning human actions, a normative
approach to thinking may be more appropriately undertaken
elsewhere, not within psychology, as they argue.
In this short commentary, I cannot offer a thorough examin-
ation of the philosophical question. Instead, I shall briefly
present the historical origins of the views that thinking belongs
to the realm of normativity and that logic constitutes the appro-
priate normative system (logicism). These views are firmly
engrained, but the present exercise of conceptual archeology –
outlining the substantive and even contentious assumptions
behind them – suggests that they are far from uncontroversial.
Thus, my analysis can be seen as lending support to E&E’s
claims, but in fact it does not settle the issue definitively. Histori-
cal analysis shows that the particular conceptual and philosophi-
cal background underpinning normativism and logicism as
targeted by the authors may be contentious, but it does not
offer the final word on the philosophical question.
For most of its existence, logic was thought to be primarily the
art or science of correct arguing and disputing, that is, as regulat-
ing multi-agent situations taking place in the public sphere. In the
Latin Middle Ages, logica was synonymous with dialectica, and the
16th century author Domingos de Soto writes: “Dialectic is the art
or science of disputing” (de Soto 1539–1540, f. iii rb). This is in
stark contrast with the now standard definitions of logic as “the
branch of philosophy that treats of the forms of thinking in
general” (Oxford English Dictionary) or as “the science of
correct reasoning” (Webster). When did logic cease to provide
the norms for the public, multi-agent situations of debating, and
come to regard the private, mono-agent situations of thinking?
The main person responsible for this transformation seems to
have been Kant, but the terrain had been well prepared by Des-
cartes (tellingly, the author of the Rules for the Direction of the
Mind). Indeed, in the preface to Principles of Philosophy, com-
menting on the ideal education for a student, Descartes writes:
After that, he should study logic. I do not mean the logic of the Schools,
for this is strictly speaking nothing but a dialectic which teaches ways of
expounding to others what one already knows [. . .]. I mean instead the
kind of logic which teaches us to direct our reason with a view to dis-
covering the truths of which we are ignorant. (Descartes 1985, p. 186)
But Descartes rejected the traditional conception of logic of his
time (scholastic logic) as the appropriate guide for correct think-
ing; so in E&E’s terms, he was a normativist but not a logicist
regarding thinking. It was Kant, in the 18th century, who then
laid down the foundations for the still pervasive close association
between thought, logic, and normativity by internalizing some of
the key concepts of the logic of his time.
As discussed by Longuenesse (1998), Kant takes as his starting
point the transcendental question, “What are the a priori con-
ditions for the representations of objects in general?”, and recon-
figures the logic of his time so as to render it useful for his
transcendental project. In particular, he selectively absorbs the
notions of “judgment,” “form,” and “categories” as found in the
logical textbooks of the time, and puts them to use so as to
describe the very conditions of possibility of our thinking and
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perceiving. The concept of judgment, for example, traditionally
used to refer to linguistic claims made by speakers in the public
sphere, is transformed by Kant into the mental act of the under-
standing involved in the apperception of objects. With Kant,
logic no longer primarily concerns argumentation; instead, it con-
cerns the inner mental activities of the lonesome thinking subject.
Moreover, rejecting the psychological descriptivism of Wolff, Kant
insisted on the normative import of the rules of thought as
described by logic. According to him, (general) logic deals with
“absolutely necessary rules of thought without which there can
be no employment whatsoever of the understanding” (Kant
1781/1787/1929, Critique of Pure Reason, p. A52/B76).
Crucially, thus, the ideas that thinking belongs to the realm of
normative phenomena and that logic provides the canons for
correct thinking are essentially Kantian theses, which are inti-
mately related to his critical project and to transcendental ideal-
ism (as argued in MacFarlane 2000). But if we do not endorse
transcendental idealism (and most of us do not), then we have
no reason to accept uncritically this particular conception of
thinking as a normative affair and the role of logic as the appro-
priate normative system. The historical connection between Kant
and the tradition in experimental psychology in question is in fact
rather straightforward: it goes in any case through Piaget, who
was clearly under strong Kantian influence (Hergenhahn 2009,
p. 624). We can thus conclude that the history of normativism
and logicism offers no obvious reasons to endorse these positions,
in particular with respect to psychological research.








Abstract: Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) laudable program to keep the
scientific investigation of human reasoning norm-free and focused on
the facts alone is an essential part of a long tradition in the philosophy
of science – but it faces deeper difficulties than the authors seem to
realize, since reasoning is a competence, and the very concept of
competence is normative.
The core virtue of empirical science, and the wellspring of its mag-
nificent success in recent human history, is that it formulates ques-
tions to nature that can be definitively answered by observation.
Scientific questions lie at the opposite end of the spectrum from
questions of value, which concern not what is, but what ought to
be, and which have the following logical form: Which possibilities
should we pursue? Observing the actual world cannot answer
such questions, and so non-terminating philosophical debates are
our only recourse. The scientific spirit is philosophically repelled
by such endless debate: its interest is just the facts and only the
facts. Animated by this essential scientific goal, Elqayam & Evans
(E&E) attempt to draw the fine line beyond which true science,
and in particular, the science of human thinking (“higher mental
processing – reasoning, judgement, and decision making”; target
article, sect. 1, para. 2), must not venture. It should embrace
“descriptivism” and reject “normativism” – which, as they show
in considerable detail, has tainted much of the work in the field.
Put baldly, E&E’s initiative is crucially important if psychology
is ever to become a true natural science (like, paradigmatically,
physics). Let us pass but quickly over the quasi-paradox that
E&E’s essay is philosophical rather than scientific: Rather than
merely observing what psychologists in fact do, they make a
case for what psychologists should do. Let us simply accept
that science is a goal-directed activity, and therefore that its
philosophical foundation must define that goal, hence say what
scientists should do (or must do in order to be scientists, etc.).
Let us simply recognize that roughly four centuries ago, scientists
self-consciously decided they would accept only efficient causes
(whatever in the past or present makes things happen), and
reject final causes (whatever future end-states, or goals, make
things happen), the vexatious (because not empirically determin-
able) “causes” of Aristotelian science. In this way, science would
concern just the facts, and only the facts.
But psychological science now wants to consider how it is that
human beings pursue and achieve their goals – in other words,
how a future goal affects present behavior. Can this be done
without venturing beyond the facts and into values? In theory,
yes. E&E therefore stand squarely in the mainstream of
science when they issue their two-part philosophical prescription
for psychological science (see sect. 7): (1) It may employ norma-
tivism, but only in the supporting roles of inspiring, formalizing,
constraining, or evaluating purely descriptive theories. (2)
Psychological theory must be distinct from psycho-therapy.
The paradigm of a science that shuns normativism and is
purely descriptive is physics. It is therefore instructive to
observe a crucial disparity between psychology and physics,
namely that therapy has a role in psychology, but not in
physics. All processes obey the laws of physics, whether they
are the processes of, for example, a watch that keeps perfect
time or one that loses an hour a day. Human thought processes
also obey the laws of physics – and those of biochemistry and
biophysics as well – whether they are perfectly sound or comple-
tely out of touch with reality. E&E’s proposal, then, is that the
“psychology of reasoning and JDM (judgement and decision
making)” should describe reasoning and JDM, rather than take
a normative position on it: “The object is not to judge such behav-
iour, but to understand and predict it” (sect. 8, para. 5).
Personally, I am in complete agreement with the motivations
and goals of this proposal, for I, too, would like to see the
growth of a proper, value-neutral, science of human reasoning.
But I think the problems faced by descriptivism go deeper that
E&E might suspect, for in the end the question becomes:
What is it this science is supposed to describe? What is referred
to by E&E’s phrase “such behaviour,” that this science should
understand and predict rather than judge? Humans have a
huge variety of behaviors in which they come to some conclusion,
and which might be called reasoning, some of which are models
of rationality, and some of which are not merely irrational but
perverse, bizarre, crazy – so much so, that they may not truly
count as reasoning at all. The elephant in the room, completely
ignored by E&E as they conduct their excellent review of the lit-
erature, is that they rely on a tacit, unstated definition of ration-
ality and JDM. But that means that we are still in the dark when it
comes to just what the subject of our science is – what it must
observe and where it must find its data.
The problem faced by descriptivism may be brought into focus
by means of the following argument:
1. Intelligence is a competence.
2. Competence is a normative concept.
3. Therefore: No account of intelligence can be entirely
descriptive, that is, entirely non-normative.
Various processes can be identified in the brain, from funda-
mental cellular metabolism to information processing. The
science of rationality and JDM is about some subset of infor-
mation processing; namely, those processes that are rational
and/or result in decisions. Leaving aside for now the thorny
issue of rationality, what makes a process count as information
processing? After all, every brain process is metabolic. Why do
we take some part or aspect of brain metabolism and say that
this part or aspect is information processing? The answer is
that this part or aspect solves some particular problem faced by
the organism: that is, it provides the organism with a competence,
the ability to act in a smart, not a stupid, way. But competences
come in many degrees and forms: whether or not something
Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
254 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5
counts as a competence always comes down to whether or not it
provides some good for the organism. But the very concept of
good is normative. Therefore, no account of intelligence can be
entirely descriptive – for the simple reason that we cannot ident-
ify any observable phenomenon as intelligent unless we see it as
contributing somehow to the good of the organism.
Overselling the case against normativism
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11000458
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Abstract: Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam &
Evans’ (E&E’s) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First,
rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek.
Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a
consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive
version of normativism.
We are in broad agreement with much of what Elqayam & Evans
(E&E) have to say in their article. First, normative theories,
process theories, and competence theories are genuinely distinct
kinds of theory and ought not to be confused with each other.
Second, the psychology of human reasoning ought not to be
merely concerned with explaining patterns of deviation from,
and conformity to, putative normative standards. Third, we
agree that it is extraordinarily hard to adjudicate between compet-
ing normative theories. Fourth, we agree that the central goals of
the psychology of reasoning are descriptive ones: to identify the
patterns of inference in which we engage and the psychological
states, processes, and mechanisms that are causally responsible
for these patterns. Finally, we strongly suspect that success in
this descriptive project does not presuppose a prior identification
of a correct normative theory of rationality. For all that, there are
two points on which we take issue with E&E’s position.
The prudential case against normativism is problematic.Central
to E&E’s case against normativism is that it invites various
infelicitous inferences: for example, from is-to-ought, and
from ought-to-is. E&E’s suggestion is that excising normative
theories will remove such temptations. Yet, they also suggest
that precisely the kinds of formal theories that have tradition-
ally been treated as normative standards may also be retained
in order to play a host of other roles: for example, constraining
and inspiring psychological theorizing, and providing a frame-
work for the articulation of competence theories. In short:
Use the (presumed normative) formal theories in psychology,
just don’t use them as normative theories. But we wonder: If
researchers really are as prone to conflating “is” and “ought”
as E&E suggest, then why should they be any more successful
in avoiding a slide back towards normative interpretations of
formal theories? Of course, whether or not this would occur
is an empirical matter. But the fact that formal theories have
a longstanding dual function – descriptive and normative –
and the fact that reasoning is an inherently normative
phenomenon – perhaps the paradigmatic object of rationality
attributions – leads us to suspect that excising normative the-
ories from descriptive psychology will not have the desired
effect.
Even supposing researchers avoid a slide back into normative
interpretations of formal theories, we doubt that banishing nor-
mative theories will yield the results that E&E seek. For it
seems that infelicities and biases closely analogous to those that
E&E trace to normativism may well still arise from the
misapplication of formal theories, even were those theories not con-
strued normatively. Consider, for example, E&E’s complaint that
dual process theorists sometimes make the ought-is fallacy of con-
cluding that System 2 underlies a response just because the
response is normatively correct. We agree that this is a mistake.
But an exactly analogous mistake can result from misapplying
formal theories in characterizing cognition, even if one denies
their normative status. Suppose, for example, that one incorrectly
assumes that the competence theory for System 2 is accurately
characterized by some formal theory, say probability calculus.
Under such circumstances one may (mistakenly) conclude that,
because a response conforms to the formal theory, it was produced
by System 2. But in this case the problem cannot be the normative
status assigned to the formal theory. Rather, the problem is simply
that one is inaccurately using a formal theory to characterize the
system’s competence. Moreover, we think that the point general-
izes. As far as we can tell, much the same is true for many of the
other biases and infelicities that E&E attribute to normativism.
Overselling the case against normativism. E&E appear to
suppose that genuine normative standards of rationality satisfy
the following conditions:
(a) They are unconditional in at least the sense that their
normative status depends on neither the goals of agents nor the
functions of the mechanisms involved in reasoning.
(b) They are deontological in the sense that they specify what it
is to reason correctly – what is constitutive of good reasoning – in
terms of conformity to some appropriate set of rules or principles.
Now perhaps E&E introduce these constraints merely to limit
the class of rational norms to those associated with the Standard
Picture (Stein 1996). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this is a
very narrow – and quite contentious – characterization of nor-
mative standards of rationality. Indeed, according to some of
the most intensively discussed philosophical theories of ration-
ality, normative standards routinely violate one or both of these
constraints. One especially prominent kind of view, which is
often called consequentialism, maintains that what it is to
reason correctly – what is constitutive of being a rational reason-
ing process – is being an effective means of achieving some goal
or range of goals. So, for example, according to one well-known
form of consequentialism – reliabilism – a good reasoning
process is one that tends to lead to true beliefs and the avoidance
of false ones (Goldman 1986; Nozick 1993). But on such a view,
normative standards of rationality are neither deontological nor
unconditional. Moreover, as far as we can tell, E&E’s worries
fail to generalize to such consequentialist theories of rationality.
With this in mind, E&E appear to be guilty of overselling their
case against normativism. Contrary to what they appear to
suggest, their arguments cannot plausibly be seen as militating
in favor of the view that “theories of higher mental processing
would be better off freed from normative considerations”
(target article, Abstract). Rather, at most their arguments
provide grounds for rejecting a specific kind of normativism:
one that construes normative standards of rationality in a
narrow and not especially plausible fashion.








Abstract: This commentary questions Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) claims
that thinking tasks are doomed to have multiple normative readings and
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that only applied research allows normative evaluations. In fact, some
tasks have just one undisputed normative reading, and not only
pathological gamblers but also normal individuals sometimes need
normative guidance. To conclude, normative evaluations are inevitable
in the investigation of human thinking.
With some “increasingly rare” exceptions, the tasks used to inves-
tigate human thinking have multiple normative readings. Hence,
one cannot establish whether they elicit correct or incorrect
answers. This is the main argument used by Elqayam & Evans
(E&E) against the normative evaluation of thinking performance.
One problem with this argument is that some experimental para-
digms for investigating human thinking have just one normative
reading. E&E examine one class of these paradigms (i.e., the con-
ditional syllogisms) and claim that it is actually subject to norma-
tive dispute. Thus, E&E conclude that sooner or later alternative
normative systems will be proposed for any thinking paradigm.
There is reason to doubt this conclusion. Consider the typical
estimation tasks wherein respondents judge the total or relative
frequency of the items of a given class (e.g., Tversky & Kahne-
man 1973). Since there is an objective yardstick for enumerating
the items (e.g., men in a list of people, words that begin with r),
these tasks have one objectively correct answer. In some cases,
respondents do not produce that answer. For example, Tversky
and Kahneman’s respondents judged that the class of men in a
list was more numerous than the class of women, when in fact
the list contained 19 names of men and 20 names of women.
Accordingly, one has to conclude that these respondents erred.
And such a conclusion will hold until some alternative account
proves that judging a class of 19 items greater than a class of
20 items is normatively correct. E&E may be right in claiming
that paradigms of this kind are becoming “increasingly rare”
(target article, sect. 3, para. 3). The existence of such paradigms,
however, shows that investigating human thinking is not destined
to use tasks with competing normative readings, and that evalu-
ating the normative status of a given judgment is not always
open to dispute.
E&E correctly insist that one should understand what individ-
uals are doing and why, rather than “discussing what they are not
doing” (sect. 8, para. 2, authors’ emphasis). The latter motivation
may have driven some of the studies that have documented
biases in human thinking. Other studies of this sort, however,
have investigated the limits of human thinking processes in
order to understand them. For example, consider Tversky and
Kaheman’s studies mentioned above. They were not aimed to
simply reveal the faulty nature of respondents’ estimations, but
instead tested the hypothesis that the ease of recall of instances
affects frequency and probability judgments in tasks for which
there is a normative standard (e.g., judging the frequency of
men in a list), as well as in tasks for which there is no such stan-
dard (e.g., judging the probability that a given depressed patient
will commit suicide). Quite ironically, E&E contrast the contro-
versial nature of thinking studies with the undisputed nature of
memory studies, and indicate the “acute” problems derived
from adopting memory paradigms to thinking research. Yet, as
Tversky and Kahneman’s studies show, memory search is the
basis of many judgmental activities, and investigating recall pro-
cesses may shed light on thinking processes.
E&E concede that in some cases one is entitled to evaluate
thinking performance: “If your objective is to improve thinking
(rather than to understand it), then you must have criteria for dis-
tinguishing good thinking from bad” (sect. 5.2, para. 5). E&E
refer to individuals who behave against their interests, such as
pathological gamblers. They argue that one has to help these
individuals by modifying their wrong beliefs and teaching them
the rules of probability calculus. According to E&E, such an
instrumental approach is necessary in applied research but
totally inappropriate in “basic theoretical research” (sect. 8,
para. 2). The point is that even basic research has discovered
individuals who need some normative help. Consider
respondents who bet on the conjunction of events A&B, rather
than on event A (Tversky & Kahneman 1983). If you follow
E&E’s recommendation, you should refrain from judging
respondents’ bets. Yet, these respondents behave against their
interests. They miss a chance of winning the bet, the one in
which the conjunction of events A&not-B occurs. Therefore,
you should inform them that they have made a bad decision. In
doing so, you employ a normative standard; that is, you inform
respondents that they do not conform to basic norms of probabil-
istic calculus. In sum, even basic research may force you to evalu-
ate respondents’ performance and to improve it by means of
normative guidance.
Besides applied domains, there is an entire domain of basic
research, neglected by E&E, wherein evaluating thinking per-
formance is inevitable. According to E&E, when respondents
have to evaluate a posterior probability, in order to “get the
problem right” (sect. 6, para. 5, emphasis added), respondents
need to reason about frequencies or to learn Bayes’ rule. This
claim is inaccurate, since respondents, including preschoolers,
may solve this problem without reasoning about frequencies
(Girotto & Gonzalez 2001; 2008). Preschoolers, of course, are
not familiar with the rules of probability calculus. Yet, at
around the age of five, they solve this sort of problem. Before
that age they fail to, and after that age their performance
improves. This example is relevant because it concerns a
problem for which even E&E accept that there is only one
right solution. However, the entire investigation of the develop-
ment of thinking processes speaks in favor of normative evalu-
ation. If one does not use normative standards, how could one
compare the answers produced by children of different ages?
More generally, how could one claim that children’s thinking
processes improve (or, for that matter, worsen; see Noveck
2001), if one does not have normative standards to assess them?
E&E are probably right in claiming that some psychologists
say, “Respondents should not think this,” in the same evaluative
sense in which they say, “Poverty should not exist.” Yet, there are
cases, like the ones mentioned above, in which psychologists are
entitled to say, “Respondents should not think this,” in the same
evaluative sense in which they say, “You should not eat this.”
Normative theory in decision making
and moral reasoning
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11000495
Natalie Gold,a Andrew M. Colman,b and Briony D. Pulfordb
aSchool of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Scotland, United Kingdom; bSchool of





Abstract: Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive
theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used
to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game
theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral
reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive
without normative considerations.
Normative theories may be superfluous in certain specific cases
discussed in Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) stimulating and informa-
tive target article. But the fact that some people may be tempted
by a fallacious is-ought inference is not sufficient reason for aban-
doning normative theories in all cases.
A widely held position in philosophy of science is that all scien-
tific observations are theory laden (e.g., Kuhn 1962), partly
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because investigators’ theories influence what data they consider
it worthwhile to collect. Further, when interpreting behavior, we
tend to apply Davidson’s (1973) “principle of charity,” originally
intended for interpreting sentences but more widely applicable.
This involves assuming that people are generally rational and
interpreting their behavior in that light. Thus, behavioral
researchers implicitly draw on a normative theory.
Normative theories have also been useful in generating power-
ful descriptive theories, using a style of theorizing that does not
fall foul of the is-ought fallacy. For example, subjective expected
utility (SEU) theory is evidently normative, specifying what
choices rational agents ought to make in order to satisfy their
own desires. By appending to SEU a hypothesis of weak ration-
ality, according to which people try to do the best for themselves
in any circumstances that arise, we derive the descriptive prin-
ciple of methodological individualism (Weber 1922/1978, Ch.
1), a mainstay of the contemporary social sciences, reflected in
rational choice theory and behavioral game theory, both direct
descendants of SEU theory (Elster 1989).
It was Savage (1972), not von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947), who introduced a normative interpretation into SEU
theory: “One idea now held by me that I think von Neumann
and Morgenstern do not explicitly support, and that so far as I
know they might not wish to have attributed to them, is the nor-
mative interpretation of the theory” (Savage 1972, p. 97). Norma-
tive considerations seem quite natural and useful in judgment
and decision making research. If you invite people to make a
snap choice between 96  69 cents and 87  78 cents, most
will choose 96  69 cents; but if you point out that
96  69 ¼ 6,624, whereas 87  78 ¼ 6,786, they will swiftly
change their minds, if allowed to (Binmore 2009, pp. 22–23).
This illustrates two important facts: first, people generally try to
act rationally in the sense of maximizing their expected utilities;
but second, they are limited by bounded rationality and are
prone to error.
A domain of higher mental processing within which normative
considerations seem quite unavoidable is moral reasoning. Eva-
luative “ought” questions are the very essence of moral reasoning.
We are currently engaged in a research project investigating
judgments as to whether it is morally acceptable to sacrifice
one life to save five in the following famous Trolley problem
(Foot 1967):
A trolley is running out of control down a railway track. In its path are
five people who will be killed if it continues on its course. By operating
a lever, you can divert the trolley on to a different track, where a solitary
man in its path will be killed. Is it morally permissible to operate the
lever?
Most people (90%, according to Hauser 2007) say yes; but Thom-
son’s (1976) closely related Footbridge problem elicits very
different responses:
A trolley is running out of control down a railway track. In its path are
five people who will be killed if it continues on its course. You are on a
footbridge over the tracks next to a large man. The only way to save the
five people is to push the man off the bridge, into the path of the trolley,
where only he will be killed. Is it morally permissible to push the man
off the footbridge?
Most people (90%, according to Hauser 2007) say no. Why do
most people consider it morally acceptable to sacrifice one life
to save five in one problem but not the other?
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, the differences
in responses to the two problems are reminiscent of the classic
demonstration of a framing effect, in which two different descrip-
tions of a problem involving a certain number of lives at risk elicit
difference responses (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Greene
(2007) has argued that the Footbridge problem tends to engage
our emotions to a greater extent than the Trolley problem, and
that our emotions deflect us from the utilitarian judgment in
the Footbridge problem.
Some philosophers have argued that there are morally relevant
distinctions between the two problems. Foot (1967) drew atten-
tion to the doctrine of double effect, first suggested by the medie-
val scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, according to which
harm is acceptable if it occurs as a foreseen but unintended con-
sequence of an action serving a greater good, as in the Trolley
problem, but not as a means to an end, as in the Footbridge
problem. Quinn (1989) argued that the difference in responses
is justified by the doctrine of doing and allowing, according to
which pushing the man off the bridge is unacceptable because
the harm results from intentional action, rather than from an
omission, or failure to act. However, some psychologists have
argued that the distinction between omission and commission
is the result of a psychological bias (e.g. Ritov & Baron 1992;
but see DeScioli et al., in press).
Others have proposed a universal moral grammar or UMG
(Hauser 2007; Mikhail 2007), according to which normative
moral principles, such as a prohibition of killing, are arrived at
by an unconscious computational model, analogous to Chomsky’s
(1995) universal grammar for human languages, this grammar
being in accord with the doctrine of double effect.
How could moral problems possibly be freed from normative
considerations? Perhaps some theories of higher mental proces-
sing can manage without such considerations, but it is hard to see
how this could (or why it should) be generalized to all domains of
research.
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Abstract: Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding
behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but
many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the
development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are
used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems
no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.
It is uncontroversial that a full understanding of behaviour
involves multiple aspects. Psychology seeks to identify lawful
regularities: We seek to understand the “what” of behaviour
such that we can predict it. We also seek to understand why
these regularities obtain. This involves two distinct kinds of
causal explanation: (1) an understanding of the mechanisms/
processes that give rise to the behaviour, and (2) functional expla-
nation, that is, an understanding of why this behaviour and not
others. Finally, psychology considers how such understanding
allows performance to be improved in practice.
For all these questions, normative standards, that is, character-
izations of how something “ought to be,” seem indispensable. Tri-
vially, performance cannot be improved without knowing what
would count as “better.” Likewise, functional explanation will
make reference to the fact that a behaviour maximizes some
“desirable” criterion – where both “desirability” and “maximiza-
tion” typically invoke normative considerations. Even the basic
task of identifying behavioural regularities cannot afford blind-
ness to normative considerations.
Rational standards provide essential interpretative tools.
Human behaviour typically affords many different interpretations.
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In daily life we resolve this ambiguity with the help of “the prin-
ciple of charity” (e.g., Govier 1987). Given multiple possible
interpretations of an utterance, we pick, as a default, the interpret-
ation that renders it most sensible. Of course, this interpretation
may prove wrong, and further evidence may lead us to abandon
it; that there are default orderings over possible interpretations,
however, simplifies massively the task of understanding.
Moreover this has consequences not only for the interpretation
of a single utterance or act, but also for prediction. How we inter-
pret what someone has said or done has direct implications for
what we expect that person to do in other, similar situations. Fur-
thermore, even without specific knowledge of an individual we
can often make reasonably accurate predictions just on the
basis of what would be “sensible” (though again, there is no guar-
antee that these predictions will be correct).
The principle of charity has both informal and more formal
manifestations within psychological research. Informally, wher-
ever we observe something surprising, we should ask ourselves
whether there is an interpretation of participants’ behaviour
that renders it sensible and hence predictable. This may lead
to re-evaluation of how our task is understood by the participants,
to a different interpretation of what they are doing, and to quite
different predictions and observations in response to changes in
task parameters. Demonstrations of the (unintended) influence
of the pragmatics of the experimental situation in giving rise to
seeming “errors” and “biases” are a prime example of such re-
evaluations (Hilton 1995).
Likewise, there are clear examples where a focus on the func-
tional, computational level gave rise to more detailed predictions
than research focused on process level explanations. For
example, Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) probabilistic approach
to the conditional provided a level of specificity previously
unknown in the field of logical reasoning by introducing quanti-
tative predictions (Hahn 2009).
Ultimately, complementing this functional level of explanation
with descriptively accurate process theory will provide even more
accurate prediction by capturing not just those aspects where be-
haviour approximates the normative standard, but also its sys-
tematic deviations. But again, for identifying these underlying
processes rational norms can provide powerful tools. This is illus-
trated by ideal observer analysis which has had tremendous
success in the study of perception (e.g., Geisler 1987). Ideal
observer models draw on the formal tools of probability and
decision theory to specify a model of optimal performance,
given the available input for a task. Actual human performance
is compared to the performance of this ideal agent. In a
process of iterative refinement, human performance and ideal
observer are brought into ever closer correspondence by incor-
porating into the ideal observer details of the human system.
This approach provides a tool for the elucidation of mechanism
and process, embedded in an overall account that seeks to
understand the system as “doing the best it can do” given the
available hardware. In so doing, it inherently links behavioural
prediction, mechanistic and functional explanation, and it
might be viewed as a methodological formalization of the prin-
ciple of charity. Similar programmes are found under the
header of bounded rationality or bounded optimality within cog-
nitive psychology. Here, it has been stressed how rational norms
can aid the disambiguation between competing theories and
assist in the identification of underlying cognitive universals
above and beyond the demand characteristics of experimental
tasks (Howes et al. 2009).
The fact that most of this work is outside the domain of classic
reasoning, judgment, and decision-making research, calls into
question Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) claim that these latter
areas would make more rapid progress by abandoning their
focus on normative standards.
It also highlights the weakness in E&E’s central claims about
the “is-ought” fallacy. Spelling out what counts as “sensible” is
itself a non-trivial task in that there are a number of normative
frameworks – logic, probability theory, decision theory, ecologi-
cal rationality, and so on. They can differ in the interpretive focus
they provide on a given task, because they make salient different
aspects of behaviour. However, lawful connections exist between
these frameworks; they are not simply “competitors.” Even more
importantly, choosing between them in the interpretation of be-
haviour is not an inference about their normativity. Classical
logic, probability theory, and decision theory all have indepen-
dent, normative justifications (e.g., in the instrumental rationality
of “Dutch books”). Appealing to certain aspects of the data in
order to claim, as do Oaksford and Chater, that, in standard
logical reasoning tasks, participants behave as if considering
these tasks to involve probabilistic inference is not a statement
about whether probability theory itself is normative, but about
whether it provides the standard that renders participants’ be-
haviour “sensible” and “intelligible.”
There is no is-ought fallacy here. The normative theory is
being used to provide interpretation and explanation of the be-
havioural data. In so doing, particular aspects of it are highlighted
as relevant. As always, such interpretation may or may not turn
out to be correct and the process may even be bi-directional; mis-
match between what we consider to be “sensible” and what we
observe may lead us to alter our understanding of “sensible”
and what factors a behaviour should take into account.
However, elucidating “sensible” will always involve consider-
ations above and beyond the immediate data themselves – only
then can it be of any use in interpretation, explanation, and pre-
diction. The data themselves are prompts, not normative
justification.
Normative theories are essential tools for understanding be-
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that evaluative normativism
leads to unacceptable research biases, and should be avoided. Though
it is stipulated that the particular biases they discuss are cause for
concern, this argument should not be generalized. The boundary
between evaluative and goal-directed “directive” norms is difficult to
define, and normative assumptions are an integral part of academic
progress; moreover, the biases that result may have beneficial potential.
As an anthropologist, I find academic culture fascinatingly full of
contradictions. Perhaps that is why, although I find this target
article convincing in its details, I interpret its significance
rather differently.
As I understand it, Elqayam & Evans (E&E) distinguish
between a “directive ought,” in which the statement “one
should x” is conditional upon the desire to achieve a specific
goal, and an “evaluative ought.” The authors write: “It is only
when formal systems are regarded as having a priori, uncondi-
tional value, that the ‘ought’ becomes an evaluative one” (sect.
2, para. 5). The absolute, unquestioned form, it seems, can lead
one towards the academic sin of bias.
My first concern is this: In practice, the distinction between
“oughts” is fuzzy. For example, does the researcher have to be
personally conscious of the goal-directed rationale behind a dis-
ciplinary norm to avoid an evaluative ought, or is it enough that it
exists? For example, in anthropology there is a clear bias against
working for the military. Our disciplinary history shows why we
would be cautious, but it would seem the bias is more widely
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known than the specific reasons for it. Similarly, must the goal be
made explicit to avoid the accusation of evaluative normativism?
Many of my immediate colleagues employ evolutionary per-
spectives. We often casually refer to the “purpose” of a trait, or
the “reason” it was selected for. We know evolution is not purpo-
seful – but a third-party observer could be forgiven for perceiv-
ing a teleological error on our part. Perhaps we should not
interpret too deeply into researchers’ choice of words when
they do not specifically address the meaning of “ought” in their
work.
For example, E&E hold Gigerenzer and Todd (Gigerenzer
et al. 1999) as an example of the proper way to avoid evaluative
normativism. Gigerenzer, they say, “famously repudiates norma-
tive systems, arguing that heuristic rules of thumb outperform
normative computations” (target article, sect. 1, para. 8; cf. Giger-
enzer 2007). To my mind, Gigerenzer and Todd do not do away
with normativism but rather substitute one norm with another:
they clearly think that problem-solving “ought” to be cost-effec-
tive (i.e., considering not just accuracy but also effort and the
costs of error).
If we stipulate that academia is a problem-solving institution,
perhaps we should consider normativism using a similar cost/
benefit analyses. How hard would it be to eradicate evaluative
normativism? And when it expresses as bias, is it a “bad thing,”
or could there be positive effects?
We should consider how deeply ingrained normative judg-
ments are in the process of academic progress – even in the
assumption that progress is “a good thing.” It is somewhat
ironic that E&E appear to be making a normative claim when
they say we should avoid normativism. One could object that
their claim is directive – that this “ought” implies a reason: to
further the scientific understanding of human behavior. But
this merely points towards another a priori assumption: that
understanding human behavior, and specifically understanding
it in a particular way, is a “good thing.” There would seem to
be a strong interaction between our evaluative “oughts” and aca-
demic progress (cf. Kuhn 1996). E&E say that normative
research biases affect what researchers choose to study (sect. 6,
para. 9); one could also say, normative research biases concen-
trate efforts. Perhaps progress can be described in terms of
improved (or, at least, more useful) normative assumptions.
But I would make two stronger claims. First, bias may be a
potentially useful part of academic method. Consider peer
review, one of the primary evaluatory mechanisms that allows
academia to function. Much effort is expended into making
peer review “unbiased,” for example, by hiding authors’ identities
from reviewers, lest they fall prey to the “Matthew” and “Matilda”
effects that bias reviews in favor of high-status (Merton 1968) and
male (Rossiter 1993) academics. While double-blinding con-
forms to the academic norm of objectivity, it also saves us from
having to decide when sex and/or status biases can be justified.
For example, it may be useful to allow a bias that favors
women in fields where they are underrepresented (e.g., engin-
eering, philosophy).
Second, our extra-academic a priori norms may alert us to
potential conflicts between the intellectual merit of a practice
within academia and the broader impacts on society. (My refer-
ence to the National Science Foundation’s evaluative criteria is
deliberate.) For example, one might feel that the President of
Harvard ought not to suggest that women may be less rep-
resented in the sciences due to innate differences in their math-
ematical ability (Bombardieri 2005); or find it inappropriate that
the excavation of the Manhattan antebellum African American
Burial Ground began without significant African American par-
ticipation (Harrington 1993). In either case, regardless of our
evaluation of intellectual merit, our extra-academic norms alert
us to possible negative impacts.
In summary, E&E make what seems to be a valid point regard-
ing a particular normative assumption. I would suggest that we
not generalize from this, but consider all biases – even ones
that produce gross biases – individually, in light of their impact
on academia and more broadly. Do as E&E have done, and
make the a priori assumptions explicit, evaluate the biases they
produce, and examine available alternatives instead of dismissing
even evaluative normativism out of hand.
Cultural and individual differences in the
generalization of theories regarding human
thinking
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Abstract: Tests of a universal theory often find significant variability and
individual differences between cultures. We propose that descriptivism
research should focus more on cultural and individual differences,
especially those based on motivational factors. Explaining human
thinking by focusing on individual difference factors across cultures
could provide a parsimonious paradigm, by uncovering the true causal
mechanisms of psychological processes.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest that it is only within the para-
digm of descriptivism that competing theories can be arbitrated.
We agree with their argument; but, in order to more parsimo-
niously and appropriately arbitrate those theories, descriptivism
should focus more on the role of studies on cultural and individ-
ual differences for the explanation of the human mind.
Normative considerations have critical limitations for under-
standing the human mind, especially on the computational
level, because normativism does not provide insight into the
variability in human cognition and behavior. Descriptivism is
an alternative approach. For example, the dual-process or dual-
system paradigm proposes two types of processes: (a) heuristic,
rapid, parallel preconscious processes, and (b) analytic, effortful,
sequential processes that correlate with general cognitive ability.
The paradigm’s core idea is that research should focus on observ-
ing and explaining the thinking and reasoning that people do,
without preconceived concerns about what they ought to do.
Nonetheless, the paradigm’s current form is still insufficient
for understanding the human mind, because descriptivism
research needs to focus more on cultural and individual differ-
ences, especially those based on motivational factors. A major
limitation of the explanatory approach is that the observation
and, thereby, the interpretation of theory construction is often
idiosyncratic to a particular culture or group. Research has
shown variations from a given prediction, regardless of whether
it is normative or descriptive, in many domains and on different
levels between cultures.
For example, researchers had thought that persons from East
Asian cultures were more risk-averse in most domains, such as
social risk, than are persons from Western cultures; but, surpris-
ingly, the former show greater risk-seeking than Westerners do
regarding financial risks (Hsee & Weber 1999). Furthermore,
such cross-cultural differences are found not only in higher-level
cognition but in other levels as well, despite human-cognition
researchers’ intuition that the higher the level of cognitive think-
ing, the more the influence of individual and cultural differences
in the resulting behavior. In contrast, observing fundamental
differences between different populations on the perceptual
level is not difficult. For example, Chua et al. (2005a) measured
the eye movements of American and Chinese participants while
they viewed photographs comprising a focal object on a complex
background. The Americans fixated more often on the focal
objects than did the Chinese, and the Americans tended to look
at the focal object more quickly. In contrast, Chinese participants
Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5 259
emphasized background in their visual perception. Even in every-
day events, Americans tended to focus more on characteristics to
do with self and personal agency and intentionality, and less on
emotionality than East Asians did (Chua et al. 2005b).
As these cross-cultural examples show, if every culture or
group requires its own explanatory story, then there probably
isn’t any way to find generalizations about human cognition and
behavior. Numerous previous studies observed a degree of varia-
bility consistent with this possibility. Obviously, this concept lacks
parsimony in regard to explaining human thinking, but parsi-
mony should be one of the core aspects of descriptivism. An
alternative (and supplementary) approach is to identify psycho-
logical variables that differ between cultures or groups, which
would help to unify research on cultural and/or group differ-
ences and research on other kinds of individual differences.
This individual differences approach seeks psychological vari-
ables, differing both within and across cultures or groups, that
explain previously observed differences in cognitive performance
(Kim & Markman 2006; Weber & Hsee 2000).
In line with this idea, Kim and his colleagues (Kim & Markman
2006; Kim et al. 2007; Markman et al. 2009) have suggested that
considering cultural difference can provide better generalizations
about human cognition, by emphasizing the processes by which
individual difference factors lead to behaviors. For example, Kim
and Markman (2006) manipulated fear of isolation (FOI) in Amer-
ican college students and observed that the high FOI group
showed a greater relative preference for dialectical and holistic
proverbs, which reflect collectivist viewpoints, than did the low
FOI group. Another typical study of cultural difference observed
this pattern with regard to Chinese and American populations,
respectively (Peng & Nisbett 1999). This result could establish a
causal link between FOI and cognition. Another example is
research into self-construal’s effect on judgment. In Gardner
et al.’s (1999) study, individuals from the United States and
Hong Kong, when primed for independent self-construal, pre-
ferred individualist values to collectivist values. In contrast, those
primed for interdependent self-construal showed the opposite
pattern. More importantly, this priming procedure produced the
same outcomes found in cultures promoting individualism and col-
lectivism, respectively, while also causally linking self-construal
differences and value differences.
Thus, differences in a motivation-based individual difference
factor, such as FOI or self-construal, create different cognitive
goals; and different cultures’ differing cognitive and behavioral out-
comes reflect these different goals. Probably this is why researchers
observe variability and inconsistencies from/against any universal
theory or explanation, regardless of whether its basis is normativism
or descriptivism. Nonetheless, individual research has often
explored only one or two aspects of the causal mechanisms of indi-
vidual differences, the differences’ influence on cognitive pro-
cesses, and/or different behavioral outcomes between cultures.
The particular goals a person can have are culturally determined.
However, the goal activation’s influence on human thinking may be
common across individuals. Individual difference factors might
differ across cultures and influence behavior. Therefore, taken
together, culturally universal cognitive mechanisms could still
cause cultural differences in behavior. While the content of
people’s goals clearly differs across cultures, the motivational
system’s mechanisms of operation might be universal. Similarly,
while cultures may emphasize different personality characteristics
(on average), these characteristics’ influence on thinking and be-
havior could be the same among members of different cultures.
In sum, we suggest research should shift away from assessing
broad behaviors and toward assessing the psychological character-
istics underlying a behavior’s processes, by exploring individual
difference factors within/between cultures. Taken at face value,
an explanation of human thinking focusing on individual difference
factors across cultures makes the theory merely complex; but, ulti-
mately, it can provide a parsimonious paradigm, by uncovering the
true causal mechanisms of psychological processes.
Norms and high-level cognition:
Consequences, trends, and antidotes
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Abstract: We are neither as pessimistic nor as optimistic as Elqayam &
Evans (E&E). The consequences of normativism have not been
uniformly disastrous, even among the examples they consider.
However, normativism won’t be going away any time soon and in the
literature on causal Bayes nets new debates about normativism are
emerging. Finally, we suggest that to concentrate on expert reasoners
as an antidote to normativism may limit the contribution of research on
thinking to basic psychological science.
Normative issues have the potential to bedevil our field (the
study of thinking) and Elqayam & Evans (E&E) have done us
a great service in laying bare many of the problematic conse-
quences of taking normative theories too seriously. Here, we
ask whether normativism has been uniformly harmful, whether
the end of normativism is really nigh, and whether the antidote
proposed by E&E may do more harm than good.
We are not as alarmed about normativism as are E&E, many of
whose arguments concern the psychology of deductive reasoning,
and conditionals in particular, where the problem of multiple
norms seems to be very acute. However, there are other areas
in the study of high-level cognition (for summaries, see Feeney
& Heit 2007; Murphy 2002) where normativism has the potential
to be equally problematic but descriptivism has held sway.
Even in the areas on which E&E focus, normativism has not
been uniformly disastrous. We do find it plausible that there are
entire literatures which would not exist were it not for normative
considerations. For instance, it is unlikely that anything resembling
the actual literature on base rate neglect would exist had there not
been a preoccupation with Bayesian norms in the 1960s and 1970s
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1973; Peterson & Beach 1967).
However, inspired by the gap between normative behaviour and
what people do in base rate neglect experiments, very important
findings have been described about the difficulties people encoun-
ter in representing statistical information. For example, we now
know the importance of the way the problem is described in facil-
itating people’s recognition of the set relations underlying statistical
problems (see Barbey & Sloman 2007; Evans et al. 2000; Girotto &
Gonzalez 2001). Extremely interesting claims about the impor-
tance of causal models in statistical reasoning have also been
made on the basis of experiments using the base rates paradigm
(Krynski & Tenenbaum 2007). We know that people tend to use
base rate statistics that they have acquired via experience more
than those given to them by the experimenter (Gigerenzer et al.
1988), and the study of base rate neglect has greatly increased
our understanding of the role of inhibitory control in thinking
(De Neys & Glumicic 2008). None of this work seems to have
been carried out in an evaluative spirit, although each of the
researchers coded their participants’ responses in the standard,
normatively determined way. Despite this, all of these studies
can fairly be described as having contributed to our understanding
of psychological processes. So even in the very select range
of domains considered by E&E, normativism has had various con-
sequences. These range from literatures almost coming to a stand-
still – as seems to be the case with the literature on Wason’s
selection task – to the continued productive use of a paradigm
whose invention was rooted in Kahneman and Tversky’s goal of
showing that a particular normative theory is an inadequate
psychological account.
By alluding to areas in the study of high-level cognition, such as
inductive reasoning and categorisation, where descriptivism
Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
260 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5
rules, we do not mean to suggest that normativism does not have
the potential to be perilous. Oaksford and Chater (2007), in their
Bayesian analysis of reasoning have been concerned with decid-
ing on the most appropriate norm and with the psychological
mechanisms that might approximate that norm. Unfortunately,
Bayesian analyses in other domains of high-level cognition (for
a review, see Jones & Love 2011) have not paid as much attention
to mechanism. It is true that some of these analyses are pitched at
the descriptive level (see Krynski & Tenenbaum [2007] on causal
models and base rate neglect), but many others work at a compu-
tational level (e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum 2009). As Sloman (2007)
has pointed out, computational Bayesian models also work as
normative models, whether or not they are described in such
terms by their creators. This is because implicit in this type of
computational model is the claim that there is a single Bayesian
account for a particular type of thinking. No doubt inspired by
this insight, Fernbach et al. (2011) have recently described a nor-
mative model of causal inductive reasoning based on causal Bayes
nets and shown that when people reason predictively, from cause
to effect, their inferences do not conform to the prescriptions of
the model. This is a very important demonstration for those of
us who work on inductive reasoning; but it also feels as if history
might be beginning to repeat itself, and rather than being at the
end of normativism, we may be about to see another battle in a
war that seems likely to end no time soon.
Finally, E&E suggest in a number of places in the target article
that we should focus on expert reasoning and how it is acquired.
We see several problems with this as an agenda for our field.
First, the cognitive biases seen in experts (defined, of course,
with reference to some normative theory) are the same as those
seen in naı¨ve reasoners (see Bornstein & Emler 2001), so there
may be very little to be gained from the exclusive study of
experts. Of course, one could study how expert reasoners
become expert, but then, if experts display the same biases as
naı¨ve reasoners, intervention is clearly required, which necessitates
debate about norms. It seems to us that this debate will happen
even if the goal of a meliorist intervention is instrumental ration-
ality. This is because, in a domain where complex statistical think-
ing is required, experts may have to be taught how to approximate a
norm in order to attain their goals. However, perhaps the most
serious problem with the abandonment of naı¨ve individuals by
our field is that this would drastically reduce our contribution to
basic psychological science. Thinking is central to what it means
to be human and if E&E are correct that the old paradigm
doesn’t work, then we must find ways to usefully study how naı¨ve
and expert participants choose, make judgements, and reason.
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that the major objective of
research on human thinking should be the development of descriptive
theories, and they challenge normativism – “the belief that people
ought to conform to a normative standard” (target article, sect. 1, para.
10). I contend that although their argument for the importance of
developing descriptive theories is compelling, normative theories are
also important, not only for improving thinking but for investigating
and understanding it as well.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) have served up an impressive collec-
tion of thought-provoking ideas. Most importantly, in my view,
they raise challenging questions about what the goals of research
on thinking should be, and about the types of theories of thinking
that researchers should strive to produce. They argue that the
primary goal should be to discover the rules that describe how
thinking is actually done, as distinct from how it ought to be
done – that the theories we strive to develop should be descrip-
tive, as distinct from normative. They contend that criteria for
evaluating the quality of thinking are essential to the practical
objective of improving thinking, but not to the objective of inves-
tigating and understanding thinking.
E&E’s argument regarding the importance of description as
a goal of research strikes me as compelling, but their dismissal
of normativism, defined as “the belief that people ought to
conform to a normative standard” (sect. 1, para. 10), does not.
I find it easy to agree with the emphasis on description, but diffi-
cult to accept the idea that appeal to norms for the purpose of
investigating and understanding thinking is inapt.
E&E acknowledge that “formal systems such as logic and Baye-
sianism have provided major incentives and inspiration to count-
less research paradigms” (sect. 7, para. 2), but they see these
systems’ pitfalls as outweighing their positives by enough to
warrant consideration of proscribing normativism. “Can we,”
they ask, “make do in reasoning and JDM [judgment and decision
making] without normative theories altogether?” (sect. 7, para. 2).
In my view, the answer is no. Or, better, that we could make do
without them, but only at unacceptable cost. I take a normative
theory of thinking to be a theory that specifies how we should
think, taking our capabilities and limitations into account.
Some refer to this type of theory as prescriptive, and reserve nor-
mative to connote what would be prescriptive for a creature
without human limitations. I find this distinction unhelpful;
what may be normative for a creature without human limitations
would not only not be prescriptive for us, it would not be norma-
tive for us either.
We want to know not only how we reason, but how we should
reason. Maybe the way we reason is how we should, and maybe
not. My sense is that the truth is somewhere in between – that
our reasoning is not entirely consistent with what any reasonable
normative model that takes account of human capabilities and
limitations would prescribe, but also not quite as bankrupt as
some presentations of the biases to which we appear to be
prone seem to suggest.
The study of thinking is motivated by a variety of goals, descrip-
tion, and evaluation – the latter of which requires norms – among
them. The results of countless studies show that neither traditional
logic nor probability theory is descriptive of human reasoning as it
is generally done. And in the opinions of many scholars, neither
logic nor probability theory constitutes a plausible normative
theory of how reasoning by mere mortals should be done. Disputes
abound among philosophers and logicians regarding what should
be considered normative in both deductive and inductive reason-
ing. This is illustrated, for example, by the long-running debates
about the rules of conditional inference: Are conditional assertions
truth functional? Should If A, then C be interpreted as the
material conditional? Is the probability of the conditional the
conditional probability? What does it mean for a counterfactual
world to be maximally (or sufficiently) similar to the actual
world? The literature is rife with arguments and counterargu-
ments about such questions, most of which are never settled
decisively.
That the challenge of developing a plausible normative theory
of thinking is daunting has long been recognized by philosophers.
MacIntyre (1988), who discusses it at length, takes the position
that it is not possible to identify principles of rationality that
will be universally recognized as valid. Still, we must have
norms, even if any norms that we adopt are unlikely to be accep-
table to everyone. We need norms, not only to live by, but in
terms of which to understand our thinking – how it is good
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and how it is not. Even to say that normativism is wrong is to
imply the existence of some norm that justifies that assessment.
There are approaches to the study of reasoning and decision
making that attempt to bridge the gap between descriptive and
normative theories. One example is that of Fox and colleagues
(Fox 2003; Fox & Parsons 1998; Fox et al. 2003), whose approach
aims to deal realistically with situations in which people have to
operate – in which problems often are poorly formed, relevant
knowledge may be lacking, the circumstances may be fluid and
time limited, but action is required. Perhaps the best chance of
developing truly useful normative theories for such cases is via
(descriptive) study of how the more effective reasoners and
decision makers deal with them. This is the rationale, I believe,
that motivates the naturalistic decision-making approach of
Klein and colleagues (Klein 1998; Pliske & Klein, 2003;
Zsambok & Klein 1997). In both cases, the goal is not only accu-
rate description of how reasoning and decision making are actu-
ally done in real-world situations, but an understanding of the
processes that can be used for prescriptive purposes as well.
E&E note several ways in which formal systems can be useful
for psychological theorizing, and vice versa. This strikes me as an
especially important part of their discussion. However, I wonder
about the impression conveyed by their Figure 2 that the flow is
primarily from formal systems to psychological theory and data
rather than the reverse, and about E&E’s exclusion of validation
from the ways in which psychological theory and data influence
formal theories (see target article, sect. 7). Excluding validation
from the ways in which psychology can influence formal theories
raises the question of what the basis of the authority of formal
theories could be, if not the warrant given by human judgment.
One accepts the laws of (some) logic as binding, if one does,
because one finds them psychologically compelling; to what
else could one turn?
The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy
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Abstract: Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we
ought to think or behave. Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that this “is-
ought fallacy” undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how
people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed
application of the “is-ought” fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis
seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory
experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived
from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&E’s arguments.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) outline an argument that, if correct,
would fatally undermine the research programme of the rational
analysis of reasoning, in which we and colleagues have been
closely involved (e.g., Chater & Oaksford 1999; Hahn & Oaksford
2007; Oaksford & Chater 1994; 1998a; 1998b; 2007; Oaksford
et al. 2000). But it would apply equally to models in behavioural
ecology (Krebs & Davies 1996), adaptive explanation in evol-
utionary biology (Sober 1993), ideal observer models in percep-
tion (Blake et al. 1996), Bayesian cognitive science (Chater et al.
2006), and rational choice theory and the whole of microeco-
nomics (Kreps 1992).
What these explanations have in common is that they harness
normative theories to explain descriptive facts. The structure of
the eye is explained because it forms clear images of the environ-
ment; the foraging patterns of a bee are explained as maximizing
food intake; a person’s “information foraging” is explained as
maximizing the amount of information acquired (Nelson 2005;
Oaksford & Chater 1994; Pirolli 2007). But it should be immedi-
ately clear that E&E’s application of the is-ought fallacy appears
itself to be fallacious. Such explanations do not derive ought
conclusions (which the is-ought fallacy forbids), but derive is con-
clusions: attempting to explain facts about wings, bees, or people.
How then do norms enter in to rational explanations?
Anderson (1990; 1991) provides an elegant account, in the
context of psychological processes (see Oaksford & Chater 2007):
Step 1. Specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system.
Step 2. Develop a formal model of the environment to which
the system is adapted.
Step 3. Make minimal assumptions about computational
limitations.
Step 4. Derive the optimal behaviour function, given 1–3
above. (This requires formal analysis using rational norms,
such as probability theory and decision theory.)
Step 5. Examine the empirical evidence to see whether the
predictions of the behaviour function are confirmed.
Step 6. Repeat, iteratively refining the theory.
Note that norms, such as those from probability theory or
decision theory, enter only in Step 4: they help derive optimal be-
haviour, given the specification of goals, environment, and com-
putational limitations. No ought is hidden here either. Given
that Steps 1 to 3 specify a well-defined problem (which is
required, or else an optimal solution to the problem will be ill-
defined), then the optimal solution (if there is one) is a matter
of fact not evaluation: an is, not an ought. Take the familiar
example of the travelling salesman problem: if the goal is visiting
all towns in the shortest possible route; if the map is such and
such; then it is a matter of fact (not evaluation) that the optimal
route is thus and so.
Now E&E might object that the choice of norms to solve the
problem at Step 4 can be challenged: Are there not competing
normative theories? We suggest, by contrast, that Step 4 must
always be well-defined (for the rational explanation to be
viable); but that the assumptions that go in to Steps 1 to 3 can
be challenged. Thus, in explaining behaviour in Wason’s (1968)
selection task, accounts differ concerning whether people are
optimizing information gain, or some measure of “utility” (i.e.,
there are differences over Step 1) (Oaksford & Chater 1994);
and theories can differ about assumptions about environmental
structure (Step 2) (Klauer 1999; Oaksford & Chater 2003). The-
ories do not differ about, for example, the axioms of probability
theory.
Perhaps individual rational explanations are free of E&E’s
charge; but might the rhetoric of rational analysis of reasoning
fall into this trap? E&E suggest that it may, proposing that the
following argument (which they attribute to us in their section
5.1, para. 1) commits the “is-ought” fallacy:
(1) Premise 1: People behave in a way that approximates Bayesian prob-
ability (“is”)
Premise 2: This behavior is successfully adaptive (“is”)
Conclusion: Therefore, Bayesian probability is the appropriate nor-
mative system (“ought”)
This would indeed be a fatally flawed argument but, pace E&E, it
is one that no proponent of rational analysis, including us, has
ever proposed. Our work has been completely explicit that the
normative basis of, for example, Bayesian inference is consistency
arguments, such as Dutch book theorems (e.g., Chater & Oaks-
ford, in press; Oaksford & Chater 2007).
We suspect that, in considering the above argument, E&E are
conflating the conclusion that Bayesian probability is the appro-
priate normative theory, with the conclusion that rational ana-
lyses, using Bayesian methods at Step 4, is the best descriptive
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theory. Rational analyses, like other scientific theories, are
chosen by their fit to the data.
Such issues are crucial in the psychology of reasoning: in build-
ing a rational analysis of conditional reasoning with verbal
materials (i.e., statements such as if A, then B; not-B, and so
on). Specifying the goal of reasoning (Step 1) may, for example,
be crucial: Is the aim to pick out conclusions that have a high
probability, given the premises? Or is it to pick out only con-
clusions that are definitely true, given the premises? How do
we interpret the materials that constitute the “environment”
over which reasoning must occur (Step 2)? Do people interpret
if. . ., then. . . as a material condition (as in propositional logic),
interpret it has an assertion about conditional probability
(Edgington 1995; Ramsey 1931), or adopt one of many other
possible interpretations. Different assumptions will lead to
different rational analyses – as with any other type of scientific
theory, competing accounts must be adjudicated, primarily by
their compatibility with the empirical data. Note, crucially,
however, that such assumptions are about facts: what is the
goal of a person’s reasoning; how do we interpret the conditional.
It is not about normative evaluations, such as what should be the
goal of reasoning or how should people interpret the conditional.
Such questions, while interesting, are not part of the scientific
project of rational analysis.
We conclude, overall, that E&E’s injunction that we never
infer an ought from an is is entirely correct; and entirely consist-
ent with the program of rational explanation of cognition, and
more generally with optimality explanations across the biological
and social sciences.
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Abstract: Normative theories like probability logic provide roadmaps for
psychological investigations. They make theorizing precise. Therefore,
normative considerations should not be subtracted from psychological
research. I explain why conditional elimination inferences involve at
least two norm paradigms; why reporting agreement with rationality
norms is informative; why alleged asymmetric relations between formal
and psychological theories are symmetric; and I discuss the arbitration
problem.
Purely psychological principles like limitations of cognitive
capacity guide psychological theories. However, a priori ration-
ality norms provide powerful roadmaps for the development of
psychological theories. They play essential roles in the context
of discovery and in the context of justification. In the context of
discovery, they guide the research questions, the tasks, and the
evaluation of the results. Wason’s selection task, for example,
was developed within the normative framework of classical
logic. From a probability logical point of view, this task does
not distinguish between the conditional event and the material
conditional interpretation, as both provide the same psychologi-
cal predictions. In the context of justification, rationality norms
are used to rationally reconstruct reasoning processes and the
empirical data. The probability propagation rules of the modus
tollens, for example, are formally much more complex than
those of the modus ponens, which explains experimental data
(Pfeifer & Kleiter 2009). Moreover, a formal theory provides a
language that makes psychological theorizing precise. Therefore,
I do not believe that “theories of higher mental processing would
be better off freed from normative considerations” (target article,
Abstract).
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that conditional elimination
inferences are single-norm paradigms. This is true in the frame-
work of classical logic. However, this does not hold in the frame-
work of probability logic. There are at least two norm conflicts in
the context of conditional elimination inferences (modus ponens,
modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the
antecedent). The probability propagation rules depend on
the interpretation of the conditional. As an example, consider
the probabilistic modus ponens. If the conditional is interpreted
as a conditional event, then the probabilistic modus consists of
the following inference:
If P(A) ¼ x and P(BjA) ¼ y, then xy  P(B)  xyþ 1 x is coherent:
If the conditional is interpreted as a material conditional, then
the probability propagation rule is a different one:
If P(A) ¼ x and P(A . B) ¼ y, then max {0, xþ y 1}  P(B)
 y is coherent:
There are similar norm conflicts for the other three conditional
syllogisms (Pfeifer & Kleiter 2005). Therefore, these conditional
elimination inferences are not examples of single-norm conflicts.
The authors argue, citing Evans (1982), that “we should desist
from the practice of reporting logical accuracy in reasoning tasks,
and instead report what people actually did” (sect. 6, para. 7).
I agree that empirical studies should report what people actually
did. However, I argue that reporting (dis)agreement with ration-
ality norms is important and informative. The basic question is
the choice of appropriate rationality norms. After about a
decade of reasoning research within the normative framework
of classical logic, we can safely state that it is high time to consider
extensions or alternative normative frameworks.
Coherence-based probability logic is one example (see, e.g.,
Pfeifer & Kleiter 2002; 2009; 2010). In this framework, the
focus is not on whether or how people draw logically correct
inferences about the logical validity of certain argument
forms. Rather, the tasks instruct the participants to transmit
the uncertainty of the premises to the conclusion. Thus, the
focus is on the participant’s degree of belief in the conclusion.
Probability logic allows for making psychological predictions
precise and offers new psychological explanations of the infer-
ences that people draw. The conditional introduction inference
from “B” to “If A, then B”, for example, is not probabilistically
informative under the conditional event interpretation of
indicative conditionals (P(BjA)) and this is the reason why
most people claim that one cannot infer a conditional from its
consequent (Pfeifer & Kleiter 2011). Contrary to standard
approaches to probability, this even holds in the special case
where the premise is given for sure (P(B) ¼ 1). Probability
logic tells us which argument forms are probabilistically infor-
mative and which ones are not (Pfeifer & Kleiter 2006; 2009).
“Probabilistic informativeness” is not an empirical term, it is
a criterion derived within the normative framework. I argue
that patterns of inferences beyond the conditional syllogisms
should be investigated. Psychological plausible principles, like
the ability of withdrawing conclusions in the light of new evi-
dence and the defeasibility of everyday inferences, should be
investigated. I agree that reasoning experiments should not
focus on logical validity. Rather, the degrees of belief in the
conclusions should be investigated.
E&E suggest there are asymmetric relations between formal
theories and psychological theories and data (see their
Figure 2). Indeed, formal theories inspire psychological theories.
However, psychological data can inspire formal theories as well.
Ford (2005), for example, investigates how experimental data
informs artificial intelligence systems and has developed a
formal system of nonmonotonic reasoning, which is inspired by
psychological data (Ford 2004). Moreover, not only psychological
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data arbitrate between formal theories: the converse holds as
well. In the field of nonmonotonic reasoning, for example,
there are many competing systems. However, System P (Kraus
et al. 1990) is an example of a common denominator of rationality
principles any system of nonmonotonic reasoning should satisfy.
It makes sense psychologically to use such a system to arbitrate
between formal theories in this field.
Another way of arbitrating between formal theories is to
require psychologically plausible but minimal principles for
rationality, such as coherence (see, e.g., Coletti & Scozzafava
2002). Coherence requires only avoiding bets that lead to sure
loss. This criterion is much weaker than, for example, requiring
maximizing expected utility. In my opinion, the relation
between normative and descriptive components in a psychologi-
cal theory of reasoning is a genuinely interactive one.
I agree with the authors that learning should be included in
reasoning research. Moreover, there seems to be a consensus
among reasoning researchers that the interpretation of the
task material remains the same within participants. However,
this is not the case in general. If participants solve several
items of the probabilistic truth table task, the number of con-
ditional event responses tend to increase from about 40% at
the beginning of the experiment to about 80% at the end.
Thus, the participant’s responses converge on the competence
answers (Fugard et al. 2011b). Assuming appropriate bridge
laws that connect “is” and “ought” inferences, I avoid commit-
ting the is–ought fallacy, if I claim that rational reasoners
should converge to the conditional event response.
A case for limited prescriptive normativism
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Abstract: Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework
necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is
because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of
some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The
empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different
formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advocate.
The problem of pursuing normative theories arises because we
think the cognitive system is successful. This reasoning can be
summarized in something like, to the extent that cognition is so
successful, whichever formal principles it is based on must be
normative. But the “success” of cognition is extremely context
dependent. Cognitive processing seems optimized with
respect to certain types of problems (e.g., Shepard 1992),
but, equally, it seems less so for other problems. In other
words, the success of cognitive processing is context depen-
dent. For example, it is arguable whether cognitive processing
is optimal in the Wason selection task. We can use information
theory to explain why people behave in the way they do in such
problems, as Oaksford and Chater (1994) did, but this does not
alter the fact that this is a deductive problem which has a
(deductively) correct answer. Indeed, if cognitive processing
were optimal across the board, the world should be problem-
free (or in any case have far fewer problems than we do
now). For example, people should always choose the right
mortgage, they should never succumb to gambling addiction,
and policy decisions should always be well-thought out and
optimal in terms of their respective objectives. Equally,
depending on training, experience, and so on, different obser-
vers may approach the same decision-making situation in
different ways. A certain apparent cognitive flexibility in
reasoning and decision making appears highly adaptive and
would seem to go against an assumption of an all-inclusive,
prescriptive normativism. Thus, there are some genuine con-
cerns regarding an assumption of a general prescriptive
normativism.
So far we have simply shared some of the concerns of Elqayam
& Evans (E&E) regarding prescriptive normativism. But then
E&E proceed to argue that the pursuit of formal cognitive the-
ories is consistent with a rejection of prescriptive normativism.
It is here that we disagree. Let us first define a formal framework
as a quantitative theory based on a set of interdependent axioms,
such as Bayesianism, information theory, or Quantum probability
(QP). Employing a formal framework for the description of cog-
nitive processes basically implies adopting a set of interrelated
postulates. Thus, to the extent that there is a belief that postulate
A is psychologically relevant, then postulate B should be psycho-
logically relevant as well. This is undeniably elegant in the sense
that the framework as a whole can be tested. In other words, once
a formal framework is adopted, then implied is a claim of internal
prescriptive normativism, since it is assumed that all aspects of
the formal framework have psychological relevance, at least
with respect to a particular range of problems. To a large
extent, this is exactly what is so appealing with approaches
based on formal frameworks, such as logicism, Bayesianism,
and information theory.
From such a perspective, as E&E note in their target article
(sect. 7), it is not surprising that Gigerenzer and Todd did not
justify their heuristics research program (Gigerenzer et al.
1999) on the basis of normative considerations. An individual
heuristic, such as “take the best,” while undeniably successful,
is just that: an individual heuristic. Its success is measured by
its ability to outperform related heuristics. But it is not possible,
for example, to justify such a heuristic in terms of related, mani-
festly true heuristics or computational intuitions. In other words,
confidence in one heuristic does not usually imply confidence in
another one; from a prior theoretical point of view, individual
heuristics are somewhat interchangeable, even when they are
highly successful (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Thus, overall, it appears that the pursuit of theories based on
formal frameworks necessarily implies a limited, internal pre-
scriptive normativism. We think that there is nothing contradic-
tory in assigning a limited prescriptive normativism to
Bayesianism, within a particular range of problems, as long as
it is remembered that for an alternative range of problems
Bayesianism may be a suboptimal framework. For example,
some researchers have argued that for a certain range of
decision-making problems, human behavior exhibits strong
order or context effects and in such cases the QP theory is a
more appropriate framework (e.g., Busemeyer et al. 2006;
2011; Pothos & Busemeyer 2009; Trueblood & Busemeyer, in
press). QP theory is like classical probability theory, but for
the fact that probability assessment is order (and context)
dependent. For example, P(A ^ B)= P(B ^ A). QP theory
has been applied very successfully in the case of physical obser-
vables, exactly because of these properties. The QP research
program in psychology aims to explore its utility in analogous
psychological situations (i.e., situations which exhibit order,
context dependence).
Our argument implies a piecemeal view of prescriptive
normativism, which is far from the general prescriptive norma-
tivism E&E argue against. Is piecemeal prescriptive normati-
vism problematic? In a scientific tradition arguably more
successful than ours, physics, there are several normative fra-
meworks (in a physical sense), which though very successful
in their limited domains, are actually formally mutually exclu-
sive. The most famous example is general relativity, which
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assumes that space is curved, and quantum mechanics, which
assumes that space is flat. Unfortunately for physicists,
general relativity and quantum mechanics are mutually exclu-
sive. While this is indeed the source of quite some frustration
to physicists, it does not prevent them from doing extremely
successful predictive science.
Therefore, overall, we think that cognitive scientists will con-
tinue to pursue theories based on formal frameworks, because
of the elegance of building theories based upon a coherent theor-
etical framework. We also believe that inevitably this will lead to
some limited prescriptive normativism, within particular ranges
of problems. The scientific objective should then be one of estab-
lishing the range of applicability of different theories and indeed
assessing the representational and process convenience of
employing different theories in different domains (in cases
where predictions of conflicting accounts converge; cf. Kuhn
1962).
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative
judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects’ performances
(e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact,
however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to
evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a
major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.
Although theorists may not believe that there is a single right or
wrong answer to a problem, reasoners often do. The target
article seems to conclude from indeterminacy as to which
normative system is being used by a participant, to the irrele-
vance of epistemic norms in reasoning. On the other hand, the
need to accept norms in applied science is recognized. It
is unclear what allows theoretical and practical claims
(“pure” and “applied” science) to diverge in their most basic
concepts.
Variety in norms can be understood in two ways: either in
terms of several normative systems “fitting the bill” (target
article, sect. 3), which is a problem for reasoning theorists; or
in terms of which norm is most appropriate to a given epistemic
task, which is a problem for individual reasoners. Note, however,
that these two uses of “norm” are not clearly distinguished in the
target article. When Elqayam & Evans (E&E) call a system that
“fits the bill” “normative,” they mean that this system is appropri-
ate, or optimal, for solving a given task. “Norm” can also be used,
however, to refer to success or error within a given “normative
system” – there are correct and incorrect ways of using a
norm. The latter distinction can be clarified through the
concept of a “constitutive rule,” that is, a rule that makes a par-
ticular cognitive task the task it is. Remembering accurately,
remembering exhaustively, and checking whether a conclusion
derives from a set of premises, each have different constitutive
rules: Their outputs count as appropriate if they are, respectively,
cases of accurate recall, exhaustive recall, and coherence tracking
(Proust, in press).
This distinction between two uses of “norm” has consequences
for the issue of normative conflict. By this term, E&E refer to the
existence of several alternative ways of interpreting what a rea-
soner does in a given task. Such cases, however, generate other
types of norm conflict that a theorist should not ignore. For
example, in “belief bias” tasks, participants need to be sensitive
to norms of deductive coherence rather than to other norms
such as fluency or relevance of epistemic content (Evans et al.
1983). The epistemic norm of interest, in this case, does not
consist in a set of optimal procedures for solving a problem (a
“normative system”), but rather in the informational constraints
inherent to the cognitive goal embedded in the task: syllogistic
closure rather than believability. Conflict may occur when
several cognitive goals compete for saliency (for a task, for a par-
ticipant). Participants need to draw on their prior experience to
build a representation of the task (i.e., of its structure and cogni-
tive goal), which may not be stable, and may not coincide with the
experimenter’s.
The latter kind of norm conflict can be studied on the basis of
participants’ self-evaluation in a cognitive task covertly involving
norm competition (conflict monitoring is one of the main func-
tions of metacognition; Botvinick et al. 2001). Such a study
belongs to the metacognition of reasoning rather than to reason-
ing per se, but the case of metadeduction suggests that control
and monitoring processes play a considerable role in how a
first-order task is processed (Reverberi et al. 2009). Note that
sensitivity to a given norm need not be based on a conceptual
type of understanding; familiarity with the task brings with it
implicit access to the epistemic norm that constitutes it as the
cognitive task it is (Proust, in press). A metacognitive study of
reasoning, however, does not seem to be threatened by an is-
ought fallacy, because the norm of interest is expressed in partici-
pants’ spontaneous self-evaluations and subsequent revisions.
Metacognitive reasoners are motivated to correct what they see
as a mistake; when they predict that a task is beyond their com-
petence, they decline it (or wager against it in retrodictive evalu-
ation) if they are allowed to (Koriat & Goldsmith 1996; Smith
et al. 2003).
Should a naturalist reject the participants’ normative sense of
error as fallacious? On the present construal of error as a viola-
tion of a constitutive rule, no appeal to a priori or irreducibly nor-
mative facts needs to be made. Natural regularities, such as
feedback and regulation laws, can account for a subject’s sense
of error (Proust 2009). On this view, violating constitutive rules
cannot be a matter of individual preference, as some naturalists
have claimed (Dretske 2000; Papineau 1999). From the obser-
vation that many different cognitive goals can be entertained, it
is tempting to conclude that the epistemic norms can be
chosen too: forming false beliefs might be a matter of prefer-
ences. Instrumental reasons to control one’s cognition (e.g., “I
need to remember her name”) must, however, be distinguished
from the normative requirements associated with the chosen
type of control (remembering a name is adequate if it is
correct). This reflects a contrast, as shown by Broome (1999),
between a reason to act and a normative requirement. The first
is an “ought” so far as it goes: you may or may not be right in
thinking you need to remember this name. A normative require-
ment, in contrast, is “strict, but relative” (relative to your attempt
to remember this name, you are strictly required to find the
correct answer).
If these observations are correct, there are alternative norma-
tive systems when there are various instrumental ways of solving
a problem. Such inter- and intra-individual differences in strat-
egies can be studied using brain imagery (Goel & Dolan 2003;
Houde´ & Tzourio-Mazoyer 2003; Osherson et al. 1998). On the
other hand, participants’ attempts to solve the problem within
a system (logic, probability theory, etc.), involve strict constitutive
requirements to which subjects need to be sensitive – and do
become sensitive over time. A naturalistic explanation of episte-
mic norms can then be offered, on the basis of how reasoners
monitor and control their own epistemic outputs. Eliminating
norms from reasoning would amount to throwing out the baby
with the bathwater: The reasoners and their motivation to
obtain a correct answer should be of theoretical, and not just
practical interest.
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid
fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and
prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between
“is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature
of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would
be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) present descriptivism as an alternative to
normativism and as a way to avoid problematic inferences and
research biases. Their proposal entails “identifying which terms
are descriptive and which are deontic, and concentrating on the
former” (see target article, Appendix: “Descriptivism”). They
contend that “evaluative considerations need only be invoked
[. . .] where the object is to improve human thinking and perform-
ance” (sect. 8, para. 5, our emphasis). Moreover, evaluative con-
siderations are fine so long as norms precede research rather than
follow from it. In line with this, E&E prefer to entirely avoid infer-
ences from descriptive to normative terms (“is-ought” inferences).
While recognizing that E&E principally address the cognitive
sciences, broader applications of their perspective could have det-
rimental consequences. In this regard, we want to call attention to
well-supported interactions between normative and descriptive
theories: Descriptive theories can evaluate normative theories,
including the evaluative terms. In such cases, the focus in psychol-
ogy is on normative terms while the aim is not to improve human
thinking. We give two examples from naturalistic ethics, where
scientific methods are employed to evaluate normative theories.
We show how these examples impact fallacies and biases, most
importantly the “is-ought” inference. Although the practice of nat-
uralizing the normative is not exclusive to ethics, ethics is nonethe-
less well-suited to discuss the nuances of the “is-ought” fallacy.
Consider the first example: If we presuppose a principle that
links normative with descriptive terms, then we can use descriptive
data to reject normative theories. Although this might be uncon-
troversial, it has had, and still has, far-reaching consequences for
specific normative theories. For instance, in the moral sciences,
“cannot” is often taken to imply “ought not.” Findings from exper-
imental psychology, neuroscience, child development, and psycho-
pathology suggest that it is most likely impossible to perform moral
actions without being emotionally motivated (e.g., Prinz 2007).
Therefore, philosophers reject theories that hold that good
actions are not motivated by emotions (e.g., a purely Kantian mor-
ality). In a similar vein, neuropsychological findings about con-
sciousness and decision making (among others), problematize
the existence of free will. To the extent that normative moral con-
cepts such as responsibility, blame, and guilt presuppose the exist-
ence of free will, normative theories might need improvement.
This interaction has consequences for fallacies and research
biases. As E&E illustrate, psychologists use empirical findings to
argue against normative theories – an “is-ought” inference – and
interpret responses in terms of their normative correlates – an
interpretation bias. If a psychologist’s aim is to evaluate a descrip-
tive theory, then these research practices are indeed fallacious and
biased. However, evaluating normative theories opens up research
questions that are interesting in their own right (i.e., above and
beyond meliorism), and this goal may require interpreting
responses in terms of normative correctness. Moreover, normative
theories can then be rejected on the basis of empirical data. Impor-
tantly, all this requires that researchers state their commitment to a
principle that links normative terms with descriptive terms.
Second, depending on one’s epistemological or meta-ethical
views, the meaning of a normative term may, at least partly,
depend on descriptive data, such as how lay people use or under-
stand the term. For instance, in a classical defense of moral relati-
vism, Harman uses the following argument: “If we learn that a band
of cannibals has captured and eaten the sole survivor of a ship-
wreck, we will speak of the primitive morality of the cannibals
and may call them savages, but we will not say that they ought
not to have eaten their captive” (Harman 1975; our emphasis). Pro-
vided we know who “we” is in this quote, we have an empirically
testable claim: Do we really not say that they ought not to have
eaten their captive? Whether the meaning of “ought” is relative
or not may depend on such descriptive facts, constituting another
way in which descriptive theories can evaluate normative theories.
Indeed, the persistent tendency in philosophy to refer to lay
people’s linguistic behavior is now a major impetus for experimen-
tal philosophy. Again, this practice provides a bridge from “is” to
“ought.” Automatically rejecting such inferences, as E&E suggest,
would then preclude naturalized and experimental philosophy.
Then again, one should not conclude that “is-ought” inferences
are by default sound. When confronted with an “is-ought” infer-
ence, the investigator must sort out and reject wrong inferences.
One should check if the authors beforehand explicitly stated a
principle or philosophy linking normative with descriptive terms,
as illustrated in our examples. Inadvertently inferring an “ought”
from an “is” is wrong. However, if a reason is specified, the rel-
evant question becomes whether one can agree with the principle
or the philosophical rationale. For instance, 19th century evol-
utionary ethicists asserted that what is more evolved or developed
is also morally better. This is, in the first place, wrong because evol-
ution does not have a direction or purpose. In the second place,
Moore (1903) interpreted these principles as attempts to state
an analytic definition, entailing that the meaning of “good” (a nor-
mative term) was entirely cashed out in natural (descriptive) terms.
Such attempts are also wrong: Philosophers and lay people use and
understand normative terms as meaning that one cannot entirely
cash them out in descriptive terms. On the other hand, we see
no reason to reject an “is-ought” inference if one agrees with the
stated reason, and therefore with the relevance of empirical data
for normative theories.
Indeed, at least for naturalized philosophy, we relocate the
burden of proof to descriptivism. Contrary to common wisdom,
the classical arguments against “is-ought” inferences are not that
far-reaching. Neither Moore nor Hume stated that all normative
terms are entirely devoid of descriptive influence. Even Moore
did not oppose an empirical research program that attempts to
find what we ought to do. Hume (1739–1740) uses his famous
“is-ought” passage to argue that it is not merely by reason or obser-
vation that we discover vice and virtue, but by sentiment. Preclud-
ing all “is-ought” inferences is a very common overreaction. In
light of this, caution is in order when E&E’s position is read
with an eye toward other areas of psychological inquiry.
Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic
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Abstract: Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) criticisms of
is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on
two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E’s assumption, not every normative
system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that
norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in
contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their
truth-conduciveness.
I highly appreciate Elqayam & Evan’s (E&E’s) keen criticism of
is-ought and ought-is fallacies in the psychological literature on
reasoning. In this comment I shed critical light on E&E’s
account of normative systems of reasoning and of prescriptive
normativism, which is understood by E&E as the view that
human (rational) thinking ought to conform to a normative
system of reasoning, S. Differing kinds of prescriptive normati-
vism result from different normative systems S2 but according
to E&E (target article, sect. 1), S must always be a formal norma-
tive system, such as logic, probability theory, or decision theory.
My first objection concerns formality. While E&E are right
that the normative systems that have dominated the psychology
of reasoning have been formal systems, not every normative
system of reasoning needs to be formal. For example, systems
of spatio-temporal, mechanical, or chemical reasoning are not
formal. Formality and universality are connected as follows: For-
mality implies universality, because formal systems abstract from
the content of non-logical symbols (Schurz 2005). The other
direction need not hold: A non-formal system of reasoning
(e.g., reasoning in chemistry) can still be highly universal. For
E&E, the reasoning systems of prescriptive normativism are typi-
cally universal, although they admit exceptions (sect. 1). In con-
trast, I want to suggest that the question of prescriptive
normativism should be entirely separated from the questions of
formality and universality. For example, Gigerenzer, who is
classified by E&E as an anti-normativist (sect. 1), behaves like
a prescriptive normativist when he recommends certain heuristic
rules for prediction tasks, only that he regards these rules as
neither formal nor universal (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
My second objection concerns E&E’s overly narrow under-
standing of prescriptive normativism. This understanding rests
on their distinction between (what they call) evaluative norms
and instrumental (or directive) norms, and corresponding
forms of rationality. While instrumental norms tell what one
ought to do to achieve one’s personal goals, evaluative norms
tell what one ought to do simpliciter. For example, Gigerenzer’s
adaptive rationality is for E&E a kind of instrumental rationality,
but Oaksford and Chater’s Bayesian rational analysis (see Oaks-
ford & Chater 2007) is a kind of evaluative rationality. I think
that E&E’s distinction is misleading because both kinds of ration-
ality, “adaptive” and “Bayesian,” have in turn to be justified in the
light of the same superordinate epistemic norms.
E&E (sect. 2, para. 4) write that their distinction is close to my
distinction between the “normative” and the “valuative” (Schurz
1997), but this is a misunderstanding. E&E’s distinction is
related, rather, to my distinction between fundamental versus
derived norms, and corresponding values. According to the stan-
dard characterization in ethics (Frankena 1963), instrumental
norms are norms that are derived from other2 given and ulti-
mately fundamental2 norms, by the means-end principle that
runs as follows: If (premise 1:) A is a (fundamental or given)
norm, and (premise 2:) B is a necessary (or optimal) means for
achieving A, then (conclusion:) B is a derived norm (Schurz
1997, Ch. 11.2, p. 8). While premise 1 is normative, premise 2
is descriptive-empirical in character. Therefore, the means-end
principle explains how the findings of empirical scientists can
become practically relevant without committing an is-ought
fallacy: Empirical findings allow one to derive a multitude of
derived norms from a small set of extra-scientifically given (inter-
subjectively accepted) fundamental norms (Schurz 2010, sect. 6).
E&E think that “instrumental norms” are not value-laden but
descriptive (sect. 2), because they assume that the fundamental
norms from which they are derived are personal goals. But for
many ethically important instrumental norms (such as “reduce
carbon dioxide emissions”) the assumed fundamental norm has
a high degree of intersubjective acceptance. This means that
instrumental norms are also more-or-less value-laden: They
inherit their value from the value of the fundamental norm or
goal from which they are derived.
Concerning “evaluative” norms, E&E seem to assume that
they are not in need of further justification by higher-ranking
norms. This view is also mistaken. For example, E&E’s evaluative
norm “Poverty should not exist” (sect. 2, para. 3) is instrumental
for the higher-ranking norm that people should not suffer. Just
the same is true for normative systems of reasoning. E&E, or
at least the psychological tradition which they criticize, seem to
assume that normative reasoning systems are accepted on the
basis of mere intuition or authority. This view has its historical
roots in the Kantian doctrine that principles of reasoning are a
priori and necessary. This view is no longer considered tenable
in contemporary epistemology.
Norms of reasoning have to be justified by higher-ranking epis-
temic goals. The most important fundamental epistemic
goal2 not mentioned in E&E’s article2 is truth-conduciveness:
Rules of reasoning should be a reliable means to increase true
beliefs and avoid false beliefs (Bishop & Trout 2005; Goldman
1986; 1999; Leplin 2009, Ch. 2; Schurz 2009). This gold-standard
of epistemology is, for example, used to justify the inference rules
of classical logic by the provable fact that they lead in all possible
worlds from true premises to true conclusions. Given recent find-
ings that the conditionals in human reasoning correspond more
to high conditional probability assertions than to exceptionless
implications of classical logic (Evans et al. 2003), the same
gold-standard has been used to argue that the system of (con-
ditional) reasoning that maximizes truth-conduciveness is not
classical logic, but system P or the stronger system Z of probabil-
istic default reasoning (Adams 1998; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996;
Leitgeb 2004; Schurz 1998; 2005; 2007). Incidentally, this fact
contradicts E&E’s claim (sect. 3, para. 3 and Table 1) that con-
ditional elimination inferences constitute a single-norm para-
digm. Truth-conduciveness has also been applied to
demonstrate the optimality of meta-induction in prediction
tasks (Schurz 2008). Other generally accepted epistemic goals
(besides truth-conduciveness) are simplicity and efficiency.
In conclusion, while I agree with E&E’s criticism of certain
dogmatic views on normative systems of reasoning, I don’t
agree with their rejection of normativism per se. A non-dogmatic
and weak version of prescriptive normativism, in the form of nor-
mative recommendations regarding which typical human think-
ing processes are more and which are less truth-conducive and
reliable, is still an important part of practically applied
psychology.
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Abstract: Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper
part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of
what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist
position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined
in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.
Ambrose Bierce, making a satirical joke, defined “Logic” as “The
art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the
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limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding”
(Bierce 1971, p. 211). The humour depends partly on how the
definition confuses the normative aspect of logic, concerned
with principles of good reasoning, with a descriptive fact about
how people sometimes do reason.
The target article defends a related claim, although without
humorous intent: that the study of human reasoning is better
pursued as a descriptive enterprise, focused on how people actu-
ally think, without reference to normative considerations.
However, Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) own normative proposal
(in this regard) demands too much, and its critical target is insuf-
ficiently precise.
Imagine someone who reads the entire target article. Before
she does so, she says her aim is to figure out what it says. After-
wards, she announces that she has read a detailed argument for
the view that normative considerations are an essential part of
the study of human reasoning. I suspect that even the authors
of the target article would be inclined, with the rest of us, to
say that this person had made a mistake, that somehow she had
got things wrong. Reasoning does aim at truth, and asking
whether it succeeds or fails, or whether a reasoner commits
errors, or does as well as he or she could, is always appropriate,
if not always easy to answer. The view being defended by the
target article requires that these evaluations, and existing discov-
eries guided by them, be abandoned when we are engaged in
scientific study of human reasoning.
Consider, for example, the work of Kuhn (1991), based on
interviews with people from various professions and walks of
life. All were asked to give reasons for their views on unemploy-
ment, education, and crime. Analysing the interviews, Kuhn was
generously prepared to count as a genuine reason any claim that
was “(a) [. . .] distinguishable from description of the causal
sequence itself and (b) [bore] on its correctness” (Kuhn 1991,
p. 45). Only 16% of non-college subjects generated genuine evi-
dence for their beliefs about crime, 28% for unemployment, and
29% for education. College subjects did better, but not perfectly
(61% for crime, 53% for unemployment, and 66% for education).
If we exclude normative considerations, we can’t regard Kuhn’s
work as showing that many people reason poorly. It would,
though, be nonsensical to read it descriptively as a discovery
about what reasons actually are. Allowing outright irrelevancies
and restatements of the conclusion to count as reasons empties
“reasoning” of significant content.
E&E appear to recognize this problem when they say, regard-
ing the work of Stanovich and West, that a normativist tendency
is “to some extent moderated by the restricted applicability to
elite reasoners” (sect. 5.2, para. 3). It is difficult, though, to see
how a truly committed descriptivist could think there were
such things as elite reasoners, which involves admitting that
they are very good at something. Shortly after the “moderated”
remark, the target article admits this, rejecting the notion of a
reasoning error, since errors imply norms. The descriptive
approach demanded here is blind in the same way as a physical
study of two clocks, one fast and one accurate, concluding that
the each clock consistently follows the laws of physics.
This objection may seem too strong. Don’t E&E allow func-
tional considerations, and evaluation of reasoning processes by
instrumental lights, but distinguish this from the error of norma-
tivism? They try, but don’t succeed. They say it is “only when
formal systems are regarded as having a priori, unconditional
value that the ‘ought’ becomes an evaluative one” (sect. 2, para.
5) and hence an instance of normativism. This sets the bar too
high – many (perhaps all) norms of reasoning are not a priori.
Most, maybe all, can be understood as conditional, to be used
if there is enough time, unless some other criterion trumps
them, as giving a fallible justification, and the like.
Other parts of the specification of “normativism” are similarly
frustrating. “Normativism” judges reasoning by the standards of a
“system,” but “system” isn’t defined. This judgement involves
“measuring against” and “conforming to,” leaving it unclear
whether normativism judges process, or outcome, or both. Nor-
mative systems are “formal,” but “formal” isn’t defined. In any
event, many plausible norms (“repeating the claim isn’t giving a
reason”) are not formal. In conflict with the claim noted above
that it is “only” a priori norms that are problematic (indicating
a requirement), we are elsewhere told that “[p]rescriptive norma-
tivism can vary according to factors such as the a priori status of
the normative system” (sect. 1, para. 8) (suggesting an option). It
would help if it was clearer what normativism actually was.
Two points should not need emphasising. First, we do not
know whether there is a single ideal theory of reasoning. It
seems likely (because individual theories exhibit their own para-
doxes and complications) that no one theory could be ideal, and
that the best possible reasoning involves a varied toolkit. It does
not follow that abstract theories of good reasoning have no role to
play in assessing or interpreting actual reasoning. Second, we do
not know exactly how our reasoning systems work. It seems
beyond doubt that we don’t have a single reasoning process,
that we can learn a variety of skills and techniques, and that
sometimes one of our reasoning dispositions looks by the lights
of one theory to be irrational, yet according to another turns
out to be an adaptive shortcut or good move. Our computational
limits are finite, but except in a few very vague ways, we don’t
know how to say what kinds of reasoning are definitely beyond us.
The upshot of these two points is that it is genuinely difficult to
say in some cases what good reasoning amounts to, and to say
either how good actual human reasoning is, or how good it
could be. Since “ought” implies “can,” we shouldn’t complain
of people that they don’t do what they can’t do. The relevance
of any particular norm to human reasoning, then, really is con-
strained by the limits of our abilities. It does not follow that we
should stop caring about the difference between good and bad
reasoning.
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) drive a wedge between Bayesianism
and instrumental rationality that most decision scientists will not
recognize. Their analogy from linguistics to judgment and decision
making is inapt. Normative models remain extremely useful in the
progressive research programs of the judgment and decision making field.
This target article falls into an odd genre in psychological
metatheory – a genre where authors try to stop the field from
doing something. In the present case, the authors want research-
ers to stop using normative theory in a certain way. Such papers
are indeed sometimes highly cited and discussed, but in my
experience they rarely succeed in actually shaping ongoing
empirical research. The evolution of research programs con-
tinues apace, determined more by the yield in new empirical
findings than by arguments about metatheory. This is likely to
be even more true in the present case, where the authors are
trying to constrain a particular practice in one of the most fruitful
and influential research programs in all of psychology – the
heuristics and biases approach. Using normative theory to
study decision making was useful in the past, and it continues
to be useful. The present target article is also embarrassingly
timed, coming on the heels of the 2008/2009 financial crisis.
Empirical and theoretical work in behavioral finance – much of
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it using normative approaches – now constantly appears in
media articles attempting to explain aspects of the crisis (as
well as famous scams such as the Madoff Ponzi).
In their target article, Elqayam & Evans (E&E) drive an odd
wedge between instrumental rationality and Bayesianism (the
latter defined as so-called normative rationality). The former is
seen as appropriate, whereas the latter is seen as the type of
approach that should be avoided. Contrary to this bifurcation,
most theorists see the Bayesian strictures as being a crucial com-
ponent of instrumental rationality, not a definition of rationality
somehow separate from the instrumental view. Joyce (2004)
gives what most decision scientists would see as the canonical
view in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality:
Bayesianism provides a unified theory of epistemic and practical ration-
ality based on the principle of mathematical expectation. In its episte-
mic guise it requires believers to obey the laws of probability. In its
practical guise it asks agents to maximize subjective expected utility
[SEU]. (Joyce 2004, p. 132)
In short, most theorists incorporate Bayesianism, in Joyce’s sense,
into the notion of instrumental rationality, so the attempt to separate
the two in the target article is a nonmainstream view. If it is only nor-
mative theory outside of approaches related to instrumental ration-
ality (defined, as Joyce does, as including the Bayesian and
associated SEU approaches) that is being attacked here, then 90%
of the heuristics and biases tradition is spared, and the authors are
left with a straw man that may apply to the four-card and a few
other strange tasks. The whole attempt to drive a wedge between
Bayesianism and instrumental rationality leads to another odd con-
clusion – that Bayesian norms do not help us as organisms achieve
our goals. Precisely the reason that people should want to follow the
axioms of utility theory (transitivity, etc.) as normative models is that
failure to follow them means that a person is not maximizing utility.
They should want to avoid becoming a money pump.
Another finding that is somewhat embarrassing for a view (like
the one in the target article) that stresses the multiplicity of
norms is that people most often retrospectively endorse the
Bayesian and SEU norms that they violate (Shafir 1993; Shafir
& Tversky 1995). In introducing the collection of Amos Tversky’s
writings, Shafir (2003) stresses this very point: “The research
showed that people’s judgments often violate basic normative
principles. At the same time, it showed that they exhibit sensi-
tivity to these principles’ normative appeal” (p. x). For example,
Koehler and James (2009) found that non-normative “probability
matchers rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior
when it is described to them” (p. 123).
E&E follow Cohen (1981) in using the grammatical compe-
tence/performance distinction borrowed from linguistics as a
structural analogue for understanding judgment and decision
making. However, the analogy to linguistics here is inapt
because it ignores the fact that the cultural evolution of reasoning
tools has no analogy in language. Because normative models are
tools of rationality and because these tools undergo cultural
change and revision, there is no idealized human “rational com-
petence” that has remained fixed throughout history. Thus, the
analogy to the linguistic domain is forced and inappropriate, as
argued many years ago by Jepson et al. (1983):
The analogy between language and inductive reasoning fails to recog-
nize that there is far more to language than grammatical competence.
Important cultural inventions, such as writing or new vocabulary,
increase the effectiveness of language use. . . . We contend that
effective inductive reasoning is also a skill; that it depends on cultural
innovations, such as probability theory. (Jepson et al. 1983, p. 495)
Psychologists are going to quite naturally study how beliefs are
formed. That is inherently one of our topics. For example, the
formation of stereotypes is a huge topic in social psychology.
Of course, we could study beliefs without ever asking whether
they were true. But what would be gained by refraining from
asking if a particular stereotype studied in social psychology
was generally true? When we do start to ask whether a belief is
true – whether it maps to reality – then we have brought in the
issue of epistemic rationality and its norms. It is the same with
the study of decision making. We can link decisions with
hedonic states and utility without ever asking whether a hedonic
state or utility was maximized. But I cannot see the point of
refraining from this question. Once we don’t refrain from this
step, norms of instrumental rationality (axioms of consistency
and freedom from context effects) come in. In short, I do not
think that psychology will heed any of these admonitions to
refrain from normative language. I know I won’t. So while this
target article is provocative and full of deep issues, it is not going
to change the type of psychology my colleagues and I practice.
In our lab, subjects do make, what we unabashedly call – errors.
Understanding reasoning: Let’s describe
what we really think about
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Abstract: I suggest psychologists would more profitably study a totally
different area of human reasoning than is discussed in the target article –
the inductive reasoning people use in their everyday life that matters in
consequential real-life decision making, rather than the deductive
reasoning that psychologists have studied meticulously but that has
relatively less ecological relevance to people’s lives.
It is really hard for me to concentrate on writing this commentary,
because I’m worried about so many other things besides this. It is
March 12, 2011, and my worries of the day include: (a) whether
the reactors affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan
will melt down, spewing radiation across that country and, poten-
tially, the world; (b) whether Libya will end up continuing with the
Gaddafi dictatorship or fall to the rebels; (c) whether there is any
prospect of my getting a raise in the next several years, given the
total mess of state governments in the United States; and (d)
whether our 2-month-old triplets will get through the night peace-
fully or whether instead tonight will prove to be a “screamer.”
Surely you can understand how these issues can seem more impor-
tant than writing a commentary! I hate it when radiation leaks from
a nuclear reactor all across the world! I also hate not getting a raise
for several years on end.
Come to think of it, problems such as these are what frustrate
me with the literature on human thinking, and in particular, on
reasoning. The field has done a marvelous job of studying the
problems that consume us just so little of the time. I’m used to
this. My own field is human intelligence, and it too specializes
in studying the problems that are easy to quantify (e.g., how
should we measure IQ) rather than the problems that are impor-
tant (e.g., if humans are so smart and their IQs increasing over
the generations, why are they destroying the world in which
they live?). As a field, psychology has mastered the study of the
expedient instead of the consequential.
Although the psychology of reasoning has overwhelmingly con-
centrated on deductive reasoning, most problems we deal with in
our everyday lives are inductive. And even when inductive reasoning
has been studied, much of the work (including my own early work)
has focused on IQ-test-like problems such as analogies, series com-
pletions, and classifications, or on problems that lend themselves to
the potential application of quantifiable formulas. But the problems
we most often face are not like these at all. What are the kinds of
reasoning problems of consequence that people face?
If I continue to smoke, what is the likelihood that smoking will
kill me or cause me grievous illness?
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If I continue to gamble at the rate I am gambling, what is the
likelihood I will drive myself and my family into financial ruin?
If I try meth or cocaine or some illegal drug once, what are the
chances I will become addicted?
What are the chances that the sexual encounter I’m planning
will end up giving me VD?
If I marry the woman (man) I’m dating, what are the chances
that it will end in divorce, and especially, an ugly divorce?
If I keep gaining weight, what are the chances I’ll end up with
Type II diabetes?
If I take this job, will I get tenure or end up jobless after a few
years?
These are the kinds of problems that weigh heavily on people’s
minds and have profound consequences. What is odd is how
little psychologists of reasoning have given them any thought,
perhaps because they are hard to study and harder, if one does
study them, to lead to articles in prestigious journals that are
more concerned with tightness of design and analysis than with
the real-world consequentiality of the problems being studied.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) study an important question in the
psychology of human reasoning: To what extent are prescriptive,
normative models useful in understanding how people think?
Their conclusion that prescriptive normative models are not
useful seems reasonable. But they do not go far enough. The
problem is fundamentally that these models, right or wrong,
apply only to a very narrow sliver of the kinds of problems that
people face in their everyday lives.
When we study deductive reasoning, the question of whether
there are normative solutions to which we should pay attention
appears weighty and important. But few problems of consequence
in our lives have deductive or even any meaningful kind of
“correct” solution. Try to think of three, or even, one! When we
look at inductive-reasoning problems such as those listed earlier,
in which we try to predict future events that matter to us, the ques-
tion of whether there is a normative solution seems rather remote.
Obviously, there is not. It does not even matter whether we are
talking about prescriptive or empirical normative models.
The problem, of course, is not limited to psychologists studying
reasoning. Most of the standardized tests used in the United
States are of the multiple-choice format or are short essays that
have normative or at least empirically scorable “correct”
answers. The advantage of such items is that they give the
appearance of objectivity, can be easily scored, and yield impress-
ive-looking statistics. The disadvantage is that they are remote
from the kinds of problems people face in their lives, which
may be why people are so much less than adequate in making
real-world decisions. Schooling gives them so little experience
in dealing with the kinds of problems of consequence they
really will face. If one looks at government leaders, it is truly
hard to find many (any?) who seem to be adept at inductive
reasoning of the kind they need to govern.
We need a new psychology of human reasoning, one devoted
to the world in which people live rather than the world in
which academic psychologists live.
Normative benchmarks are useful for studying
individual differences in reasoning
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Abstract: We applaud many aspects of Elqayam & Evans’ (E&E’s) call
for a descriptivist research programme in studying reasoning.
Nevertheless, we contend that normative benchmarks are vital for
understanding individual differences in performance. We argue that
the presence of normative responses to particular problems by certain
individuals should inspire researchers to look for converging evidence
for analytic processing that may have a normative basis.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) bring a timely focus to the numerous pit-
falls that can arise in studying human reasoning through a norma-
tivist research programme. While recognising many of these
pitfalls, we nevertheless contend that normative accounts provide
an invaluable reference point for understanding individual differ-
ences in performance and need not invoke the prescriptive notion
that people “ought” to reason in a particular way. Instead, we
argue that normative views can usefully inform theorising about
the cognitive processes individuals employ without necessarily lim-
iting the nature or scope of the processes considered. Our recent
individual differences research seems to have key points of
contact with the descriptivist programme recommended by E&E
as a counterpoint to the normativist one. At the same time, there
appear to be important points of departure that limit our ability
to commit fully to their pure, descriptivist vision. Our commentary
aims to explore some key points of alignment and non-alignment.
To begin, we fully agree with E&E that there is a fallacy in
inferring that the mere observation of normative responding is
diagnostic of underlying analytic processing (i.e., normative
responses can be taken neither as necessary nor sufficient in
identifying analytic processing). A case in point relates to the
phenomenon of belief bias, where, for example, normative
responses to syllogisms with valid-believable and invalid-unbelie-
vable conclusions can provide no evidence whatsoever as to
whether analytic processing has occurred, because either a heur-
istic or an analytic process would give rise to an identical (norma-
tive) response. Any attempt at identifying analytic strategies
within this paradigm would need to focus on invalid-believable
and valid-unbelievable conflict problems. With valid-unbelieva-
ble items the dominant response is normative conclusion accep-
tance, despite conclusion unbelievability. This suggests that
analytic processing may be occurring with such items, with a
key proposal being that reasoners attempt to “disconfirm” unbe-
lievable conclusions by searching for a single, counterexample
model (see, e.g., Evans’ Selective Processing Model [SPM];
Evans 2000). Because valid-unbelievable problems have no
counterexample models, an analytic process would then lead to
normative conclusion acceptance. For invalid-believable pro-
blems the dominant response is non-normative conclusion accep-
tance. The SPM explains this by proposing that reasoners
attempt to “confirm” believable conclusions by searching for a
single supporting model, which is readily available. Overall, this
paradigm suggests a highly nuanced picture whereby normative
and non-normative responding may arise from analytic or non-
analytic processes.
Despite interpretational difficulties, we suggest that the
presence of normative responses with particular problems
can provide researchers with a vital stimulus to search for con-
verging evidence for analytic processing, and should not be
ignored. For example, according to the SPM, normative
responses should never be seen for invalid-believable items;
yet they do arise and it seems advisable for researchers to
explore their underlying basis. Particularly useful in such
research is the acquisition of fine-grained process-tracing evi-
dence such as that derived from think-aloud protocols (Evans
et al. 1993; Lucas & Ball 2005) and inspection-time and
eye-tracking methods (Ball et al. 2006; Stupple & Ball 2008;
Stupple & Waterhouse 2009). Our recent process-tracing
studies of belief bias reveal that individuals who give logical
responses to invalid-believable conflict syllogisms process
these problems significantly more slowly compared to non-
conflict problems and to individuals who respond non-logically.
Coupling such evidence with neuroscientific data (De Neys
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et al. 2008; Goel & Dolan 2003) indicating the involvement of
the right lateral prefrontal cortex (a region specialised for cog-
nitive monitoring) in normative responding, naturally leads to
a view of individuals who respond logically to conflict problems
as deploying analytic strategies sensitive to normative con-
siderations. If such evidence additionally correlates with indi-
vidual-difference measures that are predictive of normative
responding (e.g., high working memory capacity, generation
of alternatives and need for cognition; Torrens et al. 1999),
then we assert that such triangulation points inescapably to
an association between normative responses and analytic
processing.
Whether or not this latter research process based around
methodological triangulation is descriptivist under E&E’s view
is, however, unclear, given the guiding role of normative con-
siderations in the whole endeavour – right down to defining
responses as “logically correct” or otherwise from the outset.
We acknowledge that belief bias research is not immune from
issues that pertain to selecting an appropriate normative bench-
mark. Indeed, Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) have argued that it
may not be rational to prefer logic to belief. We also agree that
it is problematic to equate the appropriate norm with the
response given by the most cognitively gifted reasoners (Stano-
vich & West 2000b). Nevertheless, we see great merit in examin-
ing the cognitive processes employed by such gifted individuals.
Moreover, De Neys (2006) has demonstrated that reasoners
attempt to adhere to a normative standard irrespective of their
cognitive ability, which suggests that these standards hold some
genuine descriptive value. Indeed, we have obtained preliminary
data indicating that normative training in a matching bias para-
digm (as used by Stupple & Waterhouse 2009) serves to increase
logical responding and slow response times. Enhancements in
logical responding have also been demonstrated with clarified
quantifiers (Schmidt & Thompson 2008) and training in the
concept of logical necessity (Prowse-Turner & Thompson
2009). These modifications to performance could be construed
as merely bringing responses into closer alignment with an exist-
ing norm, but we would argue that there is not only merit in
exploring methods of enhancing reasoning performance as
measured against normative standards, but also in examining
the associated cognitive processes and individual differences
arising from such methods.
We therefore seek clarification as to where normativism stops
and descriptivism starts. For us the situation seems more like a
continuum than a dichotomy. We also admit to confusion over
E&E’s claim that normative standards may be legitimate in a
meliorist research programme designed to enhance reasoning
skills but are inappropriate as a benchmark in research on under-
lying cognitive processes. This seems to lead to a conundrum if
we wish to examine the underlying cognitive processes arising
in response to the interventions deployed in meliorist research.
If post-intervention responses align with normative ones, then
how are we to go about understanding such changes unless we
accept that they reflect normative principles?
Probability theory and perception of
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Abstract: We argue that approaches adhering to normative systems can
be as fruitful as those by descriptive systems. In measuring people’s
perception of randomness, discrepancies between human behavior and
normative models could have resulted from unknown properties of the
models, and it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that people
are irrational or that the normative system has to be abandoned.
To a great extent, the normatively “ought” inference criticized by
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is due to the discrepancy between the
observed human behavior and the predictions by a normative
model. When such a discrepancy is found, researchers either
draw a conclusion that humans are irrational, because the discre-
pancy is deemed an error or a bias (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman
1974), or they adopt an “alternative-norm paradigm” to exonerate
a certain human fallacy (e.g., Hahn & Warren 2009). In general,
we disagree with E&E that “Normativism has played out its role
in the history of the research on human thinking” (target article,
sect. 8, para. 5). In our opinion, neither the “ought” inference nor
any particular normative model should be abandoned. Rather,
we take that what has biased and hindered research programs
on human thinking is the practice of directly comparing any
human behavior with any particular product of a normative
model and being judgmental on human rationality based on
partial comparisons.
We elaborate on the topic of “perception of randomness,”
which has been “long perceived as normatively incorrect in the
JDM [judgment and decision-making] literature” (target article,
sect. 6, para. 10). Interestingly, this normatively “ought” infer-
ence resulted primarily from comparing human behaviors with
a single normative model, the independent and stationary Ber-
noulli trials – for example, tossing the same coin repeatedly
(for a review, see Oskarsson et al. 2009). However, the process
of Bernoulli trials is not as simple as it may seem. It has myriad
properties, depending on the variable being measured and the
underlying parameters, and some of the properties are fairly
novel to the researchers in psychology. Therefore, when the
model is used to measure human behaviors, it is critical to dis-
tinguish between specific products and products with specific
properties (e.g., Lopes & Oden 1987; Nickerson 2002).
One particular phenomenon in human perception of random-
ness is that people pay special attention to streak patterns (e.g.,
consecutive heads in a row when tossing a fair coin). By contrast,
the process of Bernoulli trials predicts that the frequency of
streak patterns is the same as non-streak patterns of the same
length. This discrepancy has motivated numerous studies and
continued to yield new findings on two fronts, the nature of
human perception of randomness and the appropriate usage of
normative models. (To name a few of these studies: Ayton &
Fischer 2004; Bar-Eli et al. 2006; Burns 2004; Falk et al. 2009;
Falk & Konold 1997; Gilovich et al. 1985; Nickerson & Butler
2009; Oppenheimer & Monin 2009.) In our own research (Y.
Sun & Wang 2010a; 2010b), we found that it is critical to dis-
tinguish between two types of measurement when Bernoulli
trials are used as the normative model: how often a pattern is
to occur ( frequency, measured by mean time) and when a
pattern is to first occur (delay, measured by waiting time). It
turns out that despite the equal frequency and mean time
among patterns of the same length, streak patterns have the
longest delay and waiting time.
Apparently, frequency and delay are two different concepts (for
example, think of the experience of waiting for a bus; Gardner
1988, p. 63). Depending on the specific task environment, one
measure may be more psychologically relevant than the other.
Notably, the statistics of delay may provide normative measures
to the descriptive accounts of randomness perception. For
example, people judge the frequency of an event on the basis of
how it is representative of the underlying population (representa-
tiveness), and how easily an example can be brought to mind
(availability) (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Thus, when people
think of a random process, a streak pattern might be perceived
as the most non-representative – it has the most uneven or clus-
tered distribution over time – and the most unavailable – it is
the most delayed pattern and most likely to be preceded by
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non-streak patterns. Indeed, it has been reported that people’s
responses to streak patterns are largely consistent with the stat-
istics of waiting time rather than the mean time (Oppenheimer
& Monin 2009).
Since both mean time (frequency) and waiting time (delay) are
derived from the same normative model, they provide objective
measurements that are invariant across individual human sub-
jects. This leads to another advantage of adhering to the norma-
tive models as we can embrace their fast and deep advancement
in many different fields. Besides probabilities, the statistics of
pattern times literally deal with properties of time and space.
Recent neurological studies have drawn attention to some
unified theories on representations of space, time, and
numbers (e.g., Dehaene & Brannon 2010). It has been reported
that people tend to assign a lower probability to an event that is
more psychologically distant (Liberman & Trope 2008; Trope &
Liberman 2010) and are sensitive to the tradeoffs between the
delay in time and the probability (Luhmann et al. 2008;
McClure et al. 2007). In financial theories, the delayed waiting
time also means a greater variance of pattern times, and variance
has been perceived as an essential component of risk (Markowitz
1991; Weber et al. 2004).
Nevertheless, we agree with E&E that normatively “ought”
inferences should be taken with caution, and comparing human
behaviors with selected products of a normative model does
not immediately lead to conclusions on human rationality. In
the case of pattern times, the distinction between the frequency
and delay may provide us with a more precise tool to tease apart
the task environment from which people’s perception of random-
ness might originate, but it does not necessarily exonerate any
human fallacies at the macro level (e.g., the gambler’s fallacy,
cf., Hahn & Warren 2009; 2010; Y. Sun et al. 2010a; 2010b). In
addition, people’s perception of randomness may not be
reduced to a certain set of statistics. To gain a complete
picture, we also need descriptive approaches to address percep-
tual and cognitive mechanisms that come into play, for example,
the working memory capacity (Kareev 1992), perception of pro-
portion and symmetry (Rapoport & Budescu 1997), and, subjec-
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Abstract: Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the
outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification
(normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes,
rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive
theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may
be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of
underlying processes.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that normative theories are pro-
blematic and have impeded theoretical development in the psy-
chology of thinking and reasoning. In this commentary, I
articulate additional arguments for the assertion that using nor-
mative correctness as a diagnostic tool has impeded our ability
to formulate good cognitive theories of the processes that gener-
ate inferences. For this, I have assumed traditional models of
probability and logic, although the comments are germane to
any normative standard used to evaluate performance.
One of the primary goals of a normative theory is to serve as a
standard that specifies how people should reason and to then
evaluate how well they achieve this standard. Reliance on norma-
tivism in thinking and reasoning research was evident from the
first papers published on this subject (e.g., Wilkins 1928), and
evolved into a long-standing effort to explain why judgements
and inferences often defied normative prescriptions (e.g.,
Henle 1962; Kahneman & Tversky 1973) that remains to this day.
In fact, as a theoretical and empirical standard for cognitive
science, the proscriptions of normativism fail us badly. As cogni-
tive psychologists, our goal is to describe how situations, pro-
blems, and goals are represented; how knowledge is recruited
to the problem space; the mechanisms by which inferences are
computed; and how attentional processes and capacity limit-
ations constrain these operations. Reliance on normative stan-
dards diminishes our ability to achieve these goals in numerous
ways, not least of which is that it perpetuates reliance on an impo-
verished form of data, namely, a binary outcome variable. Thus,
complex inferential processes that access a wide array of complex
cognitive functions are reduced to a binary classification of either
normative or non-normative as the (often sole) dependent
measure. Alternative measures, such as reporting whether an
inference has been accepted, whether a card on the Wason
task has been selected, or whether a probability estimate is
“close to a base rate,” at least preserve some element of the
actual decision: its task-relevant outcome. However, like the nor-
mative measure, this single piece of information tells us little
about the processes that produced it. As a discipline, the field
of thinking and reasoning has been slow to incorporate other pro-
cessing measures, such as eye tracking, reaction times, confi-
dence measures, and so on, which would provide a much
richer view of complex processes than can be gleaned from a
single binary measure.
So impoverished is a normative index as an outcome measure
that it can be flatly misleading. Indeed, it is easily demonstrable
that the same processes may underlie both normative and non-
normative responses. For example, on conditional reasoning
tasks, both logically valid and invalid responses can be achieved
by the same process, namely, the recruitment of counter
examples to the conditional (Thompson 1994). Conversely, a nor-
mative (or non-normative) response may be achieved by a variety
of processes. A normatively incorrect response may arise because
a salient heuristic process produced a prepotent answer; because
the reasoner did not understand the instructions; because the
reasoner tried but failed to compute a normatively correct
answer; and so on. Similarly, a normatively correct response
may be achieved because the reasoner knows and applies the
relevant normative standard; because the reasoner guessed;
because he or she used a strategy, such as the recognition heur-
istic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 1999) that often produces correct
answers; and so forth.
As an argument in favour of the utility of normative theories,
one might point to the evidence demonstrating that persons of
higher cognitive ability are able to suppress a tendency to give
a “heuristic” response and produce normatively correct answers
on reasoning tasks (Stanovich 1999). This research implies that
there is value in the normative label, in that it embodies a
quality that differentiates between high and low capacity reason-
ers. Again, however, having such a limited measure of reasoning
performance means that these correlations between capacity and
normative responses, in and of themselves, tell us little about how
such suppression is achieved and may, in fact, tell us more about
the reasoner’s capacity to understand and encode instructions
than about fundamental processes of reasoning. In support of
this argument, consider that many concepts such as logical neces-
sity are likely new to most reasoners, such that applying them
consistently to a set of novel reasoning problems will certainly
require capacity. In cases where the task instructions are less
onerous, correlations with cognitive capacity may arise for any
number of reasons, ranging from having access to appropriate
normative rules, to recognizing their relevance in the current
context, and having the motivation to do so (Stanovich 2009a).
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Further evidence that normative versus non-normative
responses tell us little about the mechanisms that produced
them comes from a series of studies recently conducted in my
lab. These studies employ a paradigm developed to study pro-
cesses that monitor inferences and determine when additional
analytic thinking is warranted. In this paradigm, participants
are asked to give an initial, intuitive answer to a problem, make
a metacognitive judgement about how right that answer feels,
and are then allowed to take as much time as needed to give a
final answer. The metacognitive experience that accompanies
an initial decision predicts a lot about the effort that people put
into solving a problem. Specifically, a strong feeling of rightness
about a decision determines the amount of time spent thinking
about a problem and whether or not the initial answer is
changed in favour of another. Importantly, a strong initial
feeling of rightness does not reliably predict whether the final
answer is normatively accurate, despite the fact that it exerts sub-
stantial control over subsequent analytic reasoning. Moreover, in
several studies, we have observed that when people do change
their answers, they are often just as likely to change from a nor-
matively correct answer to a wrong one, as vice versa (Shynkaruk
& Thompson 2006; Thompson et al., under review). Understand-
ing what motivates an answer change, what constraints an answer
must satisfy to be retained, the information that is recruited to
rework the answer, and so on, will tell us a lot about human
reasoning. Knowing that the final outcome is normative tells us
virtually nothing about the underlying mechanisms.
Neurath’s ship: The constitutive relation








Abstract: I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned
with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation
between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories
provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we
need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any
specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.
The target article by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) reminds us of a
plausible methodological norm: Do not confuse normative with
descriptive theories! In many areas of psychology this distinction
seems trivial. Models of memory or perception try to elucidate
how these systems actually function, not how they should func-
tion. But what about theories of reasoning and acting, the classi-
cal domains of theoretical and practical rationality? Is it prudent
to cleanly separate normative and descriptive theories here as
well? My claim is that in psychological theories of rationality
there is an intrinsically constitutive relation between normative
and descriptive theories (Spohn 2002). I exemplify this claim in
two different psychological research areas, one from the
domain of theoretical, the other from practical rationality. I
also argue that we need to resist the temptation to collapse
descriptive theories with any specific normative theory.
Theories of theoretical rationality are concerned with how we
achieve the goal of acquiring correct beliefs about the world. The
close ties between normative and descriptive theories can easily
be seen when we consider a scientist conducting an experiment.
To explain the observed behavior, for example, randomization of
subjects, it seems natural to invoke normative theories of how
experiments should be conducted. The reason why normative
theories work as descriptive explanations here is that we under-
stand the scientist as a rational, goal-oriented person. Everyday
reasoning is, in contrast, rarely guided by explicit methodological
knowledge. Nevertheless, people’s beliefs also have a normative
force. People view themselves as motivated by reasons, and
strive for optimality to achieve their goals. They distinguish
between true and false beliefs; knowing they may err, they
revise their beliefs and accept corrections. We would not say
that a person believes that A causes B without simultaneously
assuming that this person considers this proposition to be true.
In sum, people conceive of themselves as rational agents,
which make normative theories the natural candidate to explain
their behavior.
Recent research about causal reasoning has obtained a wealth
of evidence showing that we try to go beyond observations to
obtain knowledge about causal relations in the world. People
are rarely aware of how they acquire causal knowledge, but
they understand what it means to respond to a causal query.
Thus, a natural place to look for candidate explanations is norma-
tive theories of causal inference. In fact, virtually all currently
competing theories of causal reasoning can be structured accord-
ing to the preferred normative account motivating the theory
(Waldmann & Hagmayer, in press). Causal reasoning cannot
be modeled without some normative theory that tells us what
causal judgments are.
Moral reasoning, which belongs to the domain of practical
rationality, is another example of the constitutive relation
between normative and descriptive theories. When we request
moral judgments from subjects we do not want to learn about
their preferences, wants, or inhibitions; rather, we want them
to provide a normative evaluation of whether an act is right or
wrong. Again, we conceive of subjects as rational agents who
offer us responses to normative requests. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that an overview of research on moral judgment reveals
that psychological theories use concepts from normative theories
of morality (Waldmann et al., in press). For example, when inter-
preting responses to the famous trolley problem about whether it
is permissible to sacrifice one person to save five, many theories
focus on acts, outcomes, or values, concepts that have been high-
lighted as morally relevant in normative theories. And even if
other non-moral factors are included in the explanations, we
still interpret subjects’ responses as driven by the motive to
provide a normative assessment. Otherwise, we could not say
anymore that we are studying moral judgments.
Although I claim that in theories of rationality, normative the-
ories are constitutive for the theoretical description of the target
phenomena, I agree with E&E that there is a danger of overstating
the empirical adequacy of specific theories. Normative theories
come in many variants, which compete. Their development is gov-
erned by factors such as coherence and consistency, which are less
influential in everyday reasoning. Moreover, normative theories
may restrict themselves to aspects of the target domain that are
less relevant in everyday reasoning. Hence, it is unlikely that any
specific normative position can be directly used as a descriptive
theory. Responses in causal reasoning tasks have been interpreted
as evidence for Bayesian causal network models, although it may
often be possible to provide a more parsimonious account for indi-
vidual phenomena by stripping away unnecessary untested
assumptions implicit in these models. Similarly, the interpretation
of responses as consequentialist or deontological in the trolley
problem can often be more parsimoniously explained without
attributing these global philosophical positions to subjects.
A sensible research strategy, therefore, seems to be to use one
of the competing normative theories as a starting point, but to
then ask whether all the assumptions inherent in these theories
are empirically validated and necessary to explain the target be-
havior. Later, we can even go outside the realm of rationally rel-
evant explanatory concepts. Rationality is certainly an
idealization of thinking; many of our thoughts and actions are
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influenced by factors that, on reflection, nobody would consider
as legitimate. For example, Eskine et al. (2011) found that moral
judgments about transgressions (e.g., stealing; taking a bribe)
tend to be harsher when subjects were drinking a shot of a
bitter beverage than when they were given water or a sweet bev-
erage. The taste of a beverage certainly does not constitute an
acceptable argument for a moral judgment.
In short, it may be necessary to rebuild the selected normative
framework, delete components, sacrifice coherence and consist-
ency, and even add non-normative factors. Some core com-
ponents will stay invariant, to guarantee that we still model the
target competency, such as causal or moral reasoning. The end
result of the revision process may be a caricature of any accepted
normative theory, but its normative foundation will still be
discernible. Or as the philosopher Otto Neurath famously
claimed: “We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on
the open sea, without ever being able to dismount it in dry-
dock and reconstruct it from the best components” (see Quine
1960, p. vii).
What is evaluative normativity, that we
(maybe) should avoid it?
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Abstract: Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid
evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are
two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative
normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but
the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too
tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advise us to jettison the normative
element in theoretical psychological investigations. To follow
their advice, though, we need to know just what it is we are to jet-
tison. There are two crucial areas of unclarity in their presen-
tation of normativism. The first can simply be disambiguated,
but the second indicates a deeper problem with their project.
First, some of their formulations of normativism involve a
formal system (as in their Abstract: “human thinking reflects a
normative system against which it should be measured and
judged”). Elsewhere in the target article, normativism involves
an appeal to something that is “a priori,” “unconditional,” or “uni-
versal.” But at other points, systems drop out, and all that is
involved is a particular kind of “oughtness”; and indeed, at
other points in the text, merely an appeal to rightness and wrong-
ness, or “error” is deemed sufficient to count as normativist. It is
dangerous to elide the difference between the notion of formal or
a priori systems, and evaluative normativity itself, for there are
evaluative normative theories that traffic in oughtness, but not
on the basis of any such formal or a priori principles; epistemic
reliabilism, for example (Goldman 1979; Kornblith 2003), and,
as I will argue in a moment, the ecological rationality of Gigeren-
zer, Todd, and others. Some disambiguations are therefore in
order.
E&E’s arguments mostly aim at universality (e.g., the “arbitra-
tion problem”) and the is-ought/ought-is inferences. So let’s
tease a apart several different sub-claims of their anti-normativism
that might be at issue:
(Humeanism) We should not make any hasty inferences from “is”
to “ought,” or vice versa.
(Anti-Universalism) There is no unique correct evaluative nor-
mative framework applicable to all persons and situations.
(Descriptivism) We should not make any substantive (as opposed
to merely “inspirational”) inclusion of evaluative normativity as a
part of our psychological theorizing.
The authors’ arguments for the first two anti-normativisms are
generally well-taken (see also, Weinberg 2007). But in some
places they are perhaps over-zealous. For example, there are
surely other explanations available for the focus on naive as
opposed to trained subjects, on the very plausible presupposition
that only a small portion of the population receives any such
training; and so what we learn from studying such subjects may
not generalize well. And, for that matter, expert reasoning popu-
lations have long been studied as well, as with Herbert Simon’s
highly influential research. Also, the authors’ discussion of
Humeanism could perhaps be more sensitive to a minor quand-
ary they put themselves in: Having rejected a priorist approaches
to the question of evaluative normativity, they either have to
endorse some “is” facts as evidence for “ought” facts, or end up
as full-blown skeptics about such normativity.
Disentangling Descriptivism from Humeanism and Anti-Uni-
versalism, however, does not yet render it clear, for “evaluative
normativity” itself needs further clarification. One worry is that
E&E have not actually succeeded in identifying a distinct form
of normativity that can be cleanly set aside. They distinguish it
initially from instrumental, bounded, ecological, and evolution-
ary forms of normativity, which they find unproblematically
descriptive in nature. But they are too hasty in assimilating eco-
logical normativity, for psychologists in that school seem to traffic
in forms of correctness that cannot be boiled down to “Darwinian
and Skinnerian algorithms.” Ecologists’ writings are rife with dis-
cussions of a “fit” between environment and mind, and of
“success” or simply “good reasoning” that is neither constituted
by (even if perhaps highly correlated with) the satisfaction of
specific desires of individuals nor grounded in any appeal to
what has historically promoted, or would today promote, repro-
ductive fitness. One way of seeing how ecological normativity
cannot be explicated in terms of instrumental normativity, is
that the former is very often analyzed in terms of the relationship
between a heuristic and an environment, without reference to
any (even hypothetical) desires of some agent (see Over 2000).
So, although E&E place ecologists in the “low normativism”
zone, this is due to the ecologists’ conflating evaluative normativ-
ity itself with the use of normative systems; ecological rationality
eschews the latter, but is robustly committed to the former. This
also explains the difficulty E&E have with those researchers
apparently deploying “oughtness” more than their location in
the “low normativism” zone would expect.
E&E also go on later to invoke yet another form of allegedly
unproblematic normativity, “epistemic rationality, in the sense
of holding well-calibrated beliefs” (sect. 5.2, para. 4). But such
calibration is not an unevaluative notion. Indeed, the logicists
or Bayesians could easily claim that such normativity is exactly
what they themselves are theorizing in terms of. For example,
the reason, according to logicists, why you should not affirm
the consequent is that it will generally lead you to believe false-
hoods. The reason, according to the likes of Kahneman and
Tversky, why heuristics tend to lead to biases is that they leave
us susceptible to various forms of false beliefs.
There is a fundamental problem here: The sort of normativity
that E&E want to set aside is simply too tightly wound around
our psychological theorizing to be disentangled and discarded.
That the authors find themselves writing in terms of instrumental
rationality where agents and goals drop out of consideration
altogether, and of the same epistemic rationality that their
opponents would embrace, suggests that they are just as deeply
enmeshed in evaluative normativity as everyone else, if in an
unintentionally cryptic way. The authors are concerned that nor-
mative thinking has a too powerful, “biasing” influence on scien-
tists’ minds. That very fact, however, suggests that trying to get
scientists to swear off of normative thinking altogether may be
simply impossible. Trying to do without it may only result in
Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”
274 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:5
such thinking being performed in subterranean ways, leading to
violations of both Humeanism and Anti-Universalism. Wiser
instead to regiment normative thinking. A methodological norm
wherein researchers identify and articulate their evaluative com-
mitments would put normativity out in the open, to be debated
where fruitful, ignored where not, and allow for compensation
for any biases. Where abstinence is unrealistic and perhaps
even undesirable, we are better off adopting instead a norm of
full disclosure.
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Abstract: Our target article identified normativism as the view
that rationality should be evaluated against unconditional
normative standards. We believe this to be entrenched in the
psychological study of reasoning and decision making and
argued that it is damaging to this empirical area of study,
calling instead for a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and
decision making. The views of 29 commentators (from
philosophy and cognitive science as well as psychology) were
mixed, including some staunch defences of normativism, but
also a number that were broadly supportive of our position,
although critical of various details. In particular, many
defended a position that we call “soft normativism,” which sees
a role for normative evaluation within boundaries alongside
more descriptive research goals. In this response, we clarify
our use of the term “instrumental rationality” and add
discussion of “epistemic rationality,” defining both as
descriptive and non-normative concepts. We consider the
debate with reference to dual-process theory, the “new
paradigm” psychology of reasoning, and empirical research
strategy in these fields. We also discuss cognitive variation by
age, intelligence, and culture, and the issue of relative versus
absolute definitions of norms. In conclusion, we hope at least
to have raised consciousness about the important boundaries
between norm and description in the psychology of thinking.
R1. Introduction
Our purpose has been to argue that the study of higher
cognitive processes in psychology, especially in the large
fields dedicated to the study of deductive reasoning and
of judgement and decision making (JDM), has been
unduly influenced by normative theory. We have
suggested that most of the psychological paradigms
involved have multiple normative theories that could be
applied, and that psychologists in consequence ended up
making dubious “is-ought” inferences to decide the right
normative system on the basis of the observed behaviour.
We have also argued that framing and interpreting
research within normativist frameworks has led to sys-
tematic biases in the way that research is conducted and
has confused the task of constructing and testing descrip-
tive accounts of the process involved.
Given the prevalence of normative thinking in these
research fields, we were not expecting to win any popular-
ity contest with these arguments. However, while some
commentators are as resistant to our views as expected,
we are pleasantly surprised by the amount of support
that is also to be found in these commentaries. We also
note that our target article has attracted as much
comment from philosophers as psychologists. This
should not be surprising since our article, as Foss
remarks, is essentially philosophical in nature. Several
commentators observe that our own paper is ironically
normativist in that we discuss how psychologists should
and should not practise their science. But there is no con-
tradiction here – we are not constructing a theory of
human thinking in the present discussion but rather debat-
ing the philosophy and practice of the science that
underlies attempts to do so. Our unabashed contention
is that we ought not to focus on “ought” questions while
constructing such a theory. While our focus here is on a
specific area of science – the psychology of higher cogni-
tive processes – some commentators have also raised
wider issues about epistemology and the philosophy of
science. We address these as well as the more empirical
concerns of the psychological commentators.
R2. Between normativism and descriptivism:
Definitions and boundaries
In our target article we defended a notion of instrumental
rationality defined as “Behaving in such a way as to
achieve one’s personal goals” (sect. 2, para. 1) as a non-
normative principle in our account of the human mind.
However, it is apparent that the term has a normative
meaning for others, exemplified by Stanovich’s claim
that we attempt to drive a false wedge between Bayesian-
ism and instrumental rationality, as violations of Bayesian
principles can be shown to be sub-optimal by Dutch book
arguments and the like. To clarify, we were not using the
term “instrumental rationality” in a philosophical or absol-
ute sense of maximising or optimising achievement of
goals. Neither a priori argument nor actual observation
would support the view that people are perfect compu-
tational Bayesians. We meant only to convey that the
mechanisms of the mind strive for the achievement of
goals and thus achieve an (imperfect) degree of instru-
mental rationality. Hence, our use of the term is descripti-
vist and not normativist. We discuss Bayesianism in detail
in section R5.2.
Both Schurz and Hrotic point to a fuzzy boundary
between the evaluative and instrumental ought, arguing
that what we considered evaluative oughts may themselves
be instrumental to other values (Schurz), and questioning
whether the researcher should be aware of such instru-
mental relations (Hrotic). If evaluative and instrumental
oughts cannot be clearly differentiated, we lose the
ability to tell normativism from descriptivism, respectively.
A related complaint is that, by focusing on unconditional
deontic norms, our definition of normativism is overly
narrow (Fuller & Samuels; Schurz).
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At the formal level, we concede the boundary may be
difficult to define. But our concern is at the practical
level of how researchers go about designing their
studies, analysing and interpreting their findings. It is
not usually hard to tell whether they are pursuing norma-
tivist or descriptivist goals (what they think they are doing
is another matter). If they are focused on what it is that
people do, and providing an account of how they do it,
then this is descriptivist. If, on the other hand, they want
to evaluate, score, and interpret the behaviour they
study as “good” or “bad,” “right” or “wrong,” against
some a priori norm, then it is normativist. A good
example is the study of conditional reasoning which com-
bines inferences seen as valid and invalid by standard logic
(see target article). Researchers who report and account
for the inferences people make are descriptivist. Those
(still common in the developmental literature) who
report the number of logically correct or erroneous
decisions made are being normativist. This will usually
be followed by a discussion which refers to some partici-
pants reasoning “better” than others, and so on.
R2.1. Soft normativism and the is-ought problem
Supporters of normativist research programmes often
argue that the normativist and descriptivist questions
cannot be disentangled. We believe this arises mostly
from equating norm with competence, which we discuss
in section R2.2. However, we observe that a number of
commentators, including some who focus on important
psychological questions in their own research, support a
mixed model in which descriptivism and normativism go
side by side, each contributing usefully to the other
(Achourioti, Fugard, & Stenning [Achourioti et al.];
Douven; Fuller & Samuels; McNair & Feeney;
Nickerson; Quintelier & Fessler; Schurz; Stupple &
Ball; Weinberg). We will dub this position “soft normati-
vism.” According to this view, (a) normativism inspires
research questions or whole paradigms that provide
important descriptive findings, while (b) such findings
feedback into the design and construction of normative
theories. We deal with (a) later in section R7, but (b)
still seems to leave us with the problem of is-ought infer-
ence. How can this be solved?
One suggestion, from Brase & Shanteau, is to adopt
Platt’s strong inference strategy (Platt 1964). They claim
that this method will “go a very long way towards avoiding
the problems associated with prescriptive normativism”
but they fail to explain how. Strong inference is, in our
view, a very difficult research strategy to adopt, as people
naturally focus on one hypothesis at a time in their
hypothetical thinking (Evans 2010b). But even if research-
ers can be persuaded to pursue multiple hypotheses, based
on multiple normative systems, how will this help? If we
end up adjudicating between normative systems on the
basis of behaviour then we are certainly going from “is”
to “ought” no matter how many we consider.
The two main types of solution proposed by our com-
mentators are (a) to avoid is-ought inference by attempts
to bridge the “Humean bifurcation” (Frankena 1939)
between the “is” and the “ought,” or (b) to adhere to the
Humean bifurcation, proceeding instead from given first
principles or values. Schurz seems to support a first
principles solution: If we accept a small number of
fundamental norms as given extra-scientifically, we can
then draw on empirical evidence to infer derived norms
for a practically-applied psychology. He proposes truth
conduciveness as such a fundamental epistemic norm.
The solution is close to the one we offered for applied
science in section 8 of the target article, and we
welcome Schurz’s emphasis on acknowledging the extra-
scientific nature of fundamental norms. However, we
have our doubts about truth-conduciveness as a candidate
for a fundamental norm, as we discuss in section R3.2.
In contrast, bridging solutions to the is-ought problem
identify constructs (concepts, principles, postulates)
which combine both descriptive and evaluative/deontic
elements, and allow evaluative conclusions to be derived
from them (and them only). For example, as Searle
(1964) famously argued, if Jones promised to pay Smith
$5, then Jones ought to pay Smith $5. The promise, a
deontic speech act, combines the descriptive linguistic
fact with the deontic, value-laden social obligation. We
cannot infer “ought” from pure “is,” but we can infer
“ought” from “is-with-ought,” and bridge constructs
supply us with the latter. Such solutions are as prevalent
among our commentators (Nickerson; Pfeifer; Quintelier
& Fessler; Sun & Wang; and, more implicitly, Stupple &
Ball and perhapsDouven) as they are in the literature (e.g.,
Frankena 1939; Searle 1964; Williams 1985; but cf. Schurz
1997). The commentaries draw on a wide variety of bridge
concepts, from “cannot implies not-is” (Quintelier &
Fessler) to the relations between constitutive and regulative
norms (Achourioti et al.)
Buckwalter & Stich discuss the influence of Goodman’s
(1965) reflective equilibrium, brought by Cohen (1981) into
the rationality debate. The idea is that norms and psycho-
logical evidence justify each other by being brought into
coherence, creating a “virtuous” circle of justification. We
note that reflective equilibrium is itself a bridge solution
– it presupposes that such coherence between norms and
behaviours is possible. Anderson’s six-step procedure of
rational analysis (Hahn; Oaksford & Chater) is a deriva-
tive of reflective equilibrium: It seeks to establish coherence
between behavioural observation and “optimal” (note the
evaluative term) behavioural function. The Kantian
“ought implies can” is a classic bridge construct, and so is
its contrapositive “cannot implies not-ought” (Quintelier
& Fessler). Similarly, Simon’s (1982) bounded rationality
(Gold, Colman, & Pulford [Gold et al.]; Hahn;
Nickerson), the idea that rationality should be judged rela-
tive to biological and cognitive limitations, derives from
“cannot implies not-ought” (and see sect. R2.4). Another
bridge construct is Davidson’s (1973) “principle of
charity” (Gold et al.; Hahn), the idea that behaviour
should be interpreted in a way that makes the agent
appear rational (i.e., can implies ought).
The viability of bridge solutions has been debated for
the better part of a century, and we will not solve it here
one way or the other. As we show in section R6.2,
however, bridge solutions preclude universal or absolute
normative evaluation, leaving the more radical type of
normativism vulnerable to internal inconsistencies.
R2.2. Normative theory= competence theory
Both Buckwalter & Stich and Fuller & Samuels agree
that maintaining the distinction between competence
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theory and normative theory is important, but Buckwalter
& Stich suggest that we have underestimated how difficult
it could be to undermine the view that equates them. Alas,
they are right. Despite our best efforts to the contrary (see
sections 4 and 7 of the target article), many commentators
persist either explicitly (Foss; Pothos & Busemeyer) or
implicitly (Achourioti et al.; Pfeifer; Sun & Wang) in
drawing the parallel. A special case of this is commentaries
that propose or discuss Bayesianism as a normative system
(Stanovich; McNair & Feeney), a position we discuss in
section R5.2.
Buckwalter & Stich trace the origins of the norma-
tive–competence equation to reflective equilibrium (see
sect. R2.1), and offer a persuasive counter-argument:
Since psychological inference is subserved by two distinct
systems (“minds” in our preferred terminology – see R4),
there is no single coherent solution (and see R6). Another
potential source of confusion seems to be that compu-
tational theories in reasoning and decision making often
double as normative theories. One commenting strategy
(McNair & Feeney; Pfeifer; Pothos & Busemeyer;
Sun & Wang) is therefore to showcase a particular such
theory or system, argue for its descriptive adequacy, and
from that infer that normativism is indispensible. But
this is not enough: such a strategy only demonstrates
that the theory in question is a good computational-level
(i.e., competence) theory.
The separation of norm and competence is, of course,
crucial for our argument. To “de-normatise” competence
theories, Buckwalter & Stich’s argument from dual pro-
cessing provides us a strong first step. We clarify again
that both levels, competence-computational (what) and
algorithmic-processing (how), are in our opinion indispen-
sible to a descriptivist psychology of reasoning. A descripti-
vist psychology is not just about processing; and conversely,
normativism does not hold a monopoly on computational
analysis. On the contrary, we argue that it is theorists who
insist on equating norm with competence who drive an
unjustified wedge between computational and processing
analysis. For us, the what stops short of the (evaluative)
ought – that the system computes a specific function does
not mean that this function is normatively justified. To
claim otherwise is to invite an is-ought inference.
R2.3. The role of formal theories
Both Pfeifer and Nickerson express concerns about our
depiction of the relation between formal and psychological
theories, believing that we had shown an asymmetric
relationship, in which the main flow appears to be top-
down. Such was not our intention. On the contrary, we
argued, following Marr (1982), that the main type of
relationship, constraints on theory construction, goes
both ways. We are more than happy to concede that the
same goes for inspiration. However, we point out that
inspiration equally holds when formal theories are con-
strued as purely computational. By reclaiming compu-
tational analysis for descriptivism, all we have to lose by
giving up normativism is the evaluative function (and, of
course, several dubious inferences and a handful of
research biases).
We also referred to “formal systems” or “formal the-
ories” as the level relating to computational analysis.
Whereas commentators tended to agree with our
emphasis on the non-instrumental, fundamental, and uni-
versal evaluative nature of normativism, some challenged
our assumptions about normative theories as formal
systems (Schurz; Weinberg). Historically, psychological
theories of higher mental processes have taken their nor-
mative standards from formal systems such as classical
logic or Bayesianism, but we agree with Schurz and
Weinberg that neither formality nor systematicity is
crucial. [As an aside, this would obviate the need to
define what a formal system means (Spurrett), which
we have only done by extensional definition (i.e., by pro-
viding examples).] Instead, we propose that the crucial
feature is the a priori nature of a principle (Pothos &
Busemeyer; Schurz). The same argument we applied to
formal systems is still relevant here: a priori principles
can have a role in a computational level analysis, but
cannot assume a role of fundamental value and yet be
supported by empirical evidence. In practice, of course,
computational level analyses will generally have to draw
upon formal systems for their precision and detail.
R2.4. Distinguishing types of rationality
Lastly for this section, we reopen our classification of other
types of rationality. Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality, the
idea that thinking must be adaptive, proved rather challen-
ging to evaluate. In the target article we classified it as
descriptive, albeit with some misgivings, noting its
“is-ought” inference, and the weakness of avoiding compu-
tational-level theories. (Incidentally, the latter was why –
contrary to Hrotic’s evaluation – we never presented
ecological rationality as the best way to conduct descripti-
vist research.) Thus, we can agree with Schurz that the
“ought” of ecological adaptation seems to lie in-between
an instrumental and evaluative ought, somewhere in the
fuzzy chain connecting instrumental values to increasingly
fundamental values (sect. R2); as Hrotic noted, Gigerenzer
may simply be replacing one norm with another.
Commentators have agreed with us that, unlike other
evaluative oughts in the literature, the ecological ought is
informal rather than formal (Pothos & Busemeyer;
Schurz; Weinberg); however, Schurz and Weinberg
point out that this need not preclude its classification as
normativist, and we have already conceded (in sect.
R2.3) that formality is unnecessary to define normativism.
Moreover, prototypical normativism tends to be absolute
and universal, and, again, ecological rationality proves dif-
ficult to evaluate on that score. While Pothos & Busemeyer
and Schurz emphasise the non-universal nature of individ-
ual heuristics, Weinberg argues, convincingly to our mind,
that true instrumental rationality must be sensitive to the
relative context of the agent and her goals, whereas eco-
logical rationality authors often discuss “fit” or “success”
in general and evaluative terms. All in all, the weight of evi-
dence seems to point in favour of reclassifying ecological
rationality as normativist. At least, as Schurz argues, it is
no less normativist than rational analysis.
Brase & Shanteau argue that massive modularity is a
better descriptivist system than hypothetical thinking
theory (HTT), due to its sensitivity to evolutionary prin-
ciples. This is beside the point of our article, which was
not to promote any particular descriptive account: we
referred to HTT only as an example of a descriptive
theory which nevertheless still draws on formal theories
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for its computational level analysis. It is, however, debata-
ble whether massive modularity, grounded in evolutionary
rationality, is a truly descriptive account. As Weinberg
discusses, ecological rationality cannot be seen as instru-
mental in the absence of sensitivity to the desires of indi-
vidual agents, and genetic goals can dramatically clash with
the goals of the individual (see Stanovich 2004, for a
detailed discussion). So the assumption on a priori prin-
ciples that behaviour ought to be adapted to the environ-
ment in which an organism operates, is arguably
normative, as noted above.
Last, we refer to Simon’s (1982) bounded rationality, in
itself an uncontroversial and widely accepted notion,
which several commentators refer to as a potential basis
for normative analysis (Gold et al.; Hahn; Nickerson).
We have judged bounded rationality to be unproblematic
in terms of normativism, and we see no reason to retract
this. We see bounded rationality as open to a range of
interpretations. With its emphasis on costs and benefits
of cognitive effort, bounded rationality comfortably sits
with instrumental rationality. Bounded rationality can
also serve as a basis for soft versions of normativism dis-
cussed above. However, since bounded rationality means
that relative considerations of cognitive and biological
limits need to be taken into account, it can never fit with
the more radical types of normativism, which rely on uni-
versal and absolute norms.
R3. Epistemic rationality and self-knowledge
A number of commentators (Dutilh Novaes; Proust;
Spurrett; Stanovich; Waldmann; Weinberg) have
implicitly or explicitly raised the issue of epistemic ration-
ality in contrast with the (descriptivist) notion of instru-
mental rationality that we focused on in our target
article. We agree that the topic of epistemic rationality is
an important omission in our account that needs to be rec-
tified. First, we start with some comments about the
nature of epistemic norms.
R3.1. Epistemic norms
Our critique focused specifically on the psychological
study of higher mental processes (although some of it
might be applicable to empirical philosophy as well).
Some of the commentators, however, have addressed the
broader issue of epistemic norms and their justification
(Dutilh Novaes; Proust; Quintelier & Fessler;
Schurz). To clarify, we never argued that epistemic
norms are irrelevant for reasoning – only that it is fruitless
for psychological science to focus on norms, especially
when it actively interferes with the business of conducting
research. As long as norms are kept apart from empirical
evidence (e.g., by acknowledging, as Schurz proposes,
their extra-scientific status), for us there is no issue.
Several commentators have also discussed the role of
epistemic norms as constitutive rules justifying is-ought
inference within the system they define, linking the consti-
tutive function to the regulative one either explicitly
(Achourioti et al.) or implicitly (Fuller & Samuels;
Proust; Waldmann). Constitutive rules are definitional:
they are what the system is about; regulative rules are
deontic: they regiment behaviour. The classic example is
the constitutive rules of chess, which define what chess
is as much as they regulate it. If chess rules are violated,
one is no longer playing chess. Table manners, in contrast,
are purely regulative, as eating exists independently.
Searle (1964) argued that inference from is to ought can
be justified for constitutive rules only and Achourioti
et al., at least, readily accept the moderate relativism it
imposes (see also Stenning & van Lambalgen [2008],
and our discussion of bridge solutions in sect. R2.1).
However, we cannot accept Achourioti et al.’s proposal
that “without an ‘ought’ there can’t be an ‘is’ in the first
place” (the “ought” in question being constitutive ought).
Constitutive rules define what an institution is, not what
it ought to be. Again, we take our example from language.
Word order is a constitutive rule; “kicked Jack ball the” is
not a poor sentence, it is not a sentence at all. This is a
descriptive fact, not an evaluative judgement. In contrast,
double negation is a purely regulative rule: “I don’t know
nothing” is a sentence, albeit a non-normative one and
condemned by linguistic purists. As this example clarifies,
constitutive rules are competence rules, and therefore
descriptive, not normative. Their “ought” is an epistemic
ought rather than a deontic one.
R3.2. Epistemic rationality and normativism
A traditional view of epistemic rationality is that it is truth-
seeking and several of our commentators believe that we
need a normative account of it for this reason (Douven;
Fuller & Samuels; Proust; Spurrett; Stanovich;
Waldmann). As Dutilh Novaes observes, this reflects a
Kantian tradition of logicist philosophy that has been
very influential in psychology and still is, judging by
some of the commentaries. Waldmann, for example, tells
us that people distinguish between true and false beliefs,
rejecting the false ones when evidence requires it – in
the spirit of Popper, it seems. This truth-seeking notion
of epistemic rationality needs to be complemented by a
truth-preserving form of deductive inference (Schurz)
in a traditional logicist theory of reasoning (and science).
However, the latter has already been largely dispensed
with by psychologists pursing the “new paradigm” psychol-
ogy of reasoning (sect. R5), so why not the former? For
example, if we think of people as Bayesian, then we
might expect them to hold all propositions with an infi-
nitely variable degree of belief. Beliefs may not rationally
be held with certainty, however: a prior probability of 0
or 1 remains fixed and cannot be revised in the light of
new evidence. Hence, Bayesian theorists require both a
different normative and computational account of belief
acquisition than do logicists – another example of the
multiple-norm problem.
However, we reject the idea that we need a normative
account of belief at all. Our view is that cognitive represen-
tations are viewed not as veridical, but as being fit for
purpose. They reflect the evolutionary history and instru-
mental needs of the organism. Take the case of the visual
system. It is fallacious to think that there is a “true” picture
of the world which our eyes and brains deliver faithfully to
us. There is a mass of information in light, which could be
interpreted and constructed in many ways. In addition,
our visual systems have clear limitations. Some snakes
have evolved the ability to see infra-red light because
they hunt at night and need to sense heat. We have no
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such facility. To take another example, our episodic
memory system is designed not to preserve memories
but to forget most of them rapidly after a relatively short
interval unless they have great personal significance:
This is adaptive, as generally we need access to the most
recent memories which should not be confused with
earlier ones. Our point is that cognitive representations
are only veridical to the extent and in the manner required
to serve our goals. Using the terms in a descriptive psycho-
logical sense, “epistemic rationality” is subservient to
“instrumental rationality,” and an account of belief-
generating systems is part of the computational account
of human behaviour that cognitive science seeks. As
Anderson (1978) pointed out some years ago, all compu-
tational accounts of cognitive functions constitute rep-
resentation-process pairs. Hence, the problem of
cognitive representations is mopped up in the compu-
tational-level accounts that cognitive scientists provide
for instrumentally rational behaviours.
R3.3. Self-knowledge and self-regulation
Proust argues that epistemic norms are used by reasoners
to regulate their own performance; Waldmann similarly
claims that people view themselves as rational agents
and act accordingly. Achourioti et al. make a similar
claim but on a relativist basis: There can be no single
norm since participants switch between systems and
goals. Achouriori et al. conclude that a descriptivist
account without norms is thus doomed to failure. Simi-
larly, some commentators (Gold et al.; Quintelier &
Fessler; Waldmann) propose moral judgement as a test
case in which the psychology of higher mental processing
cannot proceed without normative judgement. But we
believe there is a fundamental problem with these argu-
ments. We can have a descriptivist account of how
people pursue their own epistemic goals and norms. A
psychological theory of moral reasoning, for example,
may include a good computational description of the func-
tions involved in rendering moral judgement, but this
cannot (and should not!) justify the moral theory in ques-
tion. Put simply, psychology may show how people think
on “right” and “wrong”, but it cannot be used to decide
what is right or wrong.
It is certainly part of our own cognitive theory that
people pursue epistemic goals in the “new mind” (see
sect. R4) and this may indeed involve moral reasoning,
higher order preferences and motivation to be rational
(Stanovich 2008). We fail to see why a descriptivist
account cannot include self-regulation by rules and
systems if that is where the evidence leads us. But such
systems need not be normative in the generally accepted
sense. For example, Bonnefon describes a theory of his
own in which he assumes that people follow folk axioms
of decisions which are non-normative. There are,
however, great difficulties in measuring the actual goals
and rules that guide people’s reasoning, even at the explicit
level. Stanovich points us to evidence that when con-
fronted with their behaviour and a normative explanation,
people will often judge their own performances to be erro-
neous in hindsight. But does this really provide evidence
for the psychological reality of norms?
Unfortunately, people are highly prone to confabulation
and self-deception when it comes to the accounts they
provide of their own thinking (Bargh 2006; Carruthers
2009; Evans 2010b; Wegner 2002; Wilson 2002). As an
example, in one study the experimenters unkindly
suggested to participants that one of several common
incorrect (by the standard norm) solutions to the Wason
selection task was the right answer (Evans & Wason
1976). In all cases, participants confidently agreed that
the proposed solution was correct; not one individual
objected that it was wrong. So the explanation of the
“right” answer offered only has to be plausible and not
actually normative to get the approval of participants
that Stanovich describes.
Thompson also refers us to some of her own recent
work on meta-cognition showing that the feelings of right-
ness that people have in their own judgements and infer-
ences are unrelated to their normative accuracy. The more
fluently and quickly an intuitive response comes to mind,
the more likely people are to be confident in it. But this
fluency may be a function of a non-normative factor
such as the believability of a syllogistic conclusion (Shyn-
karkuk & Thompson 2006). A number of reasoning
studies have allowed participants to give reasons for
their choices, but to our knowledge no participant has
ever declared a known cognitive bias, such as matching
or belief bias, to be the cause of their decision. Instead,
the evidence indicates that people give a reason which
makes their choices appear rational in the context of the
experimental instructions (Lucas & Ball 2005; Wason &
Evans 1975). So, even if people talk as though they were
rationally motivated to follow their own norms and rules,
it will be very difficult to establish that this is what they
are actually doing. For example, a person may justify
their preference to vote for a political party on the basis
of belief in a principle, such as free market economics.
Psychological study may, however, show that the true
cause is something else, for example, identification with
a social group the individual would like to join, and the
stated reason no more than a theory for the behaviour sup-
plied by the media. People are not lying in such cases, but
they are confabulating.
R4. Normativism and descriptivism in
dual-process research
We support a strong form of dual-process theory which is a
two minds theory (Evans 2010b), a development from
earlier dual-system accounts. In this account, an old (intui-
tive) and new (reflective) mind co-exist within the human
cognitive architecture, cooperating and sometimes com-
peting in the control of our behaviour. While emotions
and meta-cognitive feelings arise in the intuitive mind,
we reject any suggestion that emotion should be con-
trasted with rationality, as stated by some dual-process
theorists (Epstein 1994) and perhaps implied by Gold
et al.’s discussion of moral reasoning. Instead, both
minds are, in our sense, instrumentally rational, while
often pursuing different goals by different mechanisms
(see also Stanovich 2004). The old mind evolved early
and combines evolutionary programming with experiential
learning, thus providing a form of instrumental rationality
which we share with many other animals – essentially we
repeat behaviours that have been successful in the past.
New mind rationality can also be seen as instrumental
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but is driven by anticipation of the future, with cognitive
structures that support mental simulations and conse-
quential decision making. Its representations are only
“epistemically rational” in the special sense that we
describe in section R3.2: that is, they must be fit for
purpose, so that their processing helps the new mind to
achieve its goals.
The treatment of rationality within a dual-process fra-
mework is a contentious issue. We argued that it is falla-
cious to equate abstract reasoning and normative
responding with System 2 or Type 2 thinking, and contex-
tualised reasoning and cognitive biases with System 1 or
Type 1 thinking (see also Evans 2008; in press a).
However, some authors continue to do precisely this,
even going so far in some cases as to equate System 2
with the operation of a mental logic (Ricco & Overton,
in press). Although Stanovich focuses on his points of dis-
agreement with us in his commentary, we know from his
other writing that he agrees strongly with us on this
point (e.g., Stanovich, in press). Although favouring a nor-
mative assessment of good reasoning, he nevertheless
agrees that Type 1 processing can sometimes produce
this while a number of conditions are required for Type
2 processing to do so, including perceiving the need for
reasoning, and possessing the necessary cognitive capacity
and “mindware” to achieve it (Stanovich 2010b).
Stupple & Ball provide one cheer for normativism in
their comments about dual process theory. They agree
with us that it is dangerous to infer the presence of Type
1 and Type 2 processing from the normative correctness
of responding, but suggest that norms can play a useful
if limited role in the psychology of reasoning. For
example, under certain conditions normative responding
might be an unambiguous indicator of Type 2 processing
effort. We actually agree with this point, but do not feel
that it endorses normativism in the sense with which we
are generally concerned. While the “new paradigm” psy-
chology of reasoning (sect. R5) employs a number of
methods, the traditional deductive paradigm still has its
uses in a dual-process context. For example, Evans et al.
(2010) compared deductive with pragmatic reasoning
instructions, when people were asked to draw inferences
from causal conditional statements. What was predicted –
and found – was that participants of higher cognitive
ability were more easily able to ignore beliefs and focus
on the logical structure of the problems, but only if given
deductive reasoning instructions. Our interpretation is
that the instruction to draw logically necessary conclusions
provides a need for Type 2 reasoning in order to address a
novel and difficult problem. It has nothing to do with mental
logic – one could get the same effect by giving people
lengthy anagrams, for example. So with due care, as
Stupple & Ball suggest, correct answers by a relevant
norm can sometimes be indicative of Type 2 processing
effort. Thompson, who is highly supportive of the descrip-
tivist approach, also notes in passing a similarly limited but
useful application of norms in reasoning research. None of
this amounts to the kind of evaluative normativism critiqued
in our target article.
Buckwalter & Stich’s comments imply a relativist pos-
ition which they relate to dual-process theory when they
comment that, “If each person’s reasoning is subserved
by two quite different systems, and the second system
varies significantly among individuals and cultures, the
claim that an individual’s reasoning competence must be
normatively impeccable is very implausible indeed.” Of
course we agree, and this makes us all the more puzzled
about Stanovich’s defence of normativism, given that
he, more than anyone, has stressed the importance of
acquired mindware (explicit rules and procedures) for
Type 2 reasoning (e.g., Stanovich 2010b). Indeed, in his
own comment, Stanovich asserts that “normative models
are tools of rationality [that] undergo cultural change
and revision.” But if we view cognitive psychology as a
branch of biology that is concerned with uncovering the
(culturally independent) mechanisms of the human
mind, then the nature of such shifting rules and norms is
only relevant in the limited sense discussed above – as
an indicator of what a motivated individual is trying to
achieve with high effort reasoning.
R5. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning
R5.1. From deduction to probabilistic accounts of
reasoning: The paradigm shift
Sternberg complains about the domination of the deduc-
tion paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, and its irre-
levance to everyday reasoning, commenting that “few
problems of consequence in our lives have deductive or
even any meaningful kind of ‘correct’ solution.” In effect,
he makes a case for one of our proposed research biases:
researchers focus on tasks for which clear norms are avail-
able. He is right that the psychology of deductive reason-
ing has been dominant, although fortunately other kinds
are now receiving more attention, including the study of
inductive inference (Feeney & Heit 2007), causal infer-
ence (Sloman 2005) and counterfactual reasoning (Byrne
2005). What may be less apparent to those outside of the
field, however, is that the deduction tradition itself has
undergone a recent Kuhnian revolution and paradigm
shift. One of the drivers for this was the desire of research-
ers to integrate theoretical ideas about reasoning and
decision making. While Bonnefon discusses this in the
recent context, theorists have been attempting to do this
since the early 1990s (e.g., Evans & Over 1996; Manktelow
& Over 1991; Oaksford & Chater 1994).
The deduction paradigm has also collapsed under the
weight of its own normative system – standard bivalent
logic. As evidence accumulated that much reasoning was
(a) logically erroneous and (b) highly sensitive to content
and context amassed by use of the paradigm, the paradigm
came under attack from within its own ranks. Researchers
criticised logicism for its failure to deliver either an appro-
priate norm or a relevant description of human reasoning
(Evans 2002; Oaksford & Chater 1998a). This eventually
led a number of authors to declare recently that we have
a “new” paradigm psychology of reasoning, freed from
the constraints of logic and the deduction paradigm (see
especially the two recent edited collections of Manktelow
et al. 2011; Oaksford & Chater 2010). The emphasis is no
longer on truth and deduction but on probabilistic and
Bayesian approaches, degrees of belief, and pragmatic
factors. Participants are often asked to draw plausible or
pragmatic inferences or to make direct judgements
about the believability of conditional statements, the
plausibility of conditional advice, and so on. And, as Bon-
nefon points out, researchers are free to focus upon how
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reasoning supports decision making, thus shifting the
focus from truth and epistemic rationality towards action
and instrumental rationality. Researchers are also becom-
ing more interested in informal reasoning (e.g., Stanovich
& West 2007), thus hopefully taking us somewhat closer
towards the everyday reasoning that concerns Sternberg.
The new paradigm is, however, divided on precisely the
issue with which our target article is concerned. While some
contemporary reasoning researchers (e.g., Thompson)
support our critique of norms and evaluative approaches
or advocate great caution in the use of norms (Stupple &
Ball), others (e.g., Stanovich; and now less clearly,
Oaksford & Chater) wish the new paradigm to adopt a
normative framework, albeit no longer restricted to bivalent
logic. By far the most popular alternative is Bayesianism, to
which we now turn.
R5.2. Bayesianism – description or prescription?
Bayesian inference has two big advantages over logicism
for the psychology of reasoning: (1) It permits people to
hold and draw inferences about beliefs with variable
degrees of uncertainty; and (2) it provides direct linkage
between reasoning and decision making. People viewed
as Bayesians would be able to draw upon all relevant
sources of belief and knowledge in order to support conse-
quential decision making. As McNair & Feeney illus-
trate, however, there seems to be some confusion as to
whether the current focus on Bayesian theory is intended
as a prescriptive normative account or merely a descriptive
one.
Oaksford and Chater (2007) appeared explicitly to advo-
cate Bayesianism as a normative system for human reason-
ing, as illustrated in detail in our target article. We, on the
other hand, see Bayesianism as a broadly correct descrip-
tive account of human reasoning and decision making,
without any expectation of precise conformity to its com-
putational rules (Evans 2007; Evans et al. 2008). Broadly
speaking, the evidence indicates that people do represent
degrees of belief, revise these beliefs in the light of evi-
dence, and apply them in their decision making. Perhaps
surprisingly, Oaksford & Chater (in contrast with
Hahn) launch no strong defense of normativism in their
commentary and take the stance that they are in fact
descriptive rather than prescriptive Bayesians, thus avoid-
ing is-ought inference. We are glad to hear it and note that
we had made it quite clear in the target article that we have
no objection in principle either to rational analysis or to
the use of formal, computational theories in the manner
they describe. However, we find it hard to reconcile the
stance taken in their commentary with the numerous
apparently evaluative uses of normative theory in their
earlier writings.
In our view, the new paradigm will gain little from an
approach that simply substitutes Bayesian norms for
those of logic. But we also believe that researchers must
go beyond demonstrations that Bayesianism is a good
descriptive-computational account of aspects of human
inference (Jones & Love 2011) for two reasons. First, an
account of the cognitive processes that can produce such
behaviour is needed at the algorithmic level, as there are
many cognitive mechanisms and constraints to be
studied. A major constraint, for example, is that people
apparently focus on single rather than multiple hypotheses
when engaged in hypothetical thinking and mental simu-
lation (Evans 2007). It should also be noted that there
are areas of psychology where the Bayesian model fails
spectacularly as a descriptive account. Descriptive Baye-
sianism can be hard to refute, since both beliefs and utili-
ties can be assigned subjectively on an individual basis.
However, if we examine a number of pieces of evidence
in sequence, revising our beliefs after each one, it should
make no difference at all to the order in which we see
them (as an example, consider the evidence given to a
jury during a courtroom trial). In contrast, research on
belief updating shows marked primacy and recency
effects on final belief judgements, as much research by
social psychologists has shown. This has led researchers
in this field to dismiss the Bayesian model out of hand
and focus on alternative descriptive accounts (Hogarth &
Einhorn 1992).
Despite the fact that many philosophers find Bayesian-
ism a satisfying or even compelling normative account of
instrumental rationality (see Stanovich’s commentary
and our section R2), we still see little value in prescriptive
Bayesianism in the psychology of decision making. One
might argue (ought to is) that decision makers are
shaped by evolution and learning to be instrumentally
rational, therefore they must be Bayesian and understood
accordingly. But this is an epistemic, “stands to reason”-
type ought, not a deontic one; and moreover, there is no
empirical force to it. Bayesian models fit approximately
well to behaviour in some tasks studied by psychologists
but very poorly in others, as we have mentioned. The
only role that prescriptive Bayesianism can serve in such
circumstances is to enable its advocates to declare behav-
iour irrational and in need of remediation. But this does
not seem to advance theoretical understanding: primacy
and recency effects in belief updating, for example, are
descriptive facts that must be understood with reference
to the relevant cognitive mechanisms. Instrumental ration-
ality in its descriptive sense needs to account for the indi-
vidual agent in her specific epistemic context (as
Weinberg argues in his commentary and we discuss in
R2.4) and her set of (often conflicting) goals. We fail to
see how normative judgement assists this task in any way.
R6. Cognitive variability
No one disputes that human cognition varies broadly and
systematically. The question is what it means for normative
analysis. We find it remarkable that empirical research on
cognitive variability in higher mental processing has
tended to come in two distinct camps. Individual differ-
ences, including developmental differences, tend to be
associated with normativist approaches. Perhaps, as
Dutilh Novaes has commented, this is due to the
Piagetian-Kantian heritage (see our sect. R6.1). In con-
trast, cultural differences were generally taken up by the
camp advocating moderate relativism. Taking full stock
of cognitive variability inevitably leads to at least moderate
normative relativism.
One of the initial reviewers of our target article com-
plained that relativism “stalked the pages,” and Weinberg
identifies an “anti-universalism” argument in the article.
Although we have not explicitly defended relativism (our
target was normativism), we readily concede that
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moderate relativism works well with our critique. It is a
potential consequence, especially if one wishes to keep a
modicum of normative evaluation (sect. R6.2). Relativism
has an undeservedly bad name in cognitive science,
perhaps because many authors focus on the wilder types
of radical relativism – the postmodern, Feyerabend-style
“anything goes.” However, a moderate form of relativism,
one which acknowledges both cognitive universals and
cognitive variation, is not only easier to defend (see Stich
1990; Weinberg 2007), but may well be as indispensible
for a descriptive psychology of human thinking (sect.
R6.1).
R6.1. Individual and cultural differences in reasoning
From a normative point of view, some people reason
better than others, or make better judgements and
decisions. There are a number of factors which underlie
such individual differences. One is age: children’s reason-
ing and decision making changes as they grow older. Per-
formance on the raw score tests that underlie IQ
projections, for example, increases up until about the
age of 16 (actual IQs are age-corrected). Adults vary con-
siderably in IQ, of course (and in working-memory
capacity which is closely correlated); and this is one of
several factors that have been implicated in the ability to
produce normatively correct answers. Another important
source of variation is culture, as an increasing number of
research studies shows important differences in thinking
styles; for example, between individuals in Western and
Eastern societies (Buchtel & Norenzayan 2009).
Stanovich argues that, since norms of rationality are
culturally transmitted tools, the analogy we draw to
language is “inapt.” But the cultural transmission thesis
makes our analogy to language more apt, not less. Cogni-
tive variability is a well-established fact in all areas of
cognition, and in language more than anywhere else –
otherwise, how can there be thousands of different
languages in the world? Even language universals, these
prototypical, hard core cognitive universals, vary in how
they are instantiated in specific languages; and it has
been suggested (Evans & Levinson 2009) that language
diversity far exceeds any universal core. (For normativist
discussions of the analogy to language, see, e.g., Cohen
1981; Stein 1996; for relativist discussions, see Elqayam
2011; Stich 1990.)
For a while, it seemed that normative assessment might
provide a useful tool for dual-process research. In his
earlier individual differences studies, Stanovich (1999;
Stanovich & West 2000a) found many examples of reason-
ing and decision tasks where participants of higher cogni-
tive ability were more able to find correct answers by the
standard norm applied to each task. This was attributed
to their superior ability for System 2 reasoning. But as
Thompson points out, there are multiple possible
causes of correlations between cognitive capacity and nor-
mative performance. These include a disposition for
rational thinking, and the presence of relevant education
and training (Stanovich 2009b; 2010b). In recent research,
identification of exceptions to the correlation of ability
with normative performance has increased and we now
know that many decision biases are fully independent of
cognitive ability (Stanovich & West 2008). Stanovich’s
most recent theory of the mind (Stanovich 2010b) reflects
these multiple requirements for normative responding.
Ironically, in the developmental context, Stanovich (in
press) has recently shown how simplistic and erroneous
are some recent attempts to test dual-process theories of
cognitive development, precisely because they assume
that normativity reflects System 2 thinking. So why has
Stanovich presented a staunch defence of normativism
here? Because, it seems, his goal remains that of account-
ing for good and bad reasoning: he just thinks it is a com-
plicated business. We ourselves have no mixed motives in
critiquing the highly normative traditions of developmen-
tal psychology from Piaget onwards. This tradition is
endorsed by Girotto who remarks that: “If one does not
use normative standards, how could one compare the
answers produced by children of different ages?” The
answer is: by observing what the children actually do, as
we discuss below.
A key feature of dual-process (system, mind) theories is
that humans have a uniquely developed system for general
purpose thinking and reasoning (objections of Brase &
Shanteau noted). This is enabled by the acquisition of
many beliefs, heuristics, and procedures in the new
mind (or System 2) which are dependent upon education
and cultural environment. So, while the object of cognitive
psychology is to uncover the biological mechanism of the
mind, we must always be aware of the culturally deter-
mined nature of much of its contents and sometimes
even its processes. Hence, the importance of cross-
cultural research in determining cognitive universals and
the danger of approaching research with a priori norma-
tive framework which inevitably reflects the culture in
which the researchers themselves were raised. Thinking
about rationality, for example, has very different traditions
in Eastern and Western cultures (Nisbett et al. 2001). We
absolutely agree with Kim & Park that it is most impor-
tant to study individual and cultural differences in a
descriptive psychology of thinking, and to avoid appli-
cation of universal norms in the process. However, we
cannot accept at face value their proposal that cultural
variations preclude any useful generalisation of cognitive
architecture. On the contrary, we argue that cognitive
variability (cultural, individual, historical) is essential to
understanding universal cognitive architecture: without
it, the picture portrayed by theorists may be too limited
(Henrich et al. 2010; Norenzayan & Heine 2005). Con-
sider, for example, Buchtel and Norenzayan’s (2009) pro-
posal that contextualising, holistic thinking might be
acquired in Eastern cultures as the preferred form of
Type 2 thinking. If this is right, it contributes a powerful
evidence against the received view that Type 2 processes
are essentially abstract and decontextualised (Evans, in
press).
From a descriptivist viewpoint, influence of age, intelli-
gence, and culture are observable simply because people
do different things. If this were not the case, the normative
assessments advocated by Girotto and many others could
not differ. The observable change is seen in what people
do: the correctness of the responding is, as always, an
externally imposed interpretation. Such differences in
responding may be quantitative or qualitative. For
example, as children grow older they are able to recall
longer lists of words or digits, which is a quantitative
change. They may also quite suddenly start to take
account of another person’s perspective in responding to
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a theory of mind task: a qualitative change. The same
applies to individual differences in adults and between cul-
tures. In both cases, we can observe what it is that people
do differently without normatively assessing it. It is no
coincidence that the descriptivist approach of cross-
cultural research described by Kim & Park leads often
to discovery of qualitative differences.
We agree with Thompson that a focus on normativity
may lead us into reducing complex processes to binary
measurements, and this danger is particularly strong
when investigating individual and cultural differences. As
a result, qualitative individual differences may be over-
looked. Suppose we empirically observe four ways of
responding, only one of which conforms with the norm
we have in mind? Why is it any less important to under-
stand how each of the other three arise? As an example,
in a study of Bayesian reasoning, Evans et al. (2000)
reported a number of qualitatively different responses;
some participants gave the base rate, some the false posi-
tive rate, some, say, one minus the false positive rate, and
so on. These variations have gone almost totally unnoticed
in the large literature on the base rate fallacy, because
authors time and again focus on normative responding or
its absence. The right/wrong framing has dominated per-
ceptions of findings in this literature, as in so many others.
R6.2. Normative relativism and why the bridge
solution requires it
Normative relativism means that normative evaluation
should be relative to specific agents with their specific
goals and within a specific cultural and historical context
(e.g., Elqayam 2011; Stich 1990). Soft normativism (see
sects. R2.1, R7) often leads to such normative relativism,
as some commentators have readily acknowledged
(Achourioti et al. [and see Stenning & van Lambalgen
2008]; Proust; Weinberg). In particular, normative rela-
tivism is inevitable where soft normativism attempts to
bridge is and ought (sect. R2.2), drawing on constructs
such as reflective equilibrium and constitutive norms.
The evaluative and deontic functions reflected by bridge
constructs draw heavily on cultural and historical context
(Elqayam 2011). Here are a few examples. First, as Stich
(1990) famously argued (and Buckwalter & Stich
remind us), reflective equilibrium can result in a radical,
anything-goes relativism. Moreover, Searle’s (1964) con-
stitutive norms (sect. R3.1) are social institutions, and
depend on cultural context. But the classic example is
the Kantian “ought implies can,” perhaps the prototypical
bridge construct, with its corollaries, “cannot implies not-
ought” (bounded rationality), and “can implies ought”
(principle of charity). Not for nothing did Nickerson
(2008) classify bounded rationality under “relativity.”
“Can” and “cannot” are fuzzy concepts. Ultimately, they
rely on biology and cognitive architecture, but how cogni-
tive architecture is instantiated in individual agents
depends a great deal on cultural and historical context
(Henrich et al. 2010; Norenzayan & Heine 2005). Where
“cannot” implies “not-ought,” the descriptive facts of cog-
nitive variability should force the normativist’s hand to
adopt a position of normative relativism. Where theorists
wish to bridge the “is” with the “ought,” yet avoid the rela-
tivist implications, they allow an inconsistency into their
system.
R7. Descriptivism versus normativism in conduct
of empirical research on thinking
An important issue for us, as well as many of our commen-
tators, is whether normativism helps or hinders the empiri-
cal investigation of human thinking. We argued strongly
for the descriptivist approach in our target article, also
claiming that normativism has biased what we study,
how we study it, and the interpretations of our findings.
Broad or strong support for the descriptive approach can
be found in several commentaries (e.g., Bonnefon;
Sternberg; Thompson), while a small number of others
present robust defences of the use of normativism in
psychological research (Girotto; Hahn; Pfeifer; Stano-
vich). However, a number of other commentators take
the in-between stance that we have described as “soft nor-
mativism.” This is the view that both normativism and
descriptivism have their place in empirical research, and
that while the former can lead to biases it can also be valu-
able (Douven; Hrotic; McNair & Feeney; Nickerson;,
Quintelier & Fessler; Schurz; Stupple & Ball; Sun &
Wang; Waldmann).
Closer examination of these middle ground positions
suggests that they are based on two distinct rationales.
Some authors fully endorse our psychological and descrip-
tive objectives, but think that normativism has neverthe-
less had a useful heuristic value in the conduct of
research; others see it as an essential tool for theory con-
struction. Evidence for heuristic value is that the para-
digms inspired by normativism have led to a number of
important psychological findings (e.g., Stupple & Ball;
McNair & Feeney, perhaps Waldmann). It is hard to
dispute this: Jonathan Evans has spent much of his
career working with the deduction paradigm and would
prefer not to think he was wasting his time. In fact,
Evans (2010a) shows how research on deductive reason-
ing, intended to investigate reflective Type 2 thinking,
actually yielded a wealth of information about Type 1,
intuitive thought. This happened because enough psychol-
ogists were open to what the data were telling them
(although many also were not). As soon as the extent of
logical reasoning biases, content and context effects, et
cetera, became apparent, psychologists started theorising
about them and designing new experiments to test expla-
nations of what were initially seen as cognitive biases. So
much systematic study did lead to important psychological
advances in the end, as well as the eventual abandonment
by many of the original paradigm. So in a sense, it is true in
this case that normativism inspired important empirical
studies. But we very much doubt that it was the most effi-
cient way of doing so. (We also agree with Sternberg that
a number of important kinds of reasoning – of everyday
relevance – were neglected in the process.) In the same
way, we agree that much psychological value came out
of the heuristics and biases research programme inspired
by Tversky and Kahneman (McNair & Feeney) despite
the normativist framing of much of this work.
We assumed, in our target article, the research objec-
tives of cognitive psychology. Of course, psychology does
not have a monopoly on the study of human behaviour
which features in many other disciplines, including econ-
omics, sociology, geography, history, and even the study
of literature. So we are not surprised, and nor do we
object to the fact, that some philosophers wish to study
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human reasoning in order to assess the relevance and
empirical grounding of normative theories (Douven;
Quintelier & Fessler; Schurz; also Hrotic, an anthro-
pologist). We can assure Quintelier & Fessler that we
have no desire to outlaw experimental philosophy. What
does surprise us is the enthusiastic support for empirical
assessment of normative theories from some of the psy-
chologists, such as Nickerson, who insists that we need
to know not only how we reason but how we should
reason. For our part, while we can see that empirical
studies of thinking are of interest to those who earn their
living debating the value of normative theories, such as
logicians and economists, we do not see their objectives
as being directly psychological. For their part, they still
have to solve the problem of is-ought inference.
A second argument for the value of normativism in
psychological research is that a close comparison of the
discrepancy between normative theory and actual behav-
iour is of direct value in constructing psychological the-
ories (Hahn; Nickerson; Oaksford & Chater; Pfeifer;
Waldmann). A general theme is that of iterative refine-
ment of normative theories in the light of psychological
evidence, with an increased convergence between norma-
tive and descriptive accounts (see also Buckwalter &
Stich on reflective equilibrium). Thus, Pfeifer talks
about how the psychology of reasoning has moved on
from bivalent to probability logics, which are now seen
as a much closer approximation of actual human reason-
ing. Hahn describes the iteration involved in ideal obser-
ver analysis and Oaksford & Chater lay out in detail the
research strategy for their rational analysis programme.
We do wonder, however, whether some of these authors
are really talking of competence or computational rather
than normative accounts (see sect. R2). It seems to us
that the force of a normative theory lies in its a priori, eva-
luative oughtness. We cannot imagine, for example, a strict
religious sect with a ban on premarital sex, revising its
dogma in the light of observation of regular deviations in
the behaviour of its young members.
If the process of iteration described by Oaksford &
Chater really means comparing formal computational
accounts to observed behaviour, and iteratively refining
them, then we have no problem at all with rational analy-
sis. It is a method strongly founded in the directive ought,
but need not be evaluative. We just wonder why their
earlier writing on this topic has needed to emphasise
good and bad reasoning in the way it has. The same prob-
ably applies to some other critical commentators, such as
Pfeifer and Sun & Wang, who talk of the value of devel-
oping alternative normative theories on the basis of their
favoured empirical research paradigm. If that is really
what they are doing, then they are committing is-ought
inferences which are hard to defend. But if, instead,
they are developing improved computational accounts of
the processes, drawing on available formal theories as
they do so, then we do not have a problem with this, as
we made quite clear in our target article.
R8. Conclusions
We think it important that researchers in any field of
science raise their heads above the parapets of their para-
digms from time to time, and reflect more broadly on what
they are doing. Our purpose was to stimulate such head-
raising for those engaged in the psychological study of
reasoning and decision making: fields which, while pur-
portedly signing up to the methods and objectives of the
much wider field of cognitive psychology, also have a
history of application of normative theory that sets them
apart. We are grateful to the number of colleagues who
have taken the time to comment and note the considerable
diversity in the views expressed. Whether or not we
succeed in moving the field towards a more descriptivist
approach, we hope at least that we have raised conscious-
ness of the important issue of normativism in these fields,
and that researchers will think a little more carefully and
clearly about what they are doing, following this lively
and informative debate.
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